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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTORS

We are extremely proud to present our fifth issue of the Boise State McNair Scholars Research Journal. This journal is representative of the many accomplishments of our Scholars over the last two years and demonstrates the impressive achievements that result from serious collaborative efforts. These Scholars worked many hours in seminars with staff, with faculty mentors and each other in order to do the work necessary to turn graduate school into a reality in their lives.

This year’s graduates, as those of the past, have maintained a high standard for themselves. Their dedicated work has translated to high levels of success for our program which to date has delivered more than 75% of our Scholars to excellent graduate programs. It is fitting that all this effort culminates in deserved recognition of their work through this McNair Scholars Journal. We are especially proud to see the myriad ways these students have grown as researchers and scholars.

We also extend gratitude to faculty whose guidance and support has allowed our Scholars to grow in meaningful ways, while giving them the foundation to enter graduate school with confidence and solid research experience.

Gregory Martinez    David Hall

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOB KUSTRA

Congratulations to all of the 2009 McNair Scholars for your achievements over the past year. In particular, I want to acknowledge the hard work and accomplishments of the senior Scholars whose research is represented in the papers in this publication. The papers contained in this volume represent a remarkable breadth of scholarship and mark the culmination of an extensive research experience for these promising academic talents at Boise State. I also want to recognize and thank all of the faculty mentors who have worked with our McNair Scholars. It is your patience, guidance, and encouragement that facilitates the transformation of these students into scholars.

The Ronald E. McNair Post-Baccalaureate Achievement Program honors the memory and achievement of the late Dr. Ronald E. McNair, a physicist and NASA astronaut. Its goal is to encourage undergraduates from underrepresented backgrounds to emulate the academic and professional accomplishments of Dr. McNair by facilitating their pursuit of doctoral degrees and academic careers in teaching and research. The research presented here signals the arrival of a new group of rising scholars who will carry their talents, enthusiasm, and hard work ahead into graduate programs here and across the country. The research and other experiences you have had as undergraduates and McNair Scholars at Boise State University are your first critical steps on this path. As you graduate and move on, I hope that you will continue to aspire, achieve, and pursue your dreams.

Again, Congratulations and Best Wishes,

Bob Kustra
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Democratic Elitism in the Name of Participatory Democracy:
A Critical-Theoretical Analysis of State Supported “Publics” in Brazil

Christian Belden: McNair Scholar

Dr. Ed McLuskie: Mentor

Communication

Abstract

The discourse of participation in and about Brazil has contributed to the wider discourse of the public sphere. As an occasion to revise the general concept of the public sphere, it carries its own limitations as well. The public sphere is an arena where citizens come together to discuss matters of general interest and through this discussion are then able to influence the state. The concept public sphere is a challenged concept and is often called exclusive and “unrealistic.” One scholar revises this challenged concept, Leonardo Avritzer, author of Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America. Avritzer’s revision claims to take the revision further in the direction of participatory, democratic publics. Yet it adds an administrative dimension to the public sphere that is problematic both conceptually and practically. It allows for state control of the public sphere in the name of “accountability” and “democratic elitism.” The paper offers a critique of such a revision by showing that accountability means elite governance through a reduction of participation to administered publics as a false “necessity.”

Introduction

The concept “public sphere” is a historically produced idea. In other words, it’s a concept with a historical reason. However, concepts become ways to read history. This makes debates surrounding the concept public sphere relevant to historical and empirical analyses of the “public sphere.” When concepts of the public make the notion of “participation” less and less relevant, consequences from concept to practice shrink to segments of society for whom participation already has been achieved. This has happened in a particular revision of the concept which stresses administrative issues, a conception leading to an administrative public sphere in the case of a Brazilian adaptation of Habermas’s conception to Brazilian communities.

The question then becomes whether an administrative public sphere aimed at “participatory publics” can actually achieve participation when the majority of a potential public realm is dominated by political elites whose experiences with processes of participation have been restricted to the privileged. I argue that incorporating an administrative element from the ranks of elites into the public sphere can set up the range of possible deliberative outcomes in advance of any majorities allowed to “participate.” This can be seen in the theory that still privileges the educated and the wealthy in Brazil, where an otherwise promising practice of community budgeting works not only with monetary allocation, but the allocation of permissible deliberation already defined from above and beyond the community at hand. Addressing the issue of participation requires reviewing the history of the public sphere in Brazil.

Historically Brazil has been a country with few bureaucratic mechanisms in place and little to no participation in governing by a vast majority of its citizenry. The lack of an established bureaucracy can be traced back to the colonization of Brazil by Portugal, which persisted for nearly three centuries until the early part of the nineteenth century (Kohli, p. 422). After the establishment of a sovereign Brazilian nation in 1825, the country experienced industrialization through the duration of the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth century, followed by the creation of a “centralized modern Brazilian state” during the 1930’s and 40’s (Kohli, p. 153). The creation of the modern state did not, however, give people the freedom to elect officials or participate more readily in politics in general. The forty years following, the so-called modernization of the Brazilian state, were plagued with constant regime change occurring through military coups until 1985, when Brazil elected its first
The expansion of the public sphere in Brazil worked in light of the extension of participation to the *hoi polloi*, which elected its first majority democratic government half-way through the decade of the 1980’s. Brazil’s history of marginalization and repression of the public is an interesting place for the expansion of the public sphere and increased participation because of the limited time in which there has been a majority elected democratic republic. Yet Brazil in spite of its history of colonialism, oppressive regimes, and, most recently, democratic elitism can flourish because of the extension of the right to vote and in some municipalities budgeting decisions to the majority of the citizenry (Nylen).

Greater participation is possible at the level of the nation-state in Brazil; however, “the very poor” have not gained influence because their basic needs are not being met (Souza, p. 180). This keeps the majority of the population either unwilling or unable to participate in the political process (Oxhorn). For these marginalized citizens the willingness to participate is overshadowed by other more important needs, such as food, shelter and overall security. The cost of participating for marginalized groups is not worth losing the basic necessities. In other words, participation in the democratic processes at the level of the nation-state is not worth the effort for marginalized groups because the cost of doing so means they may not be able to feed their family. As Fraser says, “Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or words to express their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not heard” (p. 119). The problem is exacerbated by the domination of political elites in the public realm because they are serving their private interest rather than the public’s interests.

However, the discourse of participation in and about Brazil can contribute to the wider discourse of the public sphere. The implementation of economic programs like participatory budgeting, under citizen control, is precedent for incorporating the voices of citizens throughout Brazil and as the discursive interaction with one another. This makes Brazil an occasion for exploring prospects for the concept of the public sphere in its participatory dimensions of discursive decision-making.

Yet the occasion to revise the general concept public sphere, such as a participatory budgeting program, carries limitations for the concept of participatory publics, especially the administrative nature of the concept-in-practice. The notion of “participatory publics” *vis-à-vis* “participatory budgeting” highlights an administrative dimension to the public sphere that is problematic both conceptually and practically. That is the claim of this research project. It requires a review of the debate over the concept “public sphere” itself.

Many scholars have challenged the concept public sphere. One important challenge contains the critique of “participation” on the score of authenticity. The critique is a friendly critique for the concept “public sphere,” and makes claims about its exclusive and “unrealistic” dimensions. Nancy Fraser claims that Jürgen Habermas’ bourgeois conception of the public sphere fails to account for alternative public spheres—e.g. plebian spheres (Fraser). Leonardo Avritzer, whose concept of “participatory publics” is applied directly to Brazil, revised the concept of the public sphere in an administrative direction. Avritzer, author of *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America*, claims to take the revision further in the direction of participatory, democratic publics. This paper shows that Avritzer offers a perspective on “realism” that allows for state control of the public sphere even while pluralizing, as Fraser does, the concept of the public sphere. Avritzer’s stress on “accountability” and his analysis of “democratic elitism” do much more than revise the concept of the public sphere. Avritzer’s revision means that accountability invites elite governance through a reduction of participation to administered publics. Considering “accountability” as a managerial practice, this paper calls for an examination and critique of an overly administrative conception of the public.

Participation by citizens should not be limited to discussing what to do with allocated funds from the state. Limiting the participant’s communicative interaction with one another to budgeting matters sets the stage for control of the public realm by elites who understand the processes of participation. Moreover, Avritzer’s revision of the public sphere’s position from its designated space between private citizens and the state and repositioning it between the market and the state reduces the public sphere to an arena where transactions occur. Finally, the aim of the administered public sphere, “participatory publics,” is greater participation. However, theoretical and pragmatic
issues occur when an administrative element is presented as necessary in the name of efficiency, speed and time. This requires consideration of the meaning and role of “participation” in the idea of the public sphere.

The Idea of Participation in the Concept of the Public Sphere

Although Habermas’ concept of the public sphere has been contested and debated by multiple scholars, most notably in Habermas and the Public Sphere Calhoun (1992), it is particularly useful to use the framework drawn from the historical context of the French, British, and German bourgeois spheres, to note themes of participation as they are drawn from that history. Additionally, the concept public sphere provides a way to read and debate that history.

Habermas writes about the transformation of the public sphere in these countries as a progression from a space where citizens were subjected to the rule of the monarchy, to one of participation within a public space. Habermas’ concept of the public sphere begins with a description of how it was transformed from one of rule by the state to that of a public body situated between the private citizens and the state. He explains that the public sphere during the medieval period “referred to the ‘representative’ court of a prince endowed with authority” (Habermas, 1974, p. 52). Moreover, the public realm was not used for deliberation amongst citizens about the common good, but rather as a space where the rulers displayed their power before people. However, in the eighteenth century, private individuals, who once were subjected to the authority of the monarchy, now comprised a public body that could make demands on the state with consequences reflecting their interests. “The public space establishes a dynamic within politics driven neither by the defense of particularistic interests nor by the attempt to concentrate power with the aim of dominating other individuals” (Avritzer, p. 41). Habermas calls this newly formed body of private individuals the bourgeois public sphere.

The formation of this new liberal model became the medium for public discussion and was unique “without historical precedent” (Habermas, 1989, p. 27). Once this transformation took place private autonomous citizens “claims to power vis-à-vis public authority were thus directed not against the concentration of power which was to be ‘shared’” (Habermas, 1974, p. 52). In turn this allowed the newly formed public body the freedom to assemble and through the “vehicle of public opinion” was able to “put the state in touch with the needs of society” (Habermas, 1989, p. 31). However, the needs of society in the bourgeois conception of the public sphere only applied to affluent men.

The bourgeois conception “assumes that a public sphere is or can be a space of zero degree culture” (Fraser, p. 120). This is problematic because the citizens participating in the public sphere are not of equal status in society. Moreover, in theory a democratic society is assumed to be a place where all citizens are free to participate in the political system, the citizens are more often than not given the opportunity to share their views without actually being heard. This happens according to Fraser because of the “bracketing of inequalities” (p. 120).

The occurrence of this type of bracketing sets aside the differences of the participants. Discourse in the public sphere thus depends on neutralizing differences when discussing matters of general interest. This is complicated because what is a matter of general interest to one person may not be to another: the communicating subject as a subject with interests is at risk of disappearing as well. Furthermore, the differences are the driving force of discourse in the public sphere, but when bracketing occurs a power dynamic is created. In turn, this creates a wall between the bracketed participants. This shapes the way the dialogue will go by creating an unseen barrier between the participants. The barrier is what keeps the interlocutors from participating in discourse in their own interests. Thus it is difficult to know what actually constitutes the public sphere (Habermas, 1992, p. 447). Where does this discursive interaction take place (Fraser)? Do coffee shops, the Internet, or town halls allow for such discourse? The presence of a potential space is here, but authority restricts usage of this space.

For example, in Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil the use of a town hall to discuss budgeting matters is one space that is used by citizens to discuss what to do with the allocated money from the state (Novy & Bernhard). However, a facilitator appointed by the municipality monitors this space. The appointment of a facilitator is problematic because these public meetings are meant to be a space for deliberation without influence from the state. This space is available to use for discursive interaction, but it is not free from the backflow of state influence on the process of deliberation about the budget. In addition, actual dissidences among the participants are restricted to monetary allocation as it is given by the state.

The concept public sphere is often co-opted in the name of democratic participation by political elites because they understand the inner-workings of the system better than the average citizen. The co-optation of this space affords the political elites an opportunity for un-due influence on the discussions in the public realm. Adding an administrator at the public level then compromises the public sphere. Furthermore, administration in the public sphere deprives the participants of an arena for discursive interaction amongst citizens. In this case the public
sphere is being reconciled with democratic theory through the creation of the concept called, “participatory publics” (Avritzer, p. 52).

The Discourse about Brazil as an Occasion to Revise the Concept “Public Sphere”

The claim of this paper is that revisionist tendencies take us further away from the concept public sphere in the name of increased democratic participation through administration. The revision of this concept to include an administrative element is both problematic practically and conceptually; practically because of the implanted administrator in the processes of deliberation; and conceptually because the ideal nature of the public sphere is “lost in translation” from that of influence to one of “authentic” participation in the name of accountability. Authenticating participation via administrative supervision in the public realm does not, however, afford greater participation to the majority of the citizenry. This is where the revision in the name of increased participation i.e., “participatory publics” takes what it wants from the concept “public sphere.” Figure 1 taken from *Democracy and the Public Space*, by Avritzer, compares the two concepts and shows the administrative nature of the participatory publics.

![Diagram of Public Sphere Concepts](image)

Figure 1.
Participatory publics can be defined in part by exploring distinct characteristics of the public sphere. As mentioned in the first section of this paper, the public sphere is a discursive space where people gather to discuss matters of general interest. This arena is no longer bound by physical dimensions, but rather is bound only by people’s willingness to participate in discursive action with one another. Avritzer explains the public sphere space as a place where individuals interact and “debate the actions taken by the political authorities, argue about moral acceptability of private relations of domination, and make claims against the state” (p. 40). To be clear the public sphere is not synonymous with the state, they are interconnected pieces with the public sphere’s function being one of influence on the state. People’s participating equally infers that they want to or have the education to participate, coupled with the importance of finding their voice and expressing it.

When people participate equally within the public sphere, it affords them the opportunity to acknowledge differences amongst community members through affirming the cultural distinctiveness of the members of the community. Once this has been established a new participatory network is created, which allows the participants to come to collective decisions about matters that “systemic actors would like to keep private” (Avritzer, p. 48).

However, systemic actors are able to influence the deliberations in the public sphere by conflating democratic theory and the public sphere with the intermediary conception participatory publics. Avritzer admits that conflating “deliberative decision-making with public administration” is exactly what the theory of the public sphere seeks to avoid (Avritzer, p. 52). However, it is exactly what Avritzer does with his concept “participatory publics.”

Participatory publics act as an intermediary to transform, as Avritzer puts it, the theory of the public sphere from one that seeks to increase democratic participation into a “truly democratic and deliberative theory” (p. 52). By conflating these two areas the public sphere is no longer the intermediary between the private citizens and the state, but rather a space that is fused with administration. This fusion does not allow for unmediated discussion amongst individuals in the designated public space, which often leads to the public sphere being used as a place for politicians to influence the decision-making of the general public.

To give a better picture of what participatory publics entail Avritzer lays out the four key elements of this concept.

- First participatory publics operate at the public level through the formation of mechanisms of face-to-face deliberation, free expression, and association. These mechanisms are meant to address specific elements in the dominant culture by identifying problematic issues and placing them on the political agenda.
- Second, social movements and voluntary associations address contentious issues by introducing alternative practices that are compatible with human rights.
- Third, participatory publics preserve a space for administrative complexity while challenging the exclusive access of technicians to decision-making fora. They strike this balance by reserving the right to monitor the implementation of their decisions.
- Fourth, the deliberations of these publics are bound up with the search for institutional forms capable of addressing the issues raised at the public level (p. 136)

These four elements that constitute participatory publics explain how participatory publics and the public sphere are conjoined. However, the first element directs the public’s discourse in light of themes provided by the dominant culture. Focusing on face-to-face deliberation and free expression avoids the question of freedom to advance interests not necessarily of the dominant culture. Moreover, the restriction to face-to-face associations rules out possible public participation virtually, via other media of communication. Matters of general concern may not be discussed, even though the public sphere is “an instance of open-ended and public–spirited communication” (Baiocchi, p. 55).

Communication in the general interest is difficult to achieve, especially with Avritzer’s positioning of the public sphere between the market and the state rather than between the private citizens and the state. How are citizens who have nothing to do with the market supposed to have a voice in the public sphere if it is situated between the market and the state and not between private citizens and the state? The concept public sphere is co-opted in this way, and is used in favor of a few private citizens for financial gain. The market is not private citizens, but a place where financial transactions take place. So if the public sphere is positioned between the market and the state the transactions that occur on the market level are taken to the public level, then the discursive process in the public sphere is transformed to fit the discussion about what to do with the ideas on the market level. This replaces private citizens with the market and policies are made to benefit the few who understand how the public sphere can be used for financial gain. This is historically familiar in Brazil. The lack of participation by the general public has at best a tenuous or failed separation between the state and the public. Throughout the history of Brazil it has been difficult if not impossible for marginalized citizens to participate. In turn, this takes the control out of the hands of
the majority and puts it in the hands of the elite. This creates a separation according to Oxhorn (2001) between the majority of the population and the political elite who have been put in power by influential societal actors. Although the idea of participation is extended to the mass majority full participation is only achieved by the few who have the proper education and the money to affect the laws being made. What this creates is a marginalization of the majority of the population.

Accessing the public sphere is difficult for marginalized groups because of the transformation that needs to take place. Guidry and Sawyer (2003) contend that modern democracies take into account the power relationships that challenge the promises of democracy; however the problem is encountered in democracy because the idea promises more than it can deliver. Democracy gives the impression that it is able to empower groups and ordinary people, but since democracy’s inception and implementation more than 200 years ago this has not been the case. Democracy has been employed by affluent men to train the public to follow and accept the laws that are made for the “benefit” of the majority. In addition Francois Furet (1998) says that “one is necessarily struck by the gap between expectations that democracy arouses and the solutions it creates for fulfilling them”, the fulfillment of the democratic promise is elusive for most (p. 66). In spite of this, as the marginalized public gathers in these social spaces, are able to communicate with community members and with political elites, it is possible for the public sphere to be dramatically altered.

However, altering the public sphere does not mean adding an administrative element. Although, Avritzer suggests participatory publics moves the country away from democratic elitism, the concept leaves us with the notion that a facilitator is necessary to ensure the decisions being made at the public level are carried out at the administrative level.

**Democratic Elitism vs. Participatory Democracy**

Democratic Elitism is a top down approach to governance (Faulks). It is a hegemonic approach to governance because it gives the general public the idea that they are participating while they are simply choosing between elite-defined options. The opportunity to vote provides citizens with the misconception that they are putting candidates into office that, in return, will create policies for the benefit of the people. The elected delegates are chosen on the promise that they will represent the people and the needs of the community. In reality the elected officials do not necessarily use their positions in politics to create policies to benefit the majority that elected them. Instead, some politicians create policies to benefit a few constituents who funded their campaigns.

Moreover, this top down approach allows clientelism to dominate the landscape of politics (Roniger & Güneş-Ayata). This creates a “patron-client” relationship that is perpetuated by the political leaders promising goods and services to the masses, in exchange for votes (Norris). This creates a “debt-peonage” relationship, in that, if the general public no longer votes for the officials then it is possible the goods and services supplied by the politician will no longer be available (Burns). This marginalizes the citizen’s participation in the public space to that of voter rather than participator. This restricted access to the public space does not afford the hoi polloi much say over what policies are being made. However, by restructuring the way people participate in the political process it is possible to combat this approach to democracy.

Participatory democracy can be characterized by the ability and willingness of individuals to engage with political actors in the democratic process. The participants have a sense of “personal responsibility to struggle against systemic exclusion and domination” and believing that one can be successful against this domination (Nylen, p. 28).

Advocates for participatory democracy claim that this is a form of “empowerment.” Meaning that through participation people are able to stand up for what they believe in. This opportunity is not one that is easily taken, especially in countries where authoritarian regimes have been the mainstay or where participation is limited to that of voter for specific politicians who in turn are given the responsibility of following through on their promises made during campaigning.

Political debate in the public sphere should “foster deliberation” that will increase the chance of arriving at legitimate, rational, or true decision (Bohman, p. 6). Similarly this should provide the basis that holds the persons in positions of political power accountable to implement the policies that have been reached by consensus. The private citizen has the ability to influence the laws being made, but this is problematized when the agreement reached in the public sphere is disregarded by the state.

A key aim of participatory publics is to combat the resistance of the state to act on decisions made in the public realm. One program that employs the concept of participatory publics is participatory budgeting.
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre

Participatory budgeting is fundamentally popular meaning that the participants are mostly community members who do not hold legislative positions. “It is an “instrument of empowerment” through participation by social actors within the public space who now become politically active and aware of the implications of not participating (Nylen, p. 60). Through this newfound level of participation community members “represent the broader interests of their neighborhoods, their associations, and of people ‘like them’” (Nylen, p. 60).

However, it can be needlessly “antagonistic to the legislative body and to existing representative organizations in civil society” (Nylen, p. 91). The large majority of citizens do not participate and the few that do participate do so minimally and therefore the idea that participatory budgeting is considered one of popular participation is actually not true. Furthermore, most average people don’t have the knowhow or the capacity to understand such matters as complicated as “budget-making” and nonelites are not capable of participating in “political decision-making” (Nylen, pp. 94, 119).

Wampler & Avritzer (2004) explain participatory budgeting as a “deliberative format that incorporates citizens into a yearlong decision-making process based on the negotiation and deliberation of public goods” (p. 299). This means that ordinary citizens play a vital role in deciding what will happen with part of the budget. Within the process of decision-making participants are responsible for making suggestions and “ranking of the proposed projects” (Novy & Bernhard, p. 2028). Participants choose what is important to them through discursive interaction with one another. Participatory budgeting is a type of decision-making system in which citizens have the authority to vote on general revenue streams and on specific policy outlays. Participatory budgeting programs create public decision-making formats that enable citizens to engage in policymaking. These institutions explicitly seek to enhance accountability, curtail corruption, end arbitrary allocation of public resources, and overcome the disempowering legacies of clientelism (Fung & Olin Wright, ; Koonings, ; Melucci & Avritzer).

One of the main issues with participatory budgeting is that this is still a government sponsored proceeding, meaning that the state allocates the money to the municipalities, which is controlled by the local government, and then taken to the local town hall where the voluntary associations and private citizens meet and discuss what to do with the budget (Goldfrank & Schneider).

Conclusions

The public sphere in Brazil took on a similar transformation as the bourgeois public sphere did in France, England and Germany. Under the rule of the monarch the public realm was an arena for the princes, kings, or queens endowed with authority to display their power before the people. However, the transformation that took place in Brazil differs from that of the afore mentioned countries in that the sovereignty granted to Brazil in the middle of the 19th century did not spawn a bourgeois class that was capable of coming together to discuss matters of general interest for the community. This occurred for many reasons, most notably because of the enormity of the country of Brazil and the unequal distribution of resources throughout the country (Kohli).

However, the expansion of the public sphere in Brazil can contribute to the wider discourse of the public sphere because of the historical context from which it was formed. In other words, it is historically significant because of the extension of participation to the majority of its citizenry with the first election, by majority, of a democratic republic in 1985.

Participatory publics has the ability to extend greater participation to citizens throughout the state of Brazil, but falls short of achieving greater participation because of the inability to incorporate citizen’s voices in matters other than the budgeting process. Often times the budgeting meetings are overtaken by discussions about more pressing matters in the community unrelated to the participatory budgeting process. An example of this can be seen in one such meeting in a poorer region of Porto Alegre. In this poorer region the participatory budgeting meeting was used to voice concerns about matters that were more important to the community than discussing what to do with the year’s allocated funds from the state.

In one meeting mothers were upset about the school shooting that occurred the day prior and that took precedent over how to distribute the budget. The facilitator is supposed to keep the participatory budgeting meetings on track by sticking to the agenda, but even with the facilitator present community concerns override the budget.

If the administrator was taken out of this process community members could use this space for discussion about what is important to them and then influence the state. The mothers, through discursive interaction at this participatory budgeting meeting decided to demonstrate at the police station the next day and demand that a police
officer be placed at the school to ensure the safety of their children (Baiocchi). Even with an administrator present it is still difficult to keep the participatory budgeting meetings on task, when concerns about community issues take precedence over the budget.

Participatory publics are a good starting point for increasing participation from the general public and more importantly marginalized groups. However, to say that this is a good stopping point for participation is false. Avritzer is not claiming that administrative public spheres are the end of the line for participation, but with the concept of participatory publics and in the case of Brazil, the municipal program in Porto Alegre, it is easy to see that elites are capable of running over the groups that struggle to understand the processes aimed at participation. Understanding the process of budgeting is difficult for people who are well-educated and have the resources, stability and understanding of the workings of the budgeting process. For those who struggle to survive daily it is challenging, if not impossible to concern themselves with the budget because of they lack the basic necessities.

The bourgeois conception of the public sphere is a contested concept because it does not account for “subaltern” spheres and two because it is seen as unrealistic and ideal (Eley, p. 321). However, if the liberal model of the public sphere is viewed from its historical perspective it can be seen as something to strive for or an idea that is useful for reading history. Taken out of context the concept public sphere can be claimed to only be useful for explaining how affluent landowning men were able to participate within the public realm.

“The public sphere is central to reconstructing a participatory conception of democracy…it provides a framework that overcomes the elite-masses dichotomy” while striving for greater participation from the majority (Avritzer, p. 48).

Greater participation is the aim of concept public sphere as participatory publics. However, an administered public creates a sphere that can be infiltrated by the state in the name of increased participation, through requiring of participation restrictions of efficiency, speed, and time.
References

Legitimating Torture: How Similar Ideologies of the United States in the War on Terror and the French in Algeria Led to Torture

Brian Lawatch: McNair Scholar

Dr. David Walker: Mentor

History

Abstract

The United State’s effort to win the war on terrorism by spreading democracy served to legitimize torture by circumventing international and domestic laws, creating ambiguity and confusion among members of the United States military. France too, in the French-Algerian War of 1954-1962 used torture in the name of spreading the benefits of French civilization. This study discusses the role of ideology by comparing similarities between France and the United States in terms of each nation’s world views. Ideology is discussed in the creation of laws legitimizing torture and how government officials came to decisions that allowed for abuses to happen. Winning these wars was considered so important that both the French and U.S. governments either created or interpreted laws in a way that allowed for torture. Government investigations are examined, revealing the role of ideology in the reports and how that effected recommendations for punishment for those culpable in torture acts. French bias is revealed, showing a strong desire to promote the torture activities, believing the methods to be effective. U.S. reports reveal a desire to fix the problem but do not investigate the roots of the abuse, for fear of losing the moral ideological authority of carrying out its wars. Ideology affected the judgment of individual soldiers in both conflicts. Confusion among the soldiers and their sense of duty to their nation affected the decision to engage in torture, sometimes believing it to be government policy to abuse prisoners in order to stop future attacks. Lastly, public perception of torture has affected how these wars are remembered. Thus, the experience of France in the Algerian War of 1954-1962 and its use of torture should have been a warning to the United States of how a well-meaning ideology can deny people the values those ideologies are said to promote.

Introduction

When pictures of torture at Abu Ghraib became revealed to the public in 2004, the United States faced a crisis of conscience. How could the United States, a nation which prided itself on being a beacon of liberty be responsible for such blatant human rights violations? Was it simply the irresponsibility of a few undisciplined soldiers or symptomatic of a much larger problem, reaching up the chain of command to the highest levels in government? What were the signs that the use of torture might create the large moral and very public dilemma the US has been faced with? One answer to these questions may be found in the comparative history of France during its own crisis concerning torture of Algerians during the French-Algerian War from 1954-1962. France was faced with an insurgent terrorist group that fought against them and horrified the French loyalists in Algeria. They named themselves the *Front de Libération Nationale.* Similar ideologies that promote the spread of a certain way of life have been parts of the foreign policy of both France and the United States. This desire to spread Western democratic institutions by way of force often hit snags on the path because of its inherent hypocrisy. The use of torture became the result of an ideology in the name of good intentions. That tradition of going out into the world with the intention of spreading cultural values in the name of democracy and liberty had proven very difficult for the French in Algeria. When leaders of the United States chose to conduct the “War on Terror” in an expansive manner meant to promote peace and democracy, methods became employed contrary to the values of the mission, which in turn counteracted the intended outcome. Torture became one of the results of such a single-minded ideology. One specific precedent that should have been paid attention to more closely by the U.S. government, military, and public domain was the experience of the nation of France and its use of torture during the French-Algerian War from 1954-1962.

1 National Liberation Front is hereafter referred to as the FLN.
The ideological missions of both France and the United States have some very striking similarities. This may explain why both nations have justified certain actions in the name of their ideologies. In this case, the accepted use of torture extends from the spreading of certain Western values in a way that undermines those values. France made the mistake of fighting against a population in the name of Algérie française.5 The United States is fighting what it calls the “Global War on Terror” in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere with initial stated proposes of creating a “transition from dictatorship to democracy” in those nations assumed to sponsor terrorism.3 However, attempting to establish democracies by use of military force has its own contradictions.

The “War on Terror” has been fought in an expansive manner with undefined borders. It is not a country being fought, but a practice of doing things, much like the “War on Drugs” or “War on Poverty.” Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the main focus of abuse and torture in the “War on Terror” is the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq, the memorandums which gave rise to abuse, and the subsequent investigations afterward. Also, the similarities to be found when compared to the French in Algeria are much more striking in the detention facilities and the insurgency in Iraq. Places like Guantanamo Bay are far from the battlefield and those conducting interrogations are also far from the battlefield—physically and mentally. That is a basis for future research. The “War on Terror” is a wholly different type of war with different standards for the handling of detainees in an era of greater scrutiny for nations conducting counterinsurgency warfare. It is those common soldiers who faced the day to day operations with insurgents, who may have just returned from a dangerous convoy, who have the most in common with French soldiers and policemen in Algeria.

One of the best histories of the French-Algerian War is Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962.4 This book served as the basis for a good background of the conflict in general. Additionally, it unintentionally pointed out many of the similarities between France’s effort to keep Algeria and the United State’s determination in the war on terror. Many of the parallels are pointed out by Thomas E. Ricks, who said the author “wrote passages about the French in Algeria that could describe the U.S. military in Iraq,” even though the book was written years before in 1977. Ricks carefully points out that there are “huge differences between the two wars,” which is important to clarify. “The United States isn’t a colonial power in Iraq, seeking to maintain a presence of troops and settlers as long as possible. Rather, in Iraq, victory would consist of getting U.S. personnel out while leaving behind a relatively friendly, open, stable and independent government.”5 But the similarities drawn from a reading of A Savage War of Peace are nonetheless striking. Additionally, President Bush was reading this same book in 2007 to better understand the conflict in Iraq.6 He even had the author over at the White House for advice, based on his expertise.7

Similarities in how torture came to be practiced by both France and the United States have been discussed in very recent historiography. Neil MacMaster, in “Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghraib” discussed the overall similarities on the paths toward torture and the consequences each nation faced.8 The overall approach he took is a good step in promoting further research into these similarities. However, a more specific look at the ideological aspect of the use of torture can help people to understand how a rational justification can become part of the reason individuals and groups resort to torture. Sociologist Marnia Lazreg, in Torture and the Twilight of Empire, describes how torture by the French “was part and parcel of an ideology of subjugation that went beyond Algeria’s borders.”9 Torture was front in center much of the focus of that ‘subjugation.’ In the last chapter, she ties it in with the events of the War on Terror. Lazreg states that “wars of occupation share one thing: They seek to disguise material and strategic interests as either a ‘civilizing’ or a democracy-disseminating mission.”10 While the role of

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2 The term Algérie française translates to “French Algeria,” the desire to keep Algeria an integral part of France.
10 Lazreg, 259-260.
the ‘civilizing’ mission does help to ‘disguise material and strategic interests,’ she fails to note that there may be a
genuine interest in lifting up those who the French and the United States have both occupied. It is not as simple as
the black and white approach that Lazreg proffers. Instead, given the nature of democracies and the availability of
dissenting opinions and ideas, there have been both those that want the material gains of subjugating others through
violent means and those that want to help others achieve a better quality of life. The role of the Mission
civilisatrice played heavily as the main ideology behind justification for torture by the French in Algeria as
discussed by Rita Maran in Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War. According to her,
ideology was front and center in the reasoning behind the use of torture, and it determined people’s justification for
and against torture. This book, while focusing on French ideology serves as the basis and inspiration for beginning
this comparison of French and U.S. ideologies in regards to torture. This material draws from these sources, but also
from first-hand research of the primary source material.

This study explores five themes in a comparative manner: The ideological missions of the French and the
United States as enlightened, civilized nations that others can and should benefit from; the role of ideology in the
creation of laws that foster torture; ideology in government investigations of abuse; the ideology of the soldiers; and
ideology and public remembrance. The search for similar ideologies in their mission to spread their values to the
world is what drove both France and the United States toward policies which encouraged the use of torture.

I Ideological Missions of France and the United States

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was approved by the National Assembly of France
on August 26, 1789. The French liberal tradition stems from the basic ideals spelled out in that document, which
France has since based its constitutions on. Many of the most important passages declare an element of freedom
from oppression: “Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights;”14 “The goal of all political associations is
the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and
resistance to oppression;”15 And most specifically relevant to the use of torture: “Inasmuch as every man is
presumed innocent until he is judged guilty, if it is deemed indispensable to keep him under arrest,
all measures not necessary for securing his person should be severely limited by law.”16 This document became the cornerstone of
the stated ideals of the French Civilizing Mission during the colonial period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
However, the Rights of Man served as a justification for an idea of French civilization as superior over others.
Therefore, the Rights of Man were “overridden, as were more recent domestic and international legal obligations on
human rights, when the use of torture was routinized by the French state during the war with Algeria”17 and
elsewhere. Because of the importance considered inherent in the French ideology of extending the Rights of Man to
other peoples of the world, any other considerations to whomever the French colonized took a back seat from their
perspective. The colonized, specifically the Algerians gained the benefits of French civilization whether they liked it
or not. The French used Algeria as the original testing ground for the spread of French Republicanism after
colonization in 1830 during the last days of the reign of Charles X. The French, for their part saw the Mission
civilisatrice as the noblest mission they could perform. They believed they played the part of parent over their
colonies, in effect relegating the colonized to a subservient position in the French Empire. In effect, the French
violated the Rights of Man in order to spread the Rights of Man. “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,”
the document says, but this was contradictory in everyday life for Algerians throughout the colonial period. The
French experience “documents the far-reaching consequences of a state’s capacity to believe in its own ideology of
freedom and promotion of the individual while using measures, including torture, that deny both.”19 This is

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11 The term Mission civilisatrice means “civilizing mission,” the view that it was not just the duty of France to
colonize other territories, but to civilize them by bring in western values and culture in order to raise the quality
of life in the places they conquered.
13 French Constitution, Preamble.
14 “Declaration of The Rights of Man and of the Citizen,” art. 1, in Susan Dunn, Sister Revolutions: French
Lightning, American Light (New York: Faber and Faber, Inc., 1999), 213.
16 “Declaration,” art. 9, in Sister Revolutions, 214. Italics not in original but added by author for emphasis.
17 Maran, 2.
19 Lazreg, 253.
something that the United States in its promotion of democracy since the beginning of the War on Terror did not seem to foresee.

The United States has increasingly seen its mission as one of spreading an idea around the world. The Declaration of Independence states:

all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government…

Those ideas of Life, Liberty, and Happiness are extensions of the Enlightenment, inspired by men such as John Locke, and later by Thomas Paine, that famous author of “Common Sense,” so influential during and after the American Revolution. They were later interpreted as the mission call of the United States to help to secure those rights to others around the world. That concept, referred to as American Exceptionalism, is the idea that the United States not only could influence world events, but should do so in order to bring about positive results. Besides, as arbiters of the flicker of democracy, many Americans saw their country “in a pivotal position in human history” to spread those ideas. William McKinley, President during the Spanish-American War with Spain, and the one who decided to keep such places as Puerto Rico and the Philippines as colonies had this to say about America’s mission: “The American People, intrenched [sic] in freedom at home, take their love for it with them wherever they go… our sense of justice will not abate under tropic suns in distant seas… so hereafter will the nation demonstrate its fitness to administer any new estate… and in the fear of God will ‘take occasion by the hand and make the bounds of freedom wider yet.’” President McKinley saw it as his special duty to keep the Philippines because it was the mission of the US to provide for them “order and of security for life, property, liberty, freedom of conscience, and the pursuit of happiness.” Indeed, after the events of World War II, the United States was instrumental in ensuring the development of democracy for many countries in Western Europe and Asia. Through the Marshall Plan, economic aid helped stimulate revived democracies propped up by US forces. The Japanese economic boom “took place against the background of a democratization reform program promoted by the American Occupation Forces.” Even Taiwan and South Korea eventually emerged as powerful democracies after a time under dictatorships. More recently, in light of the War on Terror, the mission to spread democracy entered another phase of importance. During the buildup to the Iraq War, President Bush said in his State of the Union address in January 2003 that:

The American Flag stands for more than our power and our interests. Our Founders dedicated this country to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the afflicted and defend the peace and confound the designs of evil men.

Furthermore, the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” released in 2002, demonstrated a sharp change in focus. The US would not just “extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent,” but would do so by “fighting terrorists and tyrants” wherever they may be.
The idea of spreading democracy around the globe is a noble one, but very difficult. Often, promotion of the spread of democracy has been the justification for military intervention by the United States on several occasions. However, “the aim of spreading democracy around the globe, moreover, can too easily become a license for indiscriminate and unending U.S. military interventions in the internal affairs of others.” This use of ‘indiscriminate and unending intervention’ has led to a belief in the superiority of the U.S. mission.

This belief in the superiority of the mission originally had to do with the constant intertwining of liberty and territorial expansion in the first half of the history of the United States. Territorial expansion was the physical manifestation of the “national greatness” of the United States those men like Thomas Jefferson promoted. This idea, “Manifest Destiny,” eventually came to mean using a strong hand in foreign policy as well. During the Spanish-American War, President McKinley “claimed for the United States a right and duty to establish colonies, help ‘oppressed peoples,’ and generally project its power and influence into the world. Americans would benefit, and so would all humanity.” However, methods used by the imperialist US such as the forced subjugation of the Philippines under the auspices of a guiding parent contradicted the ideals of the mission.

The sense of fraternity that France and the United States both share is the dedication to certain ideological values and beliefs. This is illustrated in a communication between the two countries in 1959, while France was struggling in Algeria. In a very frank, emotional letter from French Prime Minister Debré to the U.S. ambassador in France, he appealed to the ideology of both France and the United States in defense of the mission in Algeria:

You know well moreover that our ideals correspond to yours –did they not originally inspire them? –and that my government, like General De Gaulle, has the will to practice a policy of liberalism and of evolution, which alone is capable of reconciling harmoniously in Algeria the requirements of the two communities.

Thus, by touching on similar “ideals,” the P.M. and French government tried to garner support for the civilizing mission they were engaged in.

The problem with ideology is that “ideologies blinker and blind, obscuring reality and justifying in the name of high causes extreme inhumanity and wanton destruction.” Thus, in terms of justification for torture, the ‘high cause’ of spreading French and American values overrode concerns for humanity of individuals and their basic rights under international and domestic law.

**Ideology: Interpretation and Creation of Laws that Foster Torture**

The French-Algerian War bound France to certain international laws. The most important documents concerning law at the time were the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHR), and the Geneva Conventions. The UNHR specifically states in Article 5 that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Also, Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions, ratified in 1949 state that: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on

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31 Hunt, 30-31.
32 Hunt, 38.
34 Hunt, 6. This interpretation of ideologies comes from Michael Hunt’s summary of the views of George Keenan, American diplomat and father of the containment doctrine. Hunt believed Keenan decreed the role of ideology in foreign policy to the extent of dismissing it, in effect ignoring many of the aspects that define relations with other nations.
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.” However, the rules did not define torture, allowing differing interpretations. It was not until years later under the “Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” that torture obtained a useable definition:

For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Part of the reason for the useable definition was because of the systematized torture during the French-Algerian War. However, a more concise explanation can do little when the importance of the ideological mission is seen to trump all other concerns, even when doing so betrays that mission.

By the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, there was a useable definition as to what constituted torture. However, outrage after the attacks among the government, and the public sphere at large contributed much to opening the door to the abuses which were to eventually take the form of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.

Part of the liberal French and U.S. tradition of assuming innocence is something that needs to be taken into consideration. The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a staple of democratic tradition. During both the French-Algerian War and the War on Terrorism, these basic laws were skirted numerous times. Also, since many terrorists perform their actions outside the laws of warfare, there is thus a viable argument that the laws of warfare do not apply to them when detained: i.e. laws against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In fact, “many terrorist groups demand to be treated as prisoners of war, but they deny the state the right to take them to court as war criminals for the indiscriminate killing of civilians,” according to Walter Laqueur. The idea that terrorists act outside the realm of warfare has caused both the creation of new laws, interpretation of old laws, or the simple disregard for the law in dealing with those deemed to be terrorists.

In clearing the way for abuses to eventually take place, the French government gave “legal sanction” to the police and military in Algeria which “legitimated the practice of human rights abuse” by declaring a “state of emergency.” This law, Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955: “establishing a state of emergency and declaring the application in Algeria,” facilitated house arrests and the internment of tens of thousands of nationalists. This broad sweeping power allowed for the justification of torture because once again, it emphasized the importance of the overall mission of the French to win the war. This law “gave moral and legal sanction to abusers; they would subsequently view their acts as justified by the ‘fight against terrorism.’” In performing acts of torture, many of the men who did so “believed themselves to be meeting the requirements of the government’s policy.” When given the belief that it was acceptable to commit acts of torture because of the right of law, then it became no longer the responsibility of the individual to decide what was right or wrong.

37 Maran, 6.
40 Law 55-385: Establishing a State of Emergency and Declaring its Application in Algeria, French Law (April 3, 1955), trans. Brett Berning, The Official Journal of the French Republic (7 April, 1955): 3479-3480. This law was recently invoked during the 2005 French riots in order to give the police more leverage and greater discretion in quelling them, allowing for mandatory curfews in cities throughout France.
42 Eftekhari, 422.
Some of the notable passages from the ‘Special Powers’ act include Article 6 which allowed for the “house arrest in a district or locality of any person… whose activity proves to be too dangerous for public safety and order,” and for the “creation of camps,” where prisoners would be placed for indefinite amounts of time. These measures made it easy for the security forces in Algeria to do their job, but at the same time, lessened the measures necessary to ensure abuses would not happen. The authorities decided what constituted ‘dangerous’ activities, giving them power to arrest whomever they wanted, while the ‘camps’ were veritable concentration camps where Algerians starved and their anti-French passions conflagrated.

Another passage from the ‘Special Powers’ act, Article 11 gave the authorities the power “to ensure control of the press and publications of all kinds,” adding a high degree of censorship to the maintaining of order and the secretiveness of the degree of torture. However, the power of the government under this law to control the press lacked the effectiveness the pro-Algérie française camp preferred. Intellectuals such as Henri Alleg were able to publish evidence of torture by the French military and police in Algeria. His book, La Question (The Question) was his “personal testimony of suffering torture at the hands of the French military.” A near-bestseller, he had been held for three years without trial and then smuggled out with him his account that he had written while in detention. He described being electrocuted numerous times, held underwater until he passed out, being kicked, punched, and punctured at the hands of French intelligence officers. At the end of his book, Alleg talked about how the people of France had to be told about the truth:

All this, I have had to say for those Frenchmen who will read me. I want them to know that the Algerians do not confuse their torturers with the great people of France, from whom they have learnt so much and whose friendship is so dear to them… But they must know what is done IN THEIR NAME.

Alleg’s book reminded people of the Nazi treatment of members of the Resistance in World War II. Drawing on that parallel, people were extremely upset that their own country, with its legacy of resistance against injustice could be capable of such brutality. On March 27th, 1958, the French government banned the book and seized copies from the publishing house as well as newspapers that had published excerpts from it. By then it was too late because it had “already become a near bestseller and the subject of lively public debate.” Thus, practices such as establishing into law measures that were purported to spread the ideology of the ‘Rights of Man’ in actuality contradicted those values. This was seen in publications such as La Question, both in its description of torture endured and by the government’s reaction to the book itself.

The court system itself in Algeria, while theoretically based on the French system, was in the hands of the police instead of the Ministry of Justice. This created a system without the separation of powers inherent in different branches of government. If abuses were to occur by the police, they were to be reinforced by the police who controlled the justice system:

In other words Muslims were arrested and often tortured by the police, brought before courts which were both biased and permeated with a spirit of radicalism, and finally, after being sentenced, passed into the hands of a prison service which itself was subordinate to the police. The whole process took place within a closed circuit of which torture formed an integral part.

44 Law 55-385, art. 6.
45 Horne, 220-221.
46 Law 55-385, art. 11.
48 Feraoun, xxii.
Thus, France fostered a self-sustaining system in the courts of Algeria, later helped by the Special Powers act that gave rise to an environment where authorities tolerated and encouraged torture. Ideology told those in Algeria that the preservation of the Mission civilisatrice received all-importance, especially when “the racial supremacy of the European over the Muslim were questioned,” such as it increasingly became after World War II.53

In the United States, the meaning to domestic and international laws concerning detainees has been framed to justify the aims of the Bush administration during the War on Terror. The administration, like the French in Algeria, formulated policy, enacted laws and interpreted previous laws to fit a certain ideological mold, even when sidestepping international laws.

In his “Military Order of November 13, 2001,” President Bush stated that “if not detected and prevented,” terrorists could cause further deaths, placing “at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States Government.” 54 To prevent this, he said that the U.S. needed “to identify terrorists and those who support them…” In order to do this though, the President said that because of the situation, it was “not practicable” to hold to the “principles of law and the rules of evidence” which criminal trials typically follow because of the “extraordinary emergency” the U.S. had been placed under.55 The President then listed off the types of individuals who fell under that category. According to him, the President can determine at his discretion that “there is reason to believe that such individual[s]” are or were terrorists.”56 However, there was a complication in the determining of such cases since, as stated before, the “principles of law and the rules of evidence” did not apply. At the very highest level of government, the President was stating that certain people did not qualify for the basic rights attributed to criminals in the U.S., or to those given P.O.W. status. In such a light, the President took a step toward torture and prisoner abuse.

White House Council Alberto Gonzales wrote a memo in January 2002 to the President in favor of his decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and not to give POW status to detained combatants. His main argument in favor of this was that “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war” that “places a high premium” on “the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities.” He believed this new war “renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations… and renders quaint some of its provisions.” 57 Gonzales further justified this by stating this kind of war was “not contemplated in 1949 when the GPW was framed.”58 However, the GPW had no type of particular armed conflict in mind and that those High Contracting Parties, such as the United States were bound to follow the rules during any type of armed conflict.

The French in Algeria argued that their war was a new kind of war as well. Like the United States of today, compared to the enemy the French were fighting, they were vastly superior in technology and numbers. Roger Trinquier, a major theorist on counter-insurgency warfare and a former French officer in Algeria wrote Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency, published for the US military at the Combat Studies Institute. Trinquier called the French Army “a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigably persisting in repeating its efforts.”59 This book, heavily influential in how the United States carries out its own insurgencies shows that the use of terrorism to fight a war is not a novel idea, and therefore does not render irrelevant the Geneva Conventions.

It was not that the United States was unaware of some of the negative consequences of using methods that could be considered torture. It was simply the perceived importance of the mission at hand that trumpeted all other concerns. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formed a “working group,” designed to “assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces.”60 The group’s

53 Vidal-Naquet, 31.
report stated that many of the techniques being used by the U.S. would be considered by some nations and people as “more aggressive than those appropriate for POWs violative of international law… making U.S. personnel involved in the use of such techniques subject to prosecution for perceived human rights violations.” The report accurately predicted the negative consequences of some of the techniques to be used, saying that “should information regarding the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques… become public, it… may produce an adverse effect on support for the war on terrorism.” With this in mind, framers of policy in the war on terrorism created an interpretation of laws that fit the ideological framework of the United State’s democracy disseminating mission.

This ‘adverse effect’ took form during the French-Algerian War. Domestic protest against the way the government was waging the war in Algeria eventually came to such a head, that the war effort became compromised. The laws created and the methods employed by the French military and police in Algeria worked to create this protest. The “121 Manifesto on the Right to Refuse to take up Arms in the Algerian War” was a declaration signed by 121 intellectuals in France, including such influential people as Simon de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre. In order to win “in the fight against public indifference and apathy” in regards to torture, certain committees in France tried “to give suffering a recognizable human face.” These committees also led by many leading French intellectuals helped to stir the passions of the French public and their belief in the overall mission in Algeria. Thus, the ideology of the civilizing mission as justification of the torture techniques in Algeria simply worked to increase the public’s negative reaction to the war. The United States too, stands the risk of losing its ideological justification which Bush says “leads us into the world to help the afflicted and defend the peace and confound the designs of evil men.” Thus is the effect over-time of justifying abuses by fitting them into law according to an ideology.

Ideologies Revealed in Government Reports

During the entirety of the French-Algerian War, the French government conducted one investigation into reports of torture which amounted to about twelve pages of text. The United States has had several investigations conducted under its own direction. Major General Antonio Taguba was directed to investigate the 800th Military Police Brigade based on the photographs and reports of torture in Abu Ghraib prison. James R. Schlesinger was tasked to head an independent panel to review Department of Defense Detention operations in the fallout of Abu Ghraib. And Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay investigated the Abu Ghraib prison and detention facility under the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. Combined, these U.S. government investigations constitute a much more thorough analysis of abuses that occurred when compared to the French government’s single investigation. However, analysis of the way both the French Government and the U.S. Government investigated reports of torture reveals a belief in their respective missions of spreading similar ideologies.

In 1955, French Minister of the Interior, François Mitterand, directed government servant Roger Wuillaume to investigate the reports on torture and come up with recommendations. Intentionally avoiding use of the word “torture” throughout his report minus two instances, Wuillaume wrote about “certain acts of violence,” reported in the media. The report was very brief and had the goal of treating reports of abuses as rare, and to document it to show the French as being pro-active about it. Before detailing any abuses, he wrote that “several of the prisoners stated that no violence has been used on them,” attempting to prove the rarity of abuses. Also, Wuillaume justified some of the abuses as an “old-established practice,” and that “they were far less barbaric than others… against which no one protests.” This was a defense by the French government of the methods being used by the police and army in Algiers, arguing them as tried and true, very effective practices. When Wuillaume did

62 Evans, The Memory, ix-x.
63 Evans, The Memory, 143.
67 Maran, 24.
document cases of individuals with physical marks of abuse, instead of condemning the perpetrators, he stated that if the law “were allowed to do no more than hunt down and arrest ‘suspected culprits’, and if it was the job of the examining magistrates to establish their guilt, many crimes and misdemeanours would go unpunished.” According to the man investigating the abuses, torture was necessary.

Wuillaume then described “the forms of violence used.” He described methods such as isolated confinement, beatings and water immersion, “water-pipe method” where water is forced into the stomach through the mouth, electricity to the genitals and other sensitive parts, prolonged bodily suspension, and being “forced to dance naked in front of their relatives and neighbors, which for a Muslim is a fearful humiliation.” These clear descriptions of torture are consistently taken by Wuillaume a degree of disbelief, illustrating his mistrust of the prisoners and his overwhelming trust of the French interrogators.

He then described the “authority under which violence was used.” He began by stating that “it is extremely difficult to fix the responsibility for the use of violence even in the most serious cases,” because most of the methods “leave no marks.” Here, the role of the French ideology comes into play. A sense of mistrust toward the accusers of torture, especially the detainees of Algerian descent was evident. At the same time, Wuillaume stated that the police explained to him “they are expert at using these methods without endangering the victim’s life,” without questioning the veracity of the claim. Then, in defense of the methods, he reminded his audience of “the atrocities committed by the terrorists themselves,” who “massacred or mutilated large numbers” of those loyal to France, hinting that they probably deserved to be tortured. Thus, Wuillaume illustrated the ideology of the French civilizing mission by depicting French interrogators as noble servants of the cause while portraying Algerian accusers as deserving of the abuse.

Wuillaume did state “all physical violence verging upon torture must be prohibited,” finally using the word itself, but in a way that separated torture from what the police did. He assumed a definition of torture to be something more than just violence against a person, but excessive violence. However, measuring violence against excessive violence is not done with a yard-stick, but in the eye of the interrogator. Wuillaume willingly left that up to the professionals. They were French soldiers and policemen, and therefore, they could be trusted. They played the part of parent over the Algerians by punishing them for their disloyalty to France, a nation simply trying to uplift them.

According to Wuillaume, the overall mission in Algeria was too important, and he felt that any impediment on the rights of the police and the army to do their job would seriously weaken their efficacy. He was of the mind that in order to protect the many in Algeria, that crimes against the few were permissible, even if not legal. Thus, Wuillaume considered the role of Algérie française so important, that his recommendation to the government only served to continually justify torture because it was in the name of the ideology of the Mission civilisatrice. The fact that the report was written in 1955, well before the bulk of the torture abuses happened in Algeria, illustrate further how unconcerned the French government and army really were towards basic ideas of human rights for the Algerians.

The investigations the U.S. government mandated in 2003-2004 are much more thorough than the French report. The war in Iraq was extremely unpopular. This was exacerbated with the advent of super-fast forms of communication, making reports of torture more problematic than it had been for the French government during their war in Algeria. It was something that could not ever be disregarded for a long period of time as it was in Algeria. The reports concerning the Abu Ghraib torture scandal made recommendations to punish those soldiers responsible for or complicit in the abuse. Also, the reports urged for a review of military doctrine and training in regards to the handling of detainees. However, the government reports placed blame downward and never higher up the chain of command past the brigade level. Even when those implemented in abuse “commented upon the intense pressure they felt from higher headquarters, to include CENTCOM [United States Central Command], the Pentagon, and the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] for timelier, actionable intelligence,” they were the ones blamed for allowing their soldiers “to be subjected to inordinate pressure from Higher Headquarters.” Thus, what was said at higher levels did not matter, and that those in charge of operations at Abu Ghraib, such as Colonel Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, should have known that.

Deciphering the role of American ideology in the government reports is a difficult task because of the care put into compiling them and the fact-finding nature of them. In contrast to the lone French government report which expresses a high degree of French superiority over the Muslim Algerians, the U.S. reports illustrate a desire to truly
fix the problem by punishing those responsible for torture techniques and by implementing military-wide changes in doctrine and training. However, the role of the American ideology in the War on Terror is expressed by the sense of infallibility of those high up the chain of command. The reports inevitably hint that the leaders of the War on Terror cannot have been responsible for misdeeds. Even if there was a desire to fairly assess the faults of the Bush Administration’s direct and indirect orders that led to human rights abuses, there’s still an idea that “war is hell,” and nothing ever goes right all of the time.

Ideology of the Soldiers

Ideology among soldiers in both the French Army in Algeria and the United States military in Afghanistan and Iraq were both shaped by the similar values of their nations. The French soldiers had a “shared understanding of the duty to maintain and spread French civilization.” However, different ideas as to how this duty was fulfilled led to “confusion about the correct way to carry out their duty.” Under this ideology of the civilizing mission as the all-important reason for being in Algeria, the army “supplied a workable rationale that obviated conscious decision-making” regarding the moral dilemma of committing torture. The United States military also ‘supplied a workable rationale that obviated conscious decision-making.’ Calling the war in Iraq a “crucial advance in the campaign against terror,” President Bush framed the fight there as good versus evil, free peoples versus terrorists in his speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. Therefore, the seed had been planted, labeling those in Iraq against the US mission a ‘terrorist.’ Soldiers stood “for freedom and order,” against the “terrorists and Saddam loyalists.”

The impact on the conscience of individual soldiers fighting in the War on Terror was lessened when they considered their enemy responsible for the attacks on September 11th. Just as with the French in Algeria, Americans in Iraq were imbued with an ideology that took away humanitarian concerns while supposedly promoting a humanitarian cause.

Part of the reason for French soldiers’ determination in supporting their ideology in Algeria has much to do with their recent history stemming the previous two decades. The French military was feeling the physical and emotional strain of perpetual defeat stemming from the Nazi occupation in 1940 to the loss of the Indo-China War in 1954 and subsequent colonial wars elsewhere. The French military sought victory as a means to regain honor, even at an extremely high cost. That is one huge difference between the root causes of torture implementation between the two conflicts. The French military, seeing itself betrayed by the politics of the Fourth Republic had a different rationale of its mission in Algeria: “We have not come here… to defend colonialism. We have nothing in common with the rich colons who exploit the Muslims. We are the defenders of liberty and of a new order.” When speaking about the institutions of the Fourth Republic, the military ran radio station in Algeria announced that in Indo-China, those “men liberally betrayed us…” and that in Algeria, “here you will not be betrayed.” To the generals and career soldiers, “Algeria was the test of their redemption as soldiers and as Frenchmen imbued with a mission to save the nation from a democratic system perceived as corrupt, dysfunctional, and lacking the will to fight.” The soldiers on the other hand, were going to do whatever it was going to take to save French –and their own –honor.

The United States military has recent memories of success in the Cold War standoff and campaigns such as Operation Desert Storm in 1991, as well as a mixture of failures in Vietnam and the involvement in Somalia in the early 1990’s. Dissent among high-ranking generals in recent years regarding handling of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has only occurred after they have retired or under anonymity, illustrating that while maybe in disagreement with policies of the government, there is a sense of allegiance toward the civilian authorities while still in uniform that continues to remain strong. This differs from the commanders in Algeria who openly disobeyed or fought against their own government. While there is this difference in recent histories between the French military and United States military, there is still a sense that the U.S. cannot be allowed to lose in its wars either.

The use of terrorism by the FLN and Al Qaeda was enough to cause both France and the United States to use torture methods to suppress the organizations, adhering to an idea that “massive violence,” such as systematic

71 Maran, 73.
72 Maran, 73.
75 Horne, 175-178.
76 Lazreg, 254.
torture “has usually prevailed over terrorism, because there is not an unlimited reservoir of people” who will
continue to attack these nations.\(^78\) The ultimate goal in the Battle of Algiers was to destroy the FLN network by any
means necessary. General Jacques Massu, the hero of the day during the famous Battle of Algiers, claimed that the
use of torture was extremely justified, that “the battle was won and a halt was brought to the F.L.N. –imposed terror
and the indiscriminate killing and maiming of both European and Muslim civilians.”\(^79\) However, General Massu at
the time, failed to take into account the “emotional weapon” that the tortured populace gained. Albert Camus stated
that “torture has perhaps saved some at the expense of honour, by uncovering thirty bombs, but at the same time
it has created fifty new terrorists who… would cause the death of even more innocent people.”\(^80\) Also, the defeat of
the F.L.N. in Algiers forced the leaders of the revolution to seek safety in Tunisia, where it would organize a
government in exile, and most importantly, the internationalization of the war via television.\(^81\) The use of torture in
Abu Ghraib no doubt did much to anger millions of moderate Muslims throughout the Middle East, surely bringing
into the ranks of the Iraqi insurgency many reinforcements.

There are varying rationales among regular soldiers in regards to torture. Since no two soldiers are the
same, their perceptions of how an ideology should be spread vary as well. One American soldier who spoke out
about abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003 expressed frustration at others for allowing torture to happen: “Every time I
said something about how I was worried about the treatment of the detainees, they would either say, thy [sic] are the
enemy and if I was out there they would kill me, so they didn’t care.”\(^82\) This soldier, Sergeant Provance was among
many who saw the twisting of the American ideology of fighting for freedom by suppressing some very basic
freedoms through the practice of torture.

The same rationale was used among French soldiers in Algeria, including the willingness to kill prisoners,
not just torture. A veteran soldier talked to his new captain who thought it was “a bad practice to kill possible
innocents.” In regards to Arabs in general possibly being terrorists, the veteran soldier said to his captain “…once
you’re here, to pose yourself problems of conscience – and treat possible assassins as presumed innocents – that’s a
luxury that costs dear, and costs men.”\(^83\) In essence, the veteran asked the inexperienced captain: What is more
important? Everything you value, including the safety of France and its mission, or the possible innocence of a few?
With this view in mind, the willingness and the self-justification to use torture – and more extreme measures –
against prisoners came more easily.

Soldiers fighting for France thought of Algeria as the last of the old French Empire that covered much of
Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The focus of the mission was to keep Algeria as an integral part of
France. Thus, they were often inclined to behave in a manner that coincided with the brutality of colonialism. The
United States in Iraq has often been compared to an imperialist venture. One letter to the editor of the New York
Times in response to the White House reaction to the abuses at Abu Ghraib states “these soldiers realize they were
sent on an imperialistic mission and behave accordingly, reflecting the nature of the administration that sent
them!”\(^84\) Whether soldiers or the administration believed the mission to be imperialistic, there have continued to be
American soldiers willing to use methods regarded as torture, even after Abu Ghraib. A survey conducted by the
Army in Iraq in the fall of 2006 found that up to 40 percent of soldiers would approve of torture techniques in order
to save the lives of other soldiers.\(^85\) Extenuating circumstances such as saving the lives of other soldiers can make
rationale for abuse more understandable, but of the troops surveyed, 10 percent of them “reported that they had
mistreated civilians in Iraq, such as kicking them or needlessly damaging their possessions.”\(^86\) General Patreaus, in
a letter to all military personnel in Iraq, stated that he “was concerned by the results” of the report and reminded
them how respect for human dignity separated America from the enemy.\(^87\)

With the knowledge that no two soldiers are exactly alike in ideology or how to express that ideology, it is
unjustified to place blame on the group as a whole. With all the soldiers of both the French-Algerian War and the

\(^{78}\) Laqueur, 252.
\(^{79}\) Horne, 204-205.
\(^{80}\) Horne, 205.
\(^{81}\) Horne, 219.
\(^{82}\) “Sworn Statement of Samuel Jefferson Provance,” in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. Karen
J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 482.
\(^{83}\) Horne, 174.
\(^{85}\) Thomas E. Ricks and Ann Scott Tyson, “Troops at Odds With Ethics Standards,” Washington Post, May 5,
2007, sec. A.
\(^{86}\) Ricks.
U.S. wars after September 11th, ideology has also been expressed by the condemnation of torture and abuse, not just its approval. Paul Teitgan, past wartime resistance fighter and victim of Nazi torture, was secretary-general of the Prefecture of Algiers supervising the police from 1956-1958. He resigned his post, citing “the excesses and the torture were the reasons.” 88 His view of French ideology, of the civilizing mission, was against the use of torture and “once [you] get into the torture business, you’re lost… fear was the basis of it all. All our so-called civilisation is covered with a varnish. Scratch it, and underneath you find fear.” 89

On the other end of the spectrum, some soldiers under the cover of legal and perceived moral sanction saw torture in a different light. General Paul Aussaresses, director of intelligence operations during the Battle of Algiers wrote a memoir of his experience in Algeria entitled The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. In the preface of his book, Aussaresses states:

What I did in Algeria was undertaken for my country in good faith, even though I didn’t enjoy it. One must never regret anything accomplished in the line of a duty one believes in… I don’t attempt to justify my actions, but only to explain that once a country demands that its army fight an enemy who is using terror to compel an indifferent population to join its ranks and provoke a repression that will in turn outrage international public opinion, it becomes impossible for that army to avoid using extreme measures. 90

Aussaresses had his mind set that in the Algerian War, torture was the only way to win. He not only thought it was the way to win, but the moral thing as well. After all, he said what he did was done ‘in good faith.’

The dark side to the pro-torture argument among the soldiers was that even if done ‘in good faith’ it still worked to betray the ideological missions of both France and the United States. It is hard to justify torture when the people doing it say to their prisoners:

‘You’re going to talk! Everybody talks here! We fought the war in Indo-China –that was enough to know your type. This is the Gestapo Here! You know the Gestapo?... And your whore of a Republic, we will blow it up into the air, too! You’re going to talk, I tell you.’ 91

This example, from Alleg’s account of being tortured by members of the 10th Paras division, illustrates very strongly how torture was betraying the spirit of the Republic and the Rights of Man, the cornerstone of French ideology.

The soldiers carrying out their duties in both France’s war and the U.S.’s war have been the ones most affected by policies which govern prisoner treatment and torture application, besides the victims themselves. Also, they are the ones that are most directly representative of their home countries when in a war of occupation elsewhere. Thus, similar ideologies which purport to spread democratic civil values to ‘uncivilized’ parts of the world are largely the responsibility of the individual soldiers, French and American. The trickling down of inhumane policies such as ambiguous laws which make abuse easier tend to create confusion among those doing the actual work of carrying out the wars of their nations. That confusion has led to differing ideas in the ranks as to the proper method of treating the enemy, and to shield the conscience of many from doing what would normally be considered morally unacceptable.

**Ideology and Public Remembrance**

It was the same ideology, the idea that France was a special nation, dedicated to certain democratic values that also drove the anti-war and anti-torture movement at home. The ideology played a reverse role in the public by proving the hypocrisy in the French colonial mission because of the violent torture. Public opinion against torture became the most effective weapon that led to the decolonization and independence of Algeria. However, for a war that was very much in the public mind at the time, it was very easily “forgotten” by the public at large after it ended.

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89 Horne, 204. Italics in original.
91 Alleg, 58.
It was simply a war that people wanted to forget, but not everyone could, especially the victims and perpetrators of torture.

What role did ideology play in the public’s remembrance—or lack of remembrance—of the Algerian War? The desire for French greatness, to continue spreading ideas from the *Mission civilisatrice* without doing so by the familiar formula of colonial occupation had much to do with this. France moved on and left behind its old ways, in favor of focusing on prestige in other manners. "Charles de Gaulle could now turn to his goal of making France the leader of Europe."\(^92\) In 1960, France became the fourth nuclear power in the world. It then became an important player in the development of the European Community, now the European Union.\(^93\) The leadership provided by de Gaulle in the post-Algerian War period allowed France to focus on the development of the European and French economies.

The use of torture in the Algerian War helped contribute to the sour legacy of the war that the French were to endure. Unlike memories of French victory in World War I and the Resistance in World War II, the Algerian War was not seen by many Frenchmen as a moment to be proud of. It was representative of the last bastion of the lost French Empire, of a waste of lives for no real reason, and of French violations of human rights on a mass scale. All that, after all the horrors of World War II, of the new ideals of a "new Europe," bound by the international laws of the Geneva Conventions, where humans were assumed to have universal rights accorded them—there had still been that kind of war fought in the name of France.

As a result of the shame the war had brought to France, there was reluctance to even call it a war. Instead, the government called a “police action,” a much less violent euphemism. Plus, there was the idea that since Algeria was officially as much a part of France as Paris was at the time, there was the rationale that if it was called a war it would mean that France acknowledged Algeria as a separate nation at the time of the conflict.\(^95\) Only in 1999 did the conflict get official recognition by the government as an actual “war” in the Law of 18 October 1999.\(^96\) This recognition coincided with a growing awareness of the victims of torture, psychological illnesses in soldiers, and the true gravity of the war that was meant to be largely forgotten but was too powerful to ignore.

In a backlash to the negativity surrounding the French-Algerian War, there has been a recent attempt to promote the ideology of the *Mission civilisatrice* by trying to rewrite history in order to change public remembrance of torture in Algeria. On February 23, 2005, a law was introduced in the French parliament which stated that “teachers should teach the ‘positive role’ of the French presence overseas, especially in North Africa.”\(^97\) This attempt to promote French ideologies through an interpretation of the past drew protests from Algerians, historians, and others concerned about the state’s role in prescribing how history ought to be taught. This protest, and implications about France’s relations with Algeria, led to an executive decree nullifying the law.\(^98\) However, cancellation of the law “does not diminish the importance of the episode… in showing the contested memories and histories of French expansion.”\(^99\) This attempt to rewrite history, in doing so rewriting the role of torture used by the French in Algeria, proved unsuccessful. In reality, it served more to bring to light many of the negative aspects of French colonialism, especially torture in Algeria.

It may be too early to tell how the United States will be remembered for its conduct in the “War on Terror” and its use of torture. However, the images of American soldiers giving a thumbs up in front of a human pyramid of naked prisoners or in front of the corpse of a dead prisoner, or the image of a hooded prisoner standing on a box for fear of falling off which would mean certain electrocution, and images of police dogs barking at naked prisoners are seared into the minds of people all around the world. Whether Americans should use torture is still a subject of debate among politicians, intellectuals, and the public at large.\(^100\) It is important however, to assess how American

93 Popkin, 293-297.
94 Wegs, 54-55; 120-137.
95 Cohen, 219-220.
98 Aldrich, 14.6.
99 Aldrich, 14.6.
100 These are just some of the examples of the ongoing torture debate, all sources are too numerous to list: Adelle M. Banks, “Poll shows support for torture among Southern evangelicals,” *USA Today*, Sept 16, 2008; and *The Torture Debate in America*, ed. Karen J. Greenberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
ideology might judge the use of torture by the US. Like the French, many Americans were appalled at what representatives of their country did at places such as at Abu Ghraib. How torture affects the collective memory of this war will determine the judgment of history.

Conclusion

Torture, committed under an ideological banner by representatives of the United States and under the pressure of the highest levels of government cannot be easily explained. It is abstract to think in terms of a mission to spread democracy, western values and beliefs. However, this attempt to explain it through the similar history of the French experience in Algeria sheds light on the situation the United States is in today. France’s Mission civilisatrice, deeply rooted in concepts of the French Revolution and the ideas set fourth in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, was ideally a humanitarian venture to help those in other parts of the world in need. It became in reality a tradition of conquering other countries and subjugating their people to forced colonial rule in order to obtain resources, to retain the status as a great nation, and to spread Christianity. The United States shares a similar ideology, also rooted in its revolution. The creation of the first modern democracy imbued Americans with a sense of virtue and greatness, if not a sometimes jingoistic pride. The events of September 11th, 2001 allowed for that ideology to justify recent military intervention and for the twisting of ideology to be a justification for torture.

The creation and selective interpretation of laws allow democracies to create policies that promote abuse of prisoners. The French Special Powers act, in defense of the perceived importance of the overall mission of Algérie française, allowed for expansive police and military powers to do what was deemed necessary to win the war. This more easily allowed for internment, torture, and displacement of individuals deemed a threat to Algérie française. Once the War on Terror began, members of the highest levels of government began interpreting international and national laws in ways which allowed for how they thought detainees should be handled. They were able to skirt those norms by hiding behind an ideological banner of spreading democracy and defeating evil ideas and people. It was both the French and US government’s creation and interpretation of laws which denied basic human rights to prisoners, in turn creating international and domestic outrage and a loss of support for the mission.

Ideology revealed in government investigations is revealed differently among the French and U.S. investigators. Perhaps changing standards are the reason for the difference. The singular French investigation, the Wuillaume Report was heavily biased in reporting of abuses. While admitting abuses were going on, the report displays a high confidence in the interrogators and the French mission in general, while at the same time showing a mistrust toward the Algerians who were tortured with the attitude that ‘they probably deserved it.’ The United States on the other hand has had numerous in-detail investigations concerning torture, especially at Abu-Ghraib Prison. They represented a true effort to determine what went wrong, why abuses happened, and how to implement those lessons in future doctrine so such a thing does not undermine later missions. However, the unwillingness of any of the government investigators to look further up the chain of command illustrates the idea that the mission is all important. The ones leading the War on Terror, in their eyes, are righteous in their cause and so is the United States.

The soldiers on the ground in both the French and U.S. wars were most affected by their nation’s ideology. Because of perceived missions to spread certain western values, these soldiers deployed in far-off locations to carry out the orders of their superiors to preserve an idea. Sometimes, soldiers were blinded by that imbued ideology when it came to torturing prisoners. Some, on the other hand, saw that ideology as the reason not to torture and to report abuses. Some soldiers saw torture as essential to winning the war while others saw it as an essential reason for losing the war. The position these soldiers were placed in, both the French and US, and the constant reminder of their role in these great humanitarian missions which blinded the conscious of many soldiers who committed torture.

Public memory of the French-Algerian War has done much to disregard the importance of that war. The negativity surrounding it has led to issues such as torture victims and soldiers being essentially forgotten about because of the desire to do just that: Forget. What the public in the United States years from now will collectively remember depends greatly on its treatment of the enemy, especially in regards to torture.

Ideological constructs such as the Mission civilisatrice of France or the Wilsonian model of military intervention to promote democracy of the United States have too often served to justify activities that deny those ideologies. Torture by the French in Algeria illustrates the value of looking toward history to help determine what might happen in the future. The United States in the War on Terror has used the ideology of freedom, democracy, and liberty to attack those deemed to hate those concepts. However, dehumanization of the enemy and a perceived supremacy of the mission under that ideology led to torture. It is in the best interest of the United States to develop policies that not only promote democracy, but also rationalism and restraint. One of the best places to look to do
just that, and to check the power of its own ideologies is a study of the French and its use of torture during the French-Algerian War.

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International Students’ Awareness and Use of Counseling Services

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Abstract

Although differences between domestic and international students’ sources of academic stress, awareness and use of counseling services have been studied extensively, less attention has been devoted to the impact of unawareness and underutilization of counseling services on international students’ academic stress. In addition, little is known about the relation between academic stress and psychological adaptation in international students. Data was collected from 62 international students at a large public university in the Rocky Mountain region. As predicted, results showed a significant difference in academic stress between international students who are aware of counseling services and those who are not aware. In addition, international students who reported higher levels of academic stress also reported poorer psychological adaptation. Implications for counseling international students will be discussed.

Introduction

The number of international students enrolled in U.S. universities and colleges is increasing each year. The Open Doors Report on International Exchange reports that the number of international students enrolled in universities and colleges in the U.S. increased by 3% to a total of 582,984 in the 2006/07 academic year (Institute of International Education, 2007). Studying in the United States poses many challenges for international students, such as adjusting to a new university system, establishing a new identity in an unfamiliar culture, communicating in a foreign language, and being away from their familiar social support system (Hyun, Quinn, Madon, & Lustig, 2007; Komiya & Eells, 2001). Over the years, researchers have examined international students’ numerous academic concerns and needs. In fact, when studying in the United States, international students may experience academic difficulties, even when they have been highly successful in their home countries (Yeh & Inose, 2007). They may face the same types of academic difficulties that U.S. students face, such as test anxiety, difficulty with concentration, and time management, but they may also struggle with different challenges, such as language and/or reading difficulties, and unfamiliarity with American teaching methods (Yoon & Portman, 2004).

The language barrier is probably the most challenging problem for the majority of international students (Brown, 2008; Mori, 2000). Academically, international students struggle with completing essay examinations and taking notes during lectures due to limited language proficiency and the difficulties of studying effectively in a new educational system (Mori; Yi, Lin, & Kishimoto, 2003). The students’ inadequate language skills also often diminish their ability to understand lecture, to complete reading and writing assignments and examinations, and to orally express their opinions and ask questions in classes (Mori). Thus, lack of English skills is likely to affect international students’ academic performance, and academic difficulties in turn may affect their psychological adjustment to college life (Yeh & Inose, 2003). A great deal of research has examined the effects of stress on students’ psychological adjustment in domestic students in the United States (Dyson & Renk, 2006; Goldman & Wong, 1997; Pritchard & McIntosh, 2003; Pritchard, Wilson, & Yamnitz, 2007). Dyson and Renk found that the levels of college stress reported by college students, as well as their endorsement of avoidant coping, significantly predicted their levels of depressive symptoms. Similarly, Pritchard and McIntosh reported that, among other predictors of adjustment, strain from academic pressure was correlated with poorer psychological outcomes.

Nationwide, academic stress is on the rise among college students, and high levels of academic stress are associated with negative health outcomes (Mortenson, 2006). Mortenson found that international students are less inclined than American students to engage in the healthiest form of emotional coping (seeking emotional support) and more inclined to engage in the most unhealthy form of coping (avoidance). Despite their high need for support, international students are reluctant to seek help through counseling services (Brinson & Kottler, 1995; Mori, 2000).
Research suggests that international students are less likely to use counseling services than are domestic students (Carr, Koyama, & Thiagarajan, 2003; Hyun et al., 2007; Mau & Jepsen, 1988), and even when they seek available services, they are far more likely than American students to terminate therapeutic relationships prematurely (Mori). One reason for the underutilization of counseling services is that international students have not been exposed to such services in their own countries (Kilinc & Granello, 2003). A second explanation is the lack of awareness of their needs for mental health services. A third reason for this is the cultural stigma associated with emotional expression (Hyun et al., 2007; Vogel, Wester, & Larson, 2007). Because the values of international students are different from those of American students, their attitudes toward counseling may be different as well (Zhang & Dixon, 2003). The influence of cultural values on help-seeking behavior can be particularly important in cultures that have close networks, and where counselors are seen as out-group members who are not part of the social network or family (Vogel et al.). Thus, international students use family and friends rather than counselors when they need help. For example, Kilinc and Granello found that most Turkish students reported that they would prefer to go to a friend or family member for psychological assistance rather than use a professional resource.

Komiya and Eells (2001) found that international students who had received counseling previously possessed more open attitudes toward seeking counseling than did other international students. Experience or familiarity with college counseling centers have a favorable influence on help-seeking attitudes (Kilinc & Granello, 2003). Unfortunately, studies have also shown that international students are less likely than domestic students to ask for help or seek assistance with troubling feelings about academic performance (Mortenson, 2006). Thus, the present study examined the differences in academic stress between international students who are aware and use counseling services and those who are not aware and do not use counseling services.

Many researchers have studied international students’ awareness and use of counseling services, sources of academic stress, and the reasons for their underutilization of counseling services (Carr et al., 2003; Hyun et al., 2007; Mau & Jepsen, 1988). Research suggests that the higher international students’ levels of acculturation are, the more positive attitudes they hold toward seeking professional psychological help (Kilinc & Granello, 2003; Zhang & Dixon, 2003). Numerous studies have explored the difficulties that international students face when coming to the United States, for example language, cultural adjustment, feeling alone, vocational, social, financial, differences in academia, etc. (Brown, 2008; Jacob & Greggo, 2001; Olivas & Li, 2006). Other studies have examined the sources of international students’ academic stress and how they cope with it (Mortenson, 2006). However, no research has been done to investigate the relation between international students’ awareness and use of counseling services and their academic stress. Thus, there is a need for investigating whether or not significant differences in academic stress exist between international students who are aware of and use counseling services and those who are not aware and do not use these services. Research suggests that college life can be a stressful experience for all students (Dyson & Renk, 2006). But it can be even more stressful for international students because of the unique challenges they face (Hyun et al., 2007; Komiya & Eells, 2001).

Furthermore, previous research has indicated that academic stress has a negative impact on domestic college students’ psychological adjustment (Dyson & Renk, 2006; Goldman & Wong, 1997; Pritchard & McIntosh, 2003; Pritchard et al., 2007). However, no studies have examined this relationship in international students studying in the United States. Given that international students face unique challenges when studying in the United States (Brown, 2008; Mori, 2000; Yi, Lin, & Kishimoto, 2003; Yoon & Portman, 2004), it is important for researchers to examine the relationship between academic stress and psychological adjustment in international students. The present study investigated whether or not there is a significant difference in levels of academic stress between international students who are aware of and use counseling services and those who are not aware of and do not use counseling services. We hypothesized that international students who are aware and use counseling services experience less academic stress than those who are not aware and do not use these services. In addition, the present study examined the relationship between academic stress and psychological adjustment in international students. We hypothesized that higher levels of academic stress would relate to poorer psychological adaptation.

**Method**

**Participants**

Sixty-two international students (35 female and 24 male, average age = 24.46, SD = 5.59) at a large public university in the Rocky Mountain region completed the survey. The Institutional Review Board approved all procedures prior to data collection.
Measures

*Academic stress.* We assessed 53 stressful events specifically oriented to college students’ lives (e.g., “struggling to meet your own academic standards”) using the Inventory of College Student Recent Life Experiences (Kohn, Lafreniere, & Gurevich, 1990). Participants were asked to rate to what extent such events have been a part of their lives in the past month on a scale from 1 = *not at all* part of my life to 4 = *very much* part of my life (α = .92). This scale has been shown to be reliable and valid (Kohn et al.).

*Psychological adaptation.* To measure psychological adaptation, students responded to a thirty-item short version of the POMS, which has been shown to be valid and reliable (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981). The POMS assesses tension (α = .83), depression (α = .82), anger (α = .85), vigor (α = .76), confusion (α = .71), and fatigue (α = .83). Responses were measured on a 5-point scale, from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).

*Use of counseling services.* To measure counseling services awareness and use, students reported on four items. The responses for the first three items were measured on a yes no scale: 1) “Before filling out this survey, did you know that the university has counseling services available to all students?” 2) “Have you ever used on-campus counseling services?” 3) “Have you ever used off-campus counseling services?” The final item asked, “If you were experiencing a personal problem that frequently upset you, what are the chances that you would talk it over with someone?” Responses were measured on a scale from 1 (most certain) to 7 (definitely not).

Procedure

An email was sent to all international students inviting them to participate in the study. The email to international students read: “We are conducting a study about the awareness and use of counseling services among international students and how it affects their academic stress. We invite you to take a short survey. All survey responses are completely anonymous and confidential. You may skip any item you do not wish to answer or stop completion of the survey at any time. Thank you for your participation.”

Results

The relation between academic stress and awareness and use of counseling services

To test whether or not significant differences in academic stress exist between international students who are aware of counseling services and those who are not aware, we conducted an independent samples *t* test levels. As predicted, international students who were aware that counseling services were available to them reported significantly lower stress levels (\(M_{stress} = 2.10, SD = .42\)) than did international students who were not aware of these services (\(M_{stress} = 2.35, SD = .38\)), \(t(56) = -2.19, p < .05\).

To test whether or not significant differences in academic stress exist between international students who do not use counseling services and those who do, we again conducted an independent samples *t* test levels. Unfortunately, only six international students had used on-campus counseling services and three international students had used off-campus counseling services. Because there was such a small number of international students who had used on-campus counseling services, the findings showed no significant differences in academic stress between international students who used counseling services on-campus and those who did not, \(t(55) = .19\). Similarly, there was no significant difference in academic stress between international students who used off-campus counseling services and those who did not, \(t(56) = -.17\). Finally, students were asked, “If you were experiencing a personal problem that frequently upset you, what are the chances that you would talk it over with someone?” To assess the relation between willingness to see a counselor and academic stress levels, we conducted a Pearson’s *r* correlation. There was no relation between willingness to see a counselor and academic stress, \(r = -.01\).

The relation between academic stress and psychological adaptation

To examine whether students with higher levels of academic stress displayed poorer psychological adaptation, Pearson’s *r* correlations were computed. As predicted, international students with higher levels of stress reported significantly higher levels of fatigue, tension, depression, confusion, and anger (see Table 1).
Table 1. The Relation between Academic Stress and Psychological Adaptation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of Psychological Adaptation</th>
<th>Academic Stress</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vigor</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tension</td>
<td>.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confusion</td>
<td>.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Negative Moods</td>
<td>.55***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p < .001

Discussion

The first purpose of the present study was to ascertain whether international students who were aware of and used counseling services experienced less academic stress than those who were not aware and did not use these services. As predicted, the results indicated that international students who were aware of counseling services reported significantly lower levels of academic stress than international students who were not aware of these services. Our results are in line with Hyun et al. (2007), who found that international students’ awareness of counseling services available on-campus was significantly lower than the awareness of domestic students. Thus, our results highlight the importance for international students having access to information.

Previous research has shown that international students are significantly less likely to use counseling services than are domestic students (Carr et al., 2003; Hyun et al., 2007; Mau & Jepsen, 1988). We found no significant differences in academic stress between international students who had used on-campus and off-campus counseling services and international students who had not used these services. However, this was likely due to the fact that a small number of international students reported that they had used on-campus and off-campus counseling services. Previous research has indicated that academic stress has a negative impact on domestic college students’ psychological adjustment (Dyson & Renk, 2006; Goldman & Wong, 1997; Pritchard & McIntosh, 2003; Pritchard et al., 2007). As predicted, our results showed a significant relationship between academic stress and psychological adaptation. International students with higher levels of stress reported significantly higher levels of fatigue, tension, depression, confusion, and anger.

As with other studies, there are several limitations of the current study. The sample was small, self-selected (those who responded to e-mail request), and included only international students studying at one university. Thus, the sample may not be generalized to other international students. The results of the current study provide additional information about the impact of international students’ awareness and use of counseling services on their academic stress, and the impact of higher levels of academic stress on international students’ psychological adjustment, but there is a need for more work to be done. Future researchers should focus their attention in identifying ways on how to increase international students’ awareness and utilization of counseling services.

Conclusion

This study focuses on the impact of international students’ awareness and use of counseling services on academic stress and identifies the relation between higher levels of academic stress and psychological adaptation. Given the rise in student stress nationwide and the poor psychological outcomes associated with high levels of
academic stress, it is important that counselors help international students handle academic stress effectively by increasing their awareness and utilization of counseling services. This study has provided additional information about the impact of international students’ awareness and use of counseling services on their academic stress, and the impact of higher levels of academic stress on international students’ psychological adjustment.

References

How Bolivarian is the Bolivarian Revolution: 
Hugo Chávez and the Appropriation of History

Phillip Price: McNair Scholar
Dr. Errol Jones: Mentor

History

Abstract

Years of popular discontent with the Venezuelan government allowed Hugo Chávez to win the presidential election in 1998. Since then Venezuela has undergone dramatic changes and deviated sharply from the dominant two-party system that had previously governed the nation. Chávez’s polemical new policies have affected virtually all aspects of Venezuelan life and are founded on his interpretations of the revered South American “Liberator,” Simón Bolívar. By drawing upon the legacy of Bolívar, Chávez has been successful in exciting the masses and adding a sense of legitimacy to his “revolutionary” movement. This research will examine the correlation between these two historical figures by analyzing the histories and documents of both Chávez and Bolívar. The goals of which are to discover how closely the ideologies and actions of President Hugo Chávez coincide with those of his historical predecessor Simón Bolívar and to demonstrate how the Chávez government has appropriated the myth of Bolívar to gain legitimacy and maintain popular support in Venezuela.

Introduction

As the memories of the great victories for South American independence faded away, the reputation of the great “Liberator” Simón Bolívar followed suit. Bolívar had defeated Spain and triumphed over nature during an arduous mission for independence, but when his presence was no longer required on the battlefield there came a time “when people began to look ahead and think of a future without Bolívar.” Even Bolívar, weary of the pressures of ruling and a tumultuous career as a state builder, was keenly aware that, “the people want to know if I will ever cease to rule them.” These worries came to fruition in a cruel twist of fate in 1829 when Bolívar was exiled from the very countries he freed from Spanish oppression. This great disappointment coupled with prolonged fatigue, disease, and an overwhelming belief that he had “ploughed the sea” in service of his country led to his untimely death on December 17, 1830 at the age of forty-seven.

However, this final melancholy chapter of Bolívar’s life is not how history has chosen to remember him. Twelve years after his premature death, Bolívar’s ashes were returned to his hometown of Caracas amidst immense fanfare. During the ceremony, “Bolívar the man had begun to disappear behind Bolívar the myth.” He was held up as a “model for the nation” a man whose strength “called forth valor, wisdom, and heroic defense… [Bolívar was] an immortal genius on a celestial mission.” This veneration cemented Bolívar in the annals of history and did much to polish his faded reputation.

4 Lynch, 301.
5 Chasteen, Man and Myth, 21-22.
Creating this myth was not a difficult task for the writers of history to accomplish. After all Bolívar did in fact lead an extraordinary life, and his exploits and background were exemplary. Bolivar was generously described as

A hero of pure Venezuelan lineage, who after a tragic marriage and a golden youth in Europe, assume[d] the leadership of national independence, provide[d] the intellectual base of a continental revolution, and then the military and political talents to create a union of states and win international respect, all the time asserting his manhood as a glorious lover.  

This impressive resume was a driving force behind the cult of Bolívar. The various ways for the common man and woman to relate to this hero were abundant, allowing for assimilation to take place rather simply.

Although where Bolívar's history becomes most difficult is in its application. Creating a political philosophy based on Bolivarian ideology is a complicated task, and has led to controversy and heated debate on the actual ideals of Bolivar. This ambiguity can be understood when one is aware of the notion that “the sheer accumulation of writings on Bolivar’s life has served as much to obscure as to clarify his historical significance.”

Bolivar was an extremely diverse individual, thus deriving a true ideology is a demanding if not impossible endeavor.

Further obscuring Bolivar’s principles was his practice of appropriating numerous governmental forms. The Constitución de Bolivia, or Plan of 1826 as it is sometimes referred, is considered by many to be the most prominent example of his mature work in state building. It was Bolivar’s hope that this document could “become a model for other countries, including Gran Colombia (the combination of Venezuela, Panama, Columbia and Ecuador) to follow.” However, this document is one of extremes: a hodgepodge of various political philosophies meshed together in an attempt to create “the guarantees of permanence and of liberty, of equality and order.”

From monarchy, [Bolivar] took the principle of stability; from democracy electoral power; from the unitary system, the absolute centralization of financial matters; from the federal system, the popular voice of nomination; from the oligarchic system, the life-time character of the censors; and from the system of the plebiscites, the right to petition and the referendum on constitutional amendments.

This idealistic sampling of ideologies proved to be more than the people were ready for and was not received well by “leftist publicists” or its influential neighbor to the north: the United States.

By writing the Bolivian Constitution, Bolivar was attempting the miracle of “uniting the advantages of all systems, [but] what he did in reality was to unite all their defects: the absolutism of life tenure, the demagogic agitation of electoral assemblies, the drawbacks of both centralism and federation.” This tendency towards widespread ideological borrowing made Bolivar unique, but left his legacy open for interpretation and appropriation. Latin American leaders in search of legitimacy, whether they were dictators, democrats, or fell anywhere else in the political spectrum, have found a malleable idealistic foundation in the utilization of Bolivar.

The most recent of these leaders is the current president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Today in Venezuela Bolivar is ubiquitous. His name can be found on buses and signs; his image watching over the people in the form of paintings, murals, altars, and statues. A star has been added to the flag in his honor, even the country has been renamed the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. But what is the purpose of all this? Why is Bolivar so present and why now?

The answers to these questions lie in Hugo Chávez’s awareness that the appropriation of Bolivar’s historical myth promotes nationalism, fuels public support, and adds much needed legitimacy to his government. This clinging to the glorious past is not an original concept. In fact “Modern Latin American history is brimming

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6 Lynch, 301.
7 German Carrera Damas, El Culto de Bolívar (Caracas: Universidad de Central Venezuela, 1973)
10 Belaunde, 256.
11 Bushnell, 1.
12 Belaunde, 258.
with heroes. Since the independence movements of the early nineteenth century, the politics of the region have been profoundly personalistic.\(^\text{13}\) For example, well-known leaders such as Getulio Vargas of Brazil and Juan Peron of Argentina both used their personalities, charisma, and military ties to gain power by appealing to, then controlling the working classes.

Chávez has followed this example set by his Latin American predecessors and latched on to this personalismo formula for power. This tactic has allowed him to employ his charisma and interpretations of history to shape himself after one of Venezuela’s most renowned figures, Simón Bolívar. However, aligning himself with the past has proven to be a controversial move for Chávez and has drawn both praise and scorn. “For his supporters, Chávez represents a break with the corrupt political traditions and infrastructures; for his critics, his Bolivarian self-fashioning signifies a return to the manias and disillusions of the past.”\(^\text{14}\) Either way this issue is judged, Chávez’s adoption of Bolívar’s history and his implementation of the “Bolivarian Revolution” have done much to further his ambitions.

What follows is a comparison case study of Simón Bolívar and Hugo Chávez. Recent events stemming from Chávez’s unlikely election in 1998 have raised meaningful questions about his movement and his use of history. Why is studying the appropriation of history important? Who was Simón Bolívar? How has Chávez utilized Bolívar? How ‘Bolivarian’ is the Bolivarian Revolution? It is only through the examination of Bolívar and Chávez’s writings and statements that an accurate comparison of these two men can be formed. In this way it is the intention of this study to illustrate how Hugo Chávez has appropriated the historical record of Simon Bolivar to legitimize his political and social agendas.

### Why History is Important

Before examining the particulars of this study between Hugo Chávez and Simón Bolívar, it is first essential to understand the importance of an accurate historical record. While it is impossible to separate all myth from history, it is vital to portray history as accurately as possible. “The traditional historian’s insistence that there is a difference between fact and fiction is rooted in the common sense conviction, fundamental to the conduct of life, that some things happened and some did not, that true statements are different from lies.”\(^\text{15}\) This insistence is important, but should not be absolute or static. Myth is a part of history, and vice-versa, however being able to distinguish those differences is crucial.

At the very least, the inaccurate representation of history and the glorification of national figures sanitizes history, making it bland and full of “lies by omission.”\(^\text{16}\) An example of this embellished history is George Washington’s chopping down a cherry tree. While this event never occurred the historical myth was used to idolize a key American figure erroneously portraying him as the epitome of honesty and morality.

This particular myth, in and of itself, is not particularly detrimental to society. However, at the other end of the spectrum, some of the world’s greatest atrocities and human rights violations have occurred by inventing history and using it as a propaganda tool. Perhaps the most glaring example of this would be Adolf Hitler using “Germany’s humiliation at Versailles and the dismal German economy to re-channel rage against internal Jewry.”\(^\text{17}\)

While it is highly unlikely that President Hugo Chávez has anything sinister planned it is important for people to realize when they are being taught versions of the past that are inaccurate. The old adage that “those who do not know history are at the mercy of those who do” rings true in every generation.

### Simon Bolívar: A Brief History

So much has been written on the life and career of Simón Bolívar that to produce truly unique or original data would require an exhaustive search and is beyond the scope of this project. What follows in this section is meant as a brief synopsis to help the reader better understand the life of the man that liberated six countries from Spanish rule.

\(^{13}\) Chasteen, 1.


\(^{17}\) Ben Agger, “Beyond Beltway and Bible Belt: Re-imagining the Democratic Party and the American Left, www.fastcapitalism.com
Simón Bolívar was born into one of the most affluent Creole families in Venezuela on July 24, 1783. Yet, his childhood was both “privileged and deprived.” By the age of nine Bolívar had lost both of his parents to tuberculosis. However, their passing, in addition to the large inheritance bequeathed to him by his wealthy cousin Juan Félix Jerez Aristeguieta y Bolívar, made Simón Bolívar an extremely wealthy man, freeing him from the worries and trappings of most in Venezuelan society.

Bolívar, not content with his life in Venezuela, set off for Europe at the age of fifteen. At this point in his life he possessed only a limited education from tutors Andrés Bello and Simon Rodríguez and a short stint as “a cadet in the elite militia corps” which he passed with a “good report.” However, this lack of formal education would prove to be no hindrance for what lay ahead; rather his unique childhood awarded him “a strong will and power of decision” as well as the ability to “socialize easily with lower-class people.” Also, it was during this time that he began to “show an early trace of noblesse oblige that became a hallmark of his character.”

The time spent in Europe presented a new world to Bolívar, and was divided into two distinct segments. The first was spent primarily in Spain. There Bolívar was tutored by the marquis of Uztáriz. “Uztáriz was the first stable influence in Bolívar’s life” and under his guidance Bolívar studied “philosophy, history, mathematics, and languages, and in his circle he was able to develop his social skills, to listen and to learn.” It was also during this period when he met Maria Teresa Rodríguez del Toro y Alayza. The two fell madly in love and returned to Venezuela as husband and wife. However, tragedy struck soon after the couple arrived; Maria fell ill and died in 1803.

Stricken with grief Bolívar returned to Europe in 1804, although this time to France. There Bolívar experienced a “political and intellectual awakening.” Immersing himself in enlightenment thought, he read extensively, attended high-society affairs, and made his immortal vow in Rome that he would “not rest body or soul until he had broken the chains binding us to the will of Spanish might.” These experiences transformed him, and when Bolívar returned to Caracas in 1807 he was an intensely driven man imbued with a passion for liberty and the desire to free his country from Spanish rule.

Gaining popular support for an uprising against the Spanish crown was no simple undertaking, but Bolívar held true to his Roman oath. His first effort to take Caracas was mildly successful but led to an embarrassing defeat to a counter-revolutionary force in 1812. However, Bolívar regrouped and was able to retake Caracas. This military incursion put an end to the First Republic of Venezuela and established Bolívar as a “military dictator” in charge of the Second Republic. Unfortunately for Bolívar, this victory was short lived, and he soon found himself on the run.

Taking refuge in Haiti, Bolívar tried again to retake Caracas in 1816. His effort was a failure and forced him to reconsider his strategy. Bolívar decided it best to take Bogotá instead. The campaign required great risk, but succeeded due in large part by catching the Spanish troops completely unaware. From there Bolívar gained momentum, and he and his generals proceeded to take territory after territory. Each success building on the previous and the Spanish strongholds of Caracas, Quito, Bolivia and Lima all fell into patriot hands ousting Spain from Latin America.

These legendary victories made Bolívar immensely popular and thrust him into the political sphere. Unfortunately, he was unable to translate his success on the battlefield into that of state building. The most well-known example of this was his Bolivian Constitution. Bolívar created “an authoritarian document that instituted a president for life with almost monarchial powers and gave no significant role at all to popular elections.” To Bolívar this project was “the product of his mature political thinking, indeed his masterpiece.” However, this was not the sentiment of his opposition. The constitution became extremely unpopular and significantly advanced his

18 Lynch, 7.
19 Lynch, 18.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 19.
24 Chasteen, 14.
25 Chasteen, 27.
downfall. With his power dwindling and his opponents gaining in strength, Bolivar was forced into exile and died in 1830.

The life of Simón Bolívar is a fascinating and intricate study not only for his accomplishments and failures but also because his life seems to be a contradiction in terms. “Bolívar was an exceptionally complex man, a liberator who scorned liberalism, a soldier who disparaged militarism, a republican who admired monarchy. To study Bolívar is to study a rare and original character.” These contradictions leave the historian, or anyone for that matter, the flexibility of interpretation. This flexibility is the underlying foundation to why his name has been evoked so often by so many.

**How Chávez Appropriated Bolívar**

Hugo Chávez’s admiration of Simón Bolívar began much earlier than the Bolivarian Revolution currently underway in Venezuela. According to Chávez, as noted by Chávez biographers Cristina Marcano & Alberto Barrera Tyszka, his education about the Liberator began during his childhood. “Instead of Superman, my hero was Bolívar,” Chávez recalls, “in my village, my grandfather would say to me: look there’s Bolívar’s mountain. And I would imagine Bolívar crossing the Andes.” These idealized images of his hero introduced Chávez, at an early age, to the cult of Bolívar, and thus he has “developed a penchant for novelizing his [Bolívar’s] life.”

As time passed Chávez continued to foster his appreciation for his hero eventually becoming a scholar of Bolívar’s life and philosophies. Chávez used this knowledge in perhaps his earliest significant application of the myth of Bolívar on December 17, 1982. “He and two fellow officers inaugurate[d] their secret political cell, the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario -200, by restaging Bolívar’s Roman oath.” The oath was not verbatim to that of Bolívar’s enduring words, but they evoked Bolívar’s spirit nonetheless. “I swear in the name of the God of my parents; I swear on my homeland that I won’t give peace to my soul until I have seen broken the chains that oppress my people, by the order of the powerful. Popular election, free men and lands, horror to the oligarchy.” It was at this moment Chávez made the conscious decision to fashion himself and his revolutionary movement after Simón Bolívar. This controversial choice has proved both monumental for Venezuela and advantageous for Chávez.

In each endeavor that Chávez undertakes, he calls upon Bolívar. When the MBR – 200’s coup d’état failed in February of 1992, Chávez addressed the nation. In his now famous statement he thanked his comrades for their loyalty, courage and selfless generosity then asked them to lay down their arms. Chávez realized that their coup had failed, and he sent his “Bolivarian message” accepting full responsibility for his “Bolivarian military uprising.” The fact that Chávez was willing to shoulder the responsibility for his failed coup attempt brought him instant recognition and respect. In a country where recent years had brought the citizens of Venezuela “political and economic failures, the devaluation of the currency, bank collapses, trials for corruption and economic decline no one in a position of power had ever said sorry, or accepted any portion of blame.” Chávez and his Bolivarian ideals stood alone.

In fact just a month following his coup, Chávez was interviewed in the popular Venezuelan newspaper *El Nacional*. In this interview he is quoted that “the true creator of this liberation, the real leader of this rebellion, was General Simón Bolívar. With his incendiary verb, he has illuminated the path for us.” The truth is, since he began his time in the spotlight Chávez has rarely missed an opportunity to reference Bolívar. Whether it is to an international audience at the United Nations, a public rally in the streets of Caracas, or every Sunday on his television variety show Aló Presidente, Chavez ever so carefully and charismatically draws direct correlations between himself and Bolívar.

What is important to realize about this strategy is that when Chávez utilizes Bolívar in his rhetoric he is able to tie his cause to Bolívar’s. In doing this Chávez adds a significant voice from the past that evokes the spirit of a national icon without that same speaker being able to disagree. This inventive use of historical figures allows

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27 Lynch, xi.
29 Marcano & Tyszka, 93.
30 Conway, 152.
31 Ibid.
33 Gott, 68.
34 Marcano & Tyszka, 92.
Chávez to build unique relationships and identities with those he attaches himself to. Additionally, this ingenious style creates a model that draws the parallel that; to champion the ideals of Bolívar is the same as supporting the policies of Chávez.

**How Bolivarian is the Bolivarian Revolution?**

When Hugo Chávez set out in 1999 to create a lasting revolutionary constitution for Venezuela, he undertook an extremely challenging mission. During the 137 years between Independence from Spain in 1821 until the Venezuelan Constitution written in 1958 “more than 20 constitutions were drafted, promulgated and ignored.”

In order to quell some of this instability, Chávez chose to base his Constitution on his hero, Simón Bolívar. Article one of Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution states that:

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is irrevocably free and independent, basing its moral property and values of freedom, equality, justice, and international peace on the doctrine of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator. Independence, liberty, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination are unrenounceable rights of the Nation.

However, even with this ideology so plainly stated in the opening of the Constitution, how closely does Chávez follow his hero’s precedent?

In order to shed light on this question, this section focuses predominantly on comparing the 1826 Constitución de Bolivia written by Bolívar to that of the Hugo Chávez’s 1999 Constitution. However, additional works such as speeches, interviews, and other minor and major political statements are analyzed. These selected works have been chosen to show both the discrepancies and similarities between these two men. Also this comparison is between what is written in these documents, not what is or was actually carried out. Often there can be a great difference between intention and reality. Perhaps the most fundamental ideological contradiction between the stated principles of the two men can be seen in the differing emphasis placed on the role and involvement of the average citizen. Bolívar was a dictator for a large portion of his career and was adamantly opposed to open elections for the head of state. His preferred method of succession for the presidency was to carefully select a worthy and ethical vice-president. Then this appointee would follow as the next president at the retirement of his predecessor. In Bolívar’s opinion “This provision avoided elections, which produce the scourge of republics, anarchy.”

This line of thinking demonstrates a lack of confidence in both the “rustic inhabitants of the countryside [and] the intriguers living in the city.” Bolívar’s reasoning behind this belief was “because the former are so ignorant that they vote mechanically while the latter are so ambitious that they turn everything into factions.”

Yet it is important to note that to Bolívar “dictatorship was not a long term solution.” He strongly believed that “If a single man were necessary to sustain a state, that state should not exist, and in the end would not.” He also staunchly defended his constitution as a “liberal document,” and it is stated in Articles 6 and 7 that “The government of Bolivia is a representative democracy” and that “Sovereignty emanates from the people.” In part this is true, although the Bolivian Constitution is not a representative democracy as contemporary society has come to view this term. Bolivar “favored a restricted right to vote...and an obvious preference to govern always with the aid of extraordinary powers.” His justification for this discrimination was that “everyone is born with

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35 Max Manwaring, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare,” www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, 2005
36 1999 Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, title 1, art. 1.
42 Writings, xliii.
equal rights but not equal ability.”\textsuperscript{43} However, Bolívar did hold himself to strong ethical standards and hoped that when the people became properly educated his services in government would no longer be needed.

For Chávez this method of popular exclusion would be tantamount to political suicide. Primarily because Chávez comes from poverty; he is one of Bolívar’s so-called “rustic inhabitants.” He grew up living in a home with a dirt floor and knows intimately the hardships of poverty. This personal history has created a deep connection and emotional attachment with the poor. Moreover, when the poor in Venezuela, “which is three-quarters of the population,” look at Chávez they see themselves not an “out of touch politician.” \textsuperscript{44} Chávez frequently adds fuel to these feelings of political and social inequality by making inflammatory accusations about the opposition:

You Venezuelans are not to blame; you know who is to blame for what has happened to us; I am going to get rid of these people around us, don’t doubt it; and, what’s more, I will solve all your problems.\textsuperscript{45}

Chávez’s “fierce indictment of the old political order—and his promise of a revolution in honor of South America’s Liberator, Simón Bolívar [holds] wide appeal among poor Venezuelans.\textsuperscript{46} Chávez has taken a disenfranchised populace left out of sharing its nation’s wealth and given them hope for a brighter, more just future. Chávez embraces this popular support and has guaranteed Venezuelan citizens universal suffrage under articles 63 and 64 in his 1999 constitution.

Additionally, Article 6 of the Venezuelan Constitution states that “The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela…is and always will be democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible, pluralist, with revocable mandates.”\textsuperscript{47} Comparing these two ideologies of Bolívar and Chávez it is apparent that Chávez takes a more populist stance than does Bolívar. Bolívar would deem it irresponsible and unwise to place the fate of his nation and his government entirely in the hands of the people.

While Chávez’s touting of Bolívar’s positive stance towards democratic values can be seen to be flawed, there are numerous other aspects of the Bolivarian Revolution that are Bolivarian in spirit. These positions include equality, freedom of religion, and a deep distrust of the United States. While these principles are not identical in nature they have concurrent threads running through them. The issues of oppression are just as alive now as they were then, thus the application of these rights must change somewhat as time passes.

To begin, equality is addressed in substantial depth in both the 1826 Bolivian Constitution and the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. For Bolívar, equality is “the law of all laws” and without it “all guarantees, all rights perish.”\textsuperscript{48} This idea was not a universally popular principle then, and it pertained primarily to slave labor. However, Bolívar remained strong in his stance against slavery and wrote eloquently for its cessation. “Can there be slavery where equality reigns? Such a contradiction would demean not so much our sense of justice as our sense of reason; our notoriety would be based on insanity, not usurpation.”\textsuperscript{49} Throughout his fight for equality Bolívar held true to his principles, although he was forced to make concessions to the landed elite in order to achieve his final objective of slave emancipation.

Chávez addresses the issue of equality in Article 21 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution: All persons are equal before the law…No discrimination based on race, sex, creed or social standing shall be permitted, nor, in general any discrimination with the intent or effect of nullifying or encroaching upon the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal terms, of the rights and liberties of every individual.\textsuperscript{50}

This definition of equality goes beyond what Bolívar had in mind for equal rights, but it makes sense because of the differing political environments. When Bolívar was in power the institution of slavery was waning, and to move from emancipation to complete equal rights would be a challenge for any society to undertake no matter how enlightened.

\textsuperscript{43} Cameron & Major, 264.
\textsuperscript{44} Micheal Shifter, "In Search of Hugo Chávez," Foreign Affairs May/June (2002): 2.
\textsuperscript{45} Cameron & Major, 260.
\textsuperscript{46} Shifter, 2.
\textsuperscript{47} 1999 Constitución de Venezuela, title 1, art. 6.
\textsuperscript{48} Simon Bolívar, Address to the Constituent Congress, 61.
\textsuperscript{49} Bolívar, Address to the Constituent Congress, 62.
\textsuperscript{50} 1999 Constitución de Venezuela, title 3, art. 21.
Like Bolívar, Chávez is also adamantly opposed to slavery and has stated in Article 54, “No person shall be subjected to slavery or servitude. Traffic of persons, in particular women, children and adolescents, in any form, shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by law.” This ideology is particularly in line with Bolivarian thought and demonstrates a desire for the cessation of oppression.

Another aspect of Chávez’s new constitution that corresponds with Bolivar’s is the freedom of religion. Bolivar wrote that:

In a political system there should be no preference for one religion over another…Religion is a law of conscience. Any law imposed on it annuls it, because when we enforce duty, we remove merit from faith, which is the basis of religion.

Bolívar argued this stance using the idea that the rules of man were separate from the laws of Heaven; each set having its own purpose and its own methods of enforcement. Bolívar felt that “to mix our laws with the commandments of the Lord…would be sacrilegious and profane.” It is debatable how personally religious Bolívar was, but it is clear that he felt that freedom of religion was a necessity for the progressive operation of both church and government.

Chávez again follows suit on this issue: “The State guarantees the freedom of cult and religion. All persons have the right to profess their religious faiths and cults, and express their beliefs in private or in public.” Chávez, like Bolivar, feels that the two institutions of government and religion must be separate, and that free expression of one’s personal beliefs is an axiomatic right.

Another interesting aspect of their aligning political thought, and one that may illuminate Chávez’s behavior, is a profound sense of uneasiness towards the United States. Regarding this particular topic it is probably accurate to aver that Bolivar would be a supporter of Chávez. Bolivar truly admired the US and its methods of “rational democracy,” and he was admired in kind. However, his underlying feelings towards the United States were a mix of “admiration” and of “mistrust.” This latent anxiety worsened when Bolivar penned his 1826 Constitution. Soon after the drafting of this document he came under harsh criticism from the US for abandoning republican ideals. Even some of his ardent supporters such as the US consul in Lima, “changed abruptly from an admirer of Bolivar to almost a pathological detractor, referring to him in his dispatches as a hypocritical usurper and madman.” These heated remarks, in addition to diplomatic and military altercations, bolstered the animosity between Bolívar and the US.

This continued deterioration led to Bolivar writing perhaps his most famous quote castigating his northern neighbor: “The United States…seems destined by Providence to plague America with miseries in the name of Freedom.” However unfavorable this quote portrays the United States it is important to understand the context under which it was written. According to noted Latin American scholar David Bushnell, Bolivar wrote these words “against a backdrop of a protectorate scheme” with Great Britain, and “related monarchist intrigues.” Bolivar did not despise the United States, he simply was wary of such a powerful and ambitious nation in such relative close proximity.

This caution strengthened Bolivar’s desire to exclude the US from his Congress of Panama. In his mind this meeting would form an alliance of countries that were freed from Spanish rule that could work together for the common good and defend themselves from mutual enemies. This belief made him a “forerunner of Pan-Latin Americanism” and it is cited by Bushnell that today Bolivar would “presumably be a warm supporter of all common-market projects and possibly even common fronts against the International Monetary Fund.” These two issues are essential elements for societal change supported by Hugo Chávez.

51 1999 Constitución de Venezuela, sec. 2, art. 54.
52 Bolivar, Address to the Constituent Congress, 62
53 Bolivar, Address to the Constituent Congress, 62
54 1999 Constitución de Venezuela, sec. 2, art. 59.
55 Bushnell, 2.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
59 Bushnell, 5.
60 Ibid.
Chávez has taken this philosophy further and expanded on Bolívar’s precautionary economic concept of Pan-Latin Americanism with his own economic plan, the Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (ALBA). At its heart, ALBA is a counterbalance to US-backed free trade agreements that rejects neo-liberalism and "promotes trade and investment in member governments, based on cooperation, and with the aim of improving people’s lives, not making profits." The aim of this socially conscious policy is to move away from the uni-polar control of the United States to a multi-polar society where power is more equally distributed. This shift is aimed at creating a more just society not only in Venezuela but in all countries that are disenfranchised and suffer due to their poor global standing.

Conclusion

For Chávez to accurately embody all the qualities and ideals of Simón Bolívar would require a degree of political and social schizophrenia. The revolutionary circumstances surrounding Bolívar’s career required him to become an adept and flexible politician. One day he would need to make concessions to the oligarchy or caudillos, and the next he would fight for slave rights. He worked to give those without power a voice, but not too much as to upset the social order. Bolívar was forced to walk a political tightrope. Many times he had to choose between the lesser of two evils and pursue the path that he felt ensured the health and stability of the countries that he fought to liberate. This task is especially daunting when the economic, political, and social differences between each country and its citizenry are taken into consideration. This constant state of unrest and uncertainty transformed Bolívar’s ideologies into a contradiction in terms.

The addresses and decrees, public and private correspondence, and other writings of Bolívar seem much like the Bible or the works of Shakespeare: a diligent searcher can find something in them on almost any subject imaginable and can often find Bolívar at one time or another seeming to support every side of every argument.

This fact about Simón Bolívar has made his ideologies readily available for appropriation and application into the public realm.

Chávez has capitalized on this adaptability of the cult of Bolívar. His diligent studies of the great Liberator as well as his resourceful methods of tying Bolivar’s struggle to the problems of the poor contemporary Venezuelan citizens have been significant factors in his impressive rise to power. By adopting Bolivarian ideology, Chávez has distinguished himself from the corrupt two–party system that preceded him. This shift has also given a sense of empowerment to those who were previously oppressed. While many statistics and studies disregard Chávez’s reforms as mere handouts, the real affect and source of much of Chavez’s popularity lays in the fact that many of the poor citizens in Venezuela feel that finally someone in power sincerely cares about their plight.

Chávez has fostered this sentiment with carefully selected Bolivarian quotes and symbols. These quotes and symbols have then been relayed or displayed to the people at opportune moments and have done much to strengthen Chávez as the apotheosis of leadership. However, this selective use of history, memorable quotations, and symbolism is oversimplified history. It is true that Bolívar was an influential leader and undoubtedly one of Latin America’s greatest heroes of the Spanish–American Revolution, but that was not all he was. Bolívar, like any man or woman in history, is full of flaws, missteps, contradictions and questionable decisions. It is only through the study of the entire man that the Venezuelan people can grasp what Simón Bolívar stood for.

The real irony is that Chávez has thrilled the masses with speeches about Bolivar’s love of liberty, when liberty to Bolivar did not mean democracy or socialism. This romanticized interpretation of Bolivar has been partly responsible for Chávez’s ability to use democracy to make Venezuela less democratic. This may seem confusing, but Chávez is creating what many “classical liberal thinkers feared most...a quasi-tyranny of the majority. The Chávez regime has emerged as an example of how leaders can exploit state resources and the public’s widespread desire for change to crowd out the opposition, and, by extension, democracy." Just a brief examination of Chávez’s referendums illuminates this claim; increased executive power, centralization of the government,

61 Shawn Hattingh, "ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-Liberalism?" http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3154
62 Bushnell, 1.
lengthened presidential terms, and no cap on presidential re-elections. In regards to this ever-expanding web of power that Chávez is creating, he may be more akin to the actual Bolívar than in any other aspect. However, this is not the version of Bolívar that Chávez touts in his speeches to inspire those to take up his cause.

For the moment, it seems that Bolívar’s memory is intricately tied to the fate of Chávez. Soon after Chávez was elected President in 1999, Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez remarked after an interview with Chávez that he “was overwhelmed by the feeling that he had just been chatting pleasantly with two opposing men…One to whom the caprices of fate had given an opportunity to save his country. The other, an illusionist, who could pass into the history books as just another despot.”64 Whichever road history chooses for the Chávez regime it appears that Simón Bolívar’s legacy will be there for every step of the journey.

References


64 Shifter, 1.
Arms Transfers and Stability in the Developing World: A Causal Model

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Abstract
In recent years, several studies have emerged that seek to understand the nature, scope, and significance of arms transfers in the post-Cold War period. A common theme throughout this literature is the assertion that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave birth to a globalized, commercialized US arms industry dependent upon exports to the developing world in order to survive. Using pooled time-series data, this study tests this assertion via Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors regression. The relationship between such transfers and stability in the developing world is also explored. Using a nonrecursive simultaneous equation model, a new measure of stability is constructed accounting for political, economic and social indicators of stability. The study concludes that the global arms trade has been commercialized and that US producers are increasingly targeting countries in the developing world. Arms transfers are also seen to have a negative relationship to stability, as well as lead to lower levels of democracy in the importing state. These results are discussed with reference to US national security and the stated goals of American foreign policy.

Introduction
The Vietnam War was a watershed moment with regards to both US foreign policy and the global arms trade. This unpopular war brought an end to the post-World War II consensus that the only way to prevent the spread of Soviet communism around the world was to contain it, primarily through the threat and use of American military power (Holsti and Rosenau 1984). Policy-makers began to question the viability of sending American troops around the globe to confront communism militarily in limited theaters of conflict. The political, economic, and social costs associated with such military deployments often far exceeded the perceived benefits, which led policy-makers to reevaluate the direction of US foreign policy. The most widely accepted alternative among policy-makers was that the United States should begin to export arms to regions threatened by communism thereby creating proxy armies capable of confronting communist expansion without direct U.S. involvement (Tirman 1997). This policy would be institutionalized under Nixon and become known as the Nixon Doctrine (Sorley 1983; Wittkopf et al. 2008).

Since the implementation of this doctrine, several aspects of the global arms trade have intrigued scholars from various disciplines, and accordingly a large body of literature has emerged. It addresses not only the political, but also the economic, social, and cultural implications resulting from the exportation of arms. Predictably, there is now a plethora of literature focusing specifically on the consequences of arms for the importing state, as well as studies investigating the economic and political benefits for exporting states. These studies are diverse in terms of the methodological approach, sample size and scope, hypothesis, and the conclusions presented. They range from the quantitative to the qualitative, from studies of the industrialized world to the developing world, from those who argue the utility of such arms transfers to those who articulate the dangers, and so forth. The bulk of these studies were conducted in the midst of the Cold War, but there is a growing body of literature that seeks to understand the nature, scope, and significance of arms transfers in the post-Cold War period.

Such studies are becoming more salient as the reality of the post-Cold War arms trade is becoming more apparent. The decline in military spending worldwide forced the US arms industry to turn to free-market capitalism and the forces of globalization in order to survive. The industry began laying-off workers, selling off their defense operations, seeking consolidation, and reaching out to foreign markets as a means to cope with limited demand at home (Bitzinger 1994; Dowdy 1997; Lansford 2002). In the name of economic growth and prosperity, the Clinton administration enthusiastically supported this industrial strategy and began opening foreign markets that were traditionally off-limits, supporting government subsidies to arms producers, and assigning various governmental
agencies the task of promoting arms sales (Benson 1995; Boucher 1995; Hartung 1995a). Arms exports were viewed by policy-makers “as a means of preserving American jobs and keeping the US industrial base from eroding too quickly” (Blanton and Kegley 1997). In the post-Cold War period, “the invisible hand has become the principal mechanism for allocating potent conventional weapons and associated technologies on a global basis” (Keller and Nolan 1997).

Consequently, US arms exports remained fairly constant as the Cold War came to an end (Brzoska 2004), and following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, arms transfers to the developing world actually exceeded Cold War levels (McKibbiin 1993; Stohl and Stohl 2008). US suppliers dominated the global arms market in the 1990s, both in terms of total exports and exports to the developing world (Brzoska 2004; Grimmett 2003). This trend continued until 2005, when Russian foreign military sales (FMS) to the developing world exceeded that of FMS from US suppliers (Grimmett 2007). However, it is important to note that that the United States re-established itself as the predominant arms supplier to the developing world the following year in terms of FMS. Also, the data did not include direct commercial transfers (DCT) data, which is an unfortunate flaw because of their relevance in the commercially driven post-Cold War arms trade (Boucher 1995; Brzoska 2004).

This increased reliance on foreign markets in the developing world is problematic for a number of different reasons. Arms that find their way to underdeveloped states have been shown to reduce the domestic security of the importing state (Blanton 2001; Cashman 1993), adversely affect civil and political rights (Miller 2003), contribute to the onset of ethnic conflict (Craft 1999; Sislin and Pearson 2001), and produce “political instability, facilitate the outbreak of violence, prolong fighting, increase its severity, prompt the spread of violence into neighboring countries, and raise the cost of, and thus deter, conflict resolution efforts” when exported to states or regions currently engaged in conflict (Sislin et al. 1998). This is significant because the transformation of the US arms industry from a state-sponsored entity to a market-driven enterprise has afforded firms the freedom to export arms to regions currently ripe with conflict. In 1995 for example, a study concluded that weapons produced by US firms were being used in 45 of the 50 largest territorial and ethnic conflicts (Hartung 1995b).

These revelations have led scholars to conclude that arms transfers to the developing world “are basically destabilizing” (Neumann 1995) and will have a “profound impact on the number of national security issues concerning the Western industrialized nations” (Bitzinger 1994). Such conclusions warrant increased research since weak states have been shown to be “close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism” (Fukuyama 2004). Political and social instability have also been linked to weapons proliferation, regional conflict, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and energy insecurity (Crocker 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2004). The question, therefore, is whether or not US arms transfers are significantly contributing to the fracturing of social and political structures in the developing world, thus creating episodes of blowback detrimental to US national security.

The purpose of this cross-sectional study is to quantitatively explore this question by constructing a relevant statistical model capable of accounting for variation in political stability, economic well-being, and social stability. In the process of constructing this model, I will also take time to empirically test the common assertion among scholars that the US arms industry has been globalized, and thus commercialized in the post-Cold War period. The likely direction of arms flows will also be examined via a causal model analysis. I will conclude by discussing the results with reference to US national security interests, as well as the stated goals of American foreign policy.

**Measuring Stability**

Measuring stability is a difficult process due to the highly diverse nature of many of the variables that have been shown to either contribute to stability or adversely affect stability in any given situation. Therefore, in order to effectively devise a measure of stability that is suitable for time-series analysis, I identify so-called common indicators of weak states via a literature review. This review seems to show that a weak state is unable to perform the basic functions of government: protect and promote human security, control its geographical territory, guarantee political freedom and legitimacy, and provide basic social services such as education and healthcare. In addition to these failures, there are usually signs that the elite of the society in question is becoming predatory, and thus begin to loot or destroy the state’s assets (Carment 2003; Mazrui 1995; Rotberg 2003; Piazzan 2007).

A 1995 study came to similar conclusions. The State Failure Task Force attempted to predict the causes of state failure, and thus devised their own list of variables common amongst weak states. The group concluded that there were seventy-five relevant variables. Of these variables three were considered strong predictors of state failure: 1) a closed economic system where international trade is low or nonexistent, which in turn leads to high levels of corruption, 2) unusually high infant mortality rates, and 3) an undemocratic political system. GDP per
capita was also deemed a strong indicator, although not as strong as the three indicators noted above (Esty et al. 1998). These findings have been reiterated by scholars such as Rotberg (2007) who concluded that “corruption is fundamental to failed states,” and Feng (2005) who came to the conclusion that democracy reduces political instability, and enhances other variables such as economic freedom, education, and investment.

These studies seem to indicate that nation-state stability does not consist merely of political factors, but also includes economic and social variables. The relationship between the well-being of the citizenry and the governing body seems to be an interdependent one. This is made evident by literature that seems to show that high levels of human development reduce the likelihood of domestic disturbances and, therefore, tend to contribute to political stability (Haq 1995). In turn, countries that lack political stability have a difficult time promoting economic growth and providing essential public services such as education and healthcare to the population (Feng 2005). Therefore, when attempting to empirically measure stability it is vital to account for political, economic, and social factors.

In this study, this is accomplished by constructing an index composed of three separate indicators: human development, quality of governance, and democracy. Human development is a measure consisting of GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, and the number of students enrolled in higher education. The quality of governance measure includes three separate subjective indicators: corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. The measure for democracy includes a political rights score, as well as a civil liberties score. (A more detailed description regarding the construction of this measure is found in the Models section of this paper.)

**Human Development, Quality of Governance, Democracy Linkages**

As stated above, I theorize that when taken together, political stability, social development, and economic well-being constitutes nation-state stability. In accordance with this theory, I propose the following theoretical linkages among human development, quality of governance, and democracy:

- **Democracy promotes higher levels of human development because it allows for the general population to hold government accountable for its failure and/or inability to promote social stability and/or economic well-being.**
- **Democracy promotes a better quality of governance by spreading political power, which leads to lower levels of political corruption, a system more favorable to judicial equality, and a bureaucracy free from unreasonable political constraint.**
- **Good governance will increase the level of human development by preventing corruption, providing a sense of security by maintaining law and order, and by supporting a strong bureaucratic structure capable of providing public services. A strong bureaucracy will also provide the government the means necessary to respond to a national emergency.**
- **Good governance enhances democracy by providing and/or maintaining effective institutions that are capable of implementing public policy. This supports the political stability of the democratic regime in question by giving the government the means necessary to deliver public goods to society.**
- **High levels of human development lead to a better quality of governance by providing society with the economic and social means necessary to participate politically, which theoretically allows the public to mold the government, thus making the government more responsive to public needs.**
- **Human development enhances democracy by providing society with the economic and social means necessary to participate fully in the political arena. This allows the citizenry to safeguard their political rights and civil liberties via oversight of public officials.**

As implied by the theoretical relationships noted above, there are several interesting causal directions to explore in this analysis. Human development, quality of governance, and democracy form a complex array of relationships that I theorize constitute nation-state stability. Higher levels of human development, good governance, and higher levels of democracy are characteristic of stable states. Low levels of human development, poor governance, and low levels of democracy are characteristic of collapsed states. A combination of high and low degrees amongst these variables is what distinguishes a state as weak or failing.

**Models**

This study will consist of three separate models, each investigating an aspect of the global arms trade. The first model will be concerned with the assertion that the global arms trade was fundamentally altered by the end of
the Cold War. The second model will be a causal model that will be used to examine the likely direction of arms flows, as well as strengthen my theory regarding the construction of the stability measure. Finally, the last model will test the relationship between arms transfers and stability in the developing world.

To test the hypothesis that the global arms trade has become globalized and thus commercialized following the end of the Cold War, I first divide the pooled cross-sectional dataset used in this study into two separate sets: one is representing the Cold War period (1986-1990), and the second the post-Cold War period (1991-1999). For the years 1986-1990, I will estimate two separate Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression equations to control for possible autocorrelation. In the first, GDP per capita will function as the dependent variable while arms transfers along with seven additional variables will function as the independent variables. The second equation will operationalize arms transfers as the dependent variable and use the same control variables as the first equation with the exception of the arms transfers variable (which will be replaced by GDP per capita). I will repeat this method for the years 1991-1999.

I hypothesize that for the years 1986-1990 there will be a statistically insignificant relationship between arms transfers and GDP per capita, indicating that the ability of a nation-state to actually pay for arms was not part of the decision-making process. This is consistent with the view that during the Cold War arms were seen as a means to confront communist expansion without having to directly commit US forces (Tirman 1997). Between the years of 1991-1999, however, I predict there to be a positive, statistically significant relationship between arms transfers and GDP per capita. This would provide support for the assertion put forth by scholars that the global arms trade has become commercialized and now emphasizes profit rather than a means to protect national security interests (see Bitzinger 1994, Boucher 1995, Lansford 2002). I also hypothesize that the world system position variable will negatively related to arms transfers for the years 1986-1990, and become positive for the years 1991-1999. This will provide support for the claim that US firms are now reliant on foreign markets in the post-Cold War period.

As noted above, the four Prais-Winsten PCSEs regression equations that will be estimated consist of seven control variables other than the arms transfers and GDP per capita measure. Below is a list of these variables, along with a brief theoretical explanation for their use in this analysis:

(a) Democracy: Studies have shown that democracies are more likely to receive arms than non-democracies (Blanton and Kegley 1997; Blanton 2000). There also exists a positive and robust link between economic growth and democracy (Helliwell 1994).

(b) Age Structure: Age structure has been shown to be statistically significant in explaining variation in economic growth (Kogel 2005; see also Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000). There is also evidence that the higher the percentage of a population that is outside of the 25-39 years old range, the less severe instances of armed conflict tend to be (Mesquida and Wiener 1999). Therefore, the relationship between age structure (percent of population between 0-14 in this study) and arms transfers is hypothesized to be negative due to the assumed lack of demand for arms.

(c) Oil Reserves: According to Sadowski (1992), oil attracts increased arms imports because of the increased purchasing power associated with the resource. Also, several oil-rich countries reside in volatile regions, a fact that exacerbates the demand for arms.

(d) World System Position: Countries in the developing world are increasingly targeted by arms producers (Brzoska 2004; McKibbiin 1993). World system position is a measure of development, and thus the relationship between states in the periphery and GDP per capita is negative.

(e) Index of Power Resources: According to Welzel, Inglehart, and Kligemann’s (2003), there is a relationship between the Index of Power Resources variable and the level of human development in a country. As GDP per capita is a component of the human development measure, I predict there to be a positive relationship between these two variables.

(f) Internal Armed Conflict: Arms are assumed to be in high demand in states currently engaged in internal armed conflict. Thus, the relationship between internal armed conflict and arms transfers is hypothesized to be positive.

(g) Life Expectancy: Arms have been shown to increase the likelihood of armed conflict (see Pearson et al. 1989, Craft 1999, Sislin and Pearson 2001). Also, armed conflict has been shown to have a negative relationship to life expectancy (Li and Wen 2005). Therefore, this relationship is hypothesized to be negative.

After this analysis, I will use a nonrecursive causal model to explore the likely direction of arms flows, as well as strengthen our theory regarding the stability measure. To accomplish these tasks I utilize two separate statistical
First, I estimate each equation independently using Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors regression (PCSEs) to control for possible autocorrelation in the model. Such a technique is useful in this instance because of the inability of OLS regression to control for autocorrelation in the simultaneous equation environment. This method when paired with the construction of nonrecursive multiple-equation model should provide valuable insight into direction of arms flows to the developing world while creating a process capable of identifying unreasonably high levels of autocorrelation. While this statistical method is not ideal, it represents perhaps the most efficient means available to test this hypothesis in the simultaneous equation, pooled data environment while maintaining the means necessary to investigate the possibility of autocorrelation.

As implied above, the purpose of the nonrecursive simultaneous equation model is to empirically establish a link among the three variables being used to define stability, as well as provide insight into the direction of arms flows. This nonrecursive causal model is presented in Figure 1. It consists of three endogenous variables: human development, quality of governance, and democracy. Arms transfers will be one of eleven exogenous variables present in the model, and will be operationalized in all three regression equations. As is common with nonrecursive models, two-stage least squares with error components (EC2SLS) will be used to estimate this particular model (referred to as XTIVREG in Stata 10).

To begin this analysis, I will estimate the regression equation that seeks to explain human development. It will be operationalized in both the initial Prais-Winsten PCSEs regression analysis, as well as the simultaneous equation system. The hypothesized relationship between human development and the first endogenous variable in the equation, quality of governance, is a positive one. Several contemporary cross-sectional studies have found that there is a statistically significant relationship among the three indicators of human development: GDP per capita, life expectancy, education, and the three indicators that compose the quality of governance measure that is utilized in this study: corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality (Gupta, Davoodi, Alonso-Terme 2002; see also Mauro...
The next regression equation to be estimated in both the initial Prais-Winsten PCSEs regression analysis, as well as the simultaneous equation system, seeks to explain the variation in the quality of governance of a country. The hypothesized relationship between quality of governance and the first endogenous variable, human development, is positive. This reflects the literature noted above that proposes that as the three indicators that compose the quality of governance measure improve, this should be accompanied by a rise in the level of human development as defined by the three indicators noted above.

The relationship between human development and democracy, the second endogenous variable in this equation, is also hypothesized to be positive. Welzel and Inglehart (1999) argue that democratization is a critical component of human development. They conclude that as human development increases, this allows for a greater access to human resources, which in turn lead to greater liberty aspirations. This contributes to the establishment of democratic institutions by allowing the society in question to pressure the centralized authority, eventually leading to a greater level of democracy. It can be argued, therefore, that the underlying theme of the concept of human development is in fact human choice (Welzel, Inglehart, and Kligemann 2003). The GDP per capita component is a proxy of economic development, which allows society to take part in the democratic process. The education and life expectancy components function as a means to measure the effectiveness of government, as well as the availability of basic social services. Furthermore, low levels of GDP per capita, education, and life expectancy seem to indicate that inner-society is alienated from the decision-making process, thus unable to influence government policy or demand governmental accountability.

The hypothesized relationship between arms transfers and human development is positive, reflecting contemporary literature on the subject that the global arms trade has been globalized following the end of the Cold War (Bitzinger 1994; Lansford 2002; Neumann 1995). It is argued that this has led to the commercialization of the arms trade, affording arms producers the freedom to target wealthier, more developed countries in the developing world (Boucher 1995; Brzoska 2004). In a preliminary analysis of the data to be used in this study, I found there to be a statistically insignificant positive correlation of .087 between arms transfers and human development from 1986-1990. Using data from 1991-1999 however, I found there to be a positive correlation of .190, which is statistically significant at the .01 level. Although more analysis is needed, this seems to affirm what the current literature asserts: that the global arms trade is more commercial and thus beginning to mimic the flow of basic consumer goods (this will be explored further in the Results section of this paper).

Along with arms transfers this equation will include seven other exogenous variables, many of which have been shown in previous studies to be statistically significant in explaining variation in human development. Below is a list of these variables, along with a short theoretical explanation for their use in this equation:

(a) Ethnic Fractionalization: In a study by Easterly (2001), higher levels of ethnic diversity were found to have a negative effect on health outcomes and the number of publicly provided health services.

(b) Number of Armed Conflicts: Armed conflict has been linked to economic hardship (Muggah and Batchelor 2002), poor public health (Banatvala and Zwi 2000), and the inability of a society to reconstruct educational infrastructure following conflict (Wessells 1998).

(c) Protestant Tradition: This variable will account for the historically strong positive correlation between countries with a large percentage of Protestants and economic growth (Inglehart 1988). Although this relationship has dramatically weakened over time, it is still of interest to scholars seeking to explain variation in economic performance (see Stulz and Williamson 2003, Thomas and Mueller 2000).

(d) Age Structure: Age structure has been shown to be statistically significant in explaining variation in economic growth (Kogel 2005; see also Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000).

(e) Oil Reserves: Oil-rich countries tend to use their oil revenues to “finance diversified investments, and a big push in industrial development” (Sachs and Warner 1997). This implies a positive relationship between the amount of oil in a country and economic growth.

(f) Chief Executive in Military: If the chief executive of a country is a member of the military, it is likely that the individual in power holds different values and/or priorities than that of the general population. I predict that a member of the military is more likely to favor increased military spending over spending on social services that would enhance human development. Thus, this relationship is hypothesized to be negative.

(g) Index of Power Resources: As the relative level and distribution of economic, intellectual, and organizational resources increases, the level of human development should also increase. This is consistent with Welzel, Inglehart, and Kligemann’s (2003) view that this measure of “individual resources” is a critical component of human development.

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GDP per capita, access to education, and life expectancy. As corruption decreases, this allows for a higher quality of public infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997) and increased foreign investment (Habib and Zurawicki 2002), both of which have a positive relationship to human development (Globerman and Shapiro 2003). An increase in law and order and bureaucratic quality provides society a sense of relative security and affords government the ability to provide public services and implement public policy.

The relationship between quality of governance and the second endogenous variable in the equation, democracy, is also hypothesized to be positive. Democracy is considered a sign of a well-functioning government and allows for state institutions to be modified or adjusted according to the needs of society (La Porta et al. 1999). Democracy and civil liberties have also been shown to have a strong positive relationship to the performance of government with regards to investment projects (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1997). Exposure to democracy has also been shown to lower the level of corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Sung 2004; Treisman 2000). It appears therefore, that an effective democratic system creates an environment in which government accountability is commonplace, and public access to governmental infrastructure is not limited, which in turn allows citizens to retain some control over their officials. This leads to a better quality of governance by preventing the institutionalization of corruption, promoting law and order, and by demanding better bureaucratic quality as a means to implement public policy.

The hypothesized relationship between arms transfers and the quality of governance is similar to that of the relationship between arms transfers and human development. It is hypothesized to be positive reflecting the contemporary literature noted above that asserts that the global arms trade has become globalized, and thus commercialized, in the post-Cold War period. In a study examining the causal relationship between globalization and governance, the researchers concluded that openness to trade results in a decrease in corruption and thus better governance (Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo 2001). In this study, I assume that the flow of arms has been fundamentally altered as asserted by contemporary literature and thus place arms transfers in this conceptual framework. Therefore arms, like basic consumer goods, should have a positive relationship to the quality of governance in the importing state.

This regression equation includes five other exogenous variables, many of which have been utilized in previous studies in an attempt to explain variation in quality of governance. Below is a list of these variables along with a brief theoretical explanation for the inclusion in this equation:

(a) British Colony: It has been asserted that a reliance on a common law legal system, which is found in many former British colonies, results a more egalitarian form of government (La Porta et al. 1999). This has been confirmed by a number of studies who found a statistically significant relationship between former British rule and corruption (see Herzfeld and Weiss 2003, Treisman 2000).

(b) Protestant Tradition: Sandholz and Koetzle (2000) found that the higher percentage of the population that is Protestant, the less corrupt the state in question is. This finding “confirms the hypothesis that the Protestant emphasis on individual responsibility and rectitude carries over into a reduced tolerance for corruption.”

(c) Oil Reserves: The more dependent a country is on oil revenue, the more likely it will suffer from several political deficiencies. Government that operates within an oil dependent country tends to act independent of their citizens, be prone to political collapse, be non-transparent in their use of public funds, and have poor functioning bureaucratic structures (Moore 2004).

(d) Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign direct investment tends to flow to countries that exhibit low levels of corruption (Habib and Zurawicki 2002) and are perceived to have a strong bureaucratic structure (Busse and Hefeker 2007).

(e) Number of Armed Conflicts: Armed conflict is assumed to inhibit the ability of a government to provide basic social services to its population due to the constraints placed on government expenditures and human capital. Therefore, it is hypothesized that armed conflict will lead to a breakdown in law and order and also weaken the bureaucratic structure. This is consistent with Naizger and Auvinen’s (2002) conclusion that war and violence result in social disruption and the spread of hunger and disease.

The last regression equation to be estimated in both the Prais-Winsten PCSEs model, as well as the simultaneous equation system seeks to explain variation in democracy. The relationship between democracy and the two endogenous variables in the model, human development and quality of governance, has already been discussed in this section. Both relationships are hypothesized to be positive, which reflects contemporary literature that seems to indicate that higher levels of democracy are associated with higher levels of human development and better governance (see Welzel and Inglehart 1999, La Porta et al. 1999, Sung 2004).
The hypothesized relationship between the exogenous variable of interest, arms transfers, and democracy is negative. While several recent studies have shown that democracies are more likely to receive arms than non-democracies (Blanton and Kegley 1997; Blanton 2000), it is important to make the distinction between who receives arms and what kind of effects these arms have on the governmental and societal structure of the importing state. I predict that the simultaneous equation model will reveal a causal relationship between arms transfers and democracy that will indeed be negative, implying perhaps that in the context of the developing world arms function as a means to preserve the status-quo, thus preventing the growth of democratic institutions.

Six other exogenous variables are operationalized in this regression equation. Below is a list of these variables along with a brief theoretical explanation for their use in this particular equation:

(a) Ethnic Fractionalization: The more ethnically diverse a country is, the less democratic it tends to be. Such a result has been confirmed in cross-sectional studies conducted by Burkhart (1997, 2007).

(b) British Colony: It is commonly argued that countries that were once under British rule are likely to inherit democratic intuitions and social values sympathetic to democracy from their former ruler. Lipset et al. (1993) argues that such a colonial experience provides a critical learning experience in the ways of democratic governance.

(c) Age Structure: I hypothesize that the younger the population, the less democratic the state in question will be. Such an assumption is predicated on the view that since the young tend vote less frequently, emerging democratic infrastructure in the developing world will be more open to political exploitation, thus undermining the democratic process.

(d) Oil Reserves: In the developing world, oil tends to have antidemocratic properties. In a study, Ross (2001) found that in more developed countries oil brings wealth and democracy, while in under-developed states it tends to prevent the birth of democratic institutions.

(e) World System Position: Several studies have indicated that states that reside in the periphery are less democratic than states that reside in the semi-periphery or in the core (see Burkhart 1997, Gonick and Rosh 1988). This is hypothesized to be a negative relationship in this analysis as well because the variable utilized in this study will be a dummy variable coded 1 if the country is in the periphery and 0 if it resides outside of the periphery.

(f) Index of Power Resources: As the relative distribution of economic, intellectual, and organizational resources increase, the level of democracy should also increase. The concentration of power resources in the hands of a few tends to lead to the centralization of political power, while an equal distribution of these resources contributes to the sharing of political power, thus promoting the construction of democratic institutions (Vanhanen 1997).

When expressed in full equation form, the model is as follows. It will be estimated on pooled data from 88 countries in the developing world between the years 1986-1999 (the countries used in this study are listed in the Appendix section of this paper).

\[ HD = f(QG^*, DM^*, A, F, C, P, AS, OR, E, IP) \]
\[ QG = f(HD^*, DM^*, A, B, P, OR, FI, C) \]
\[ DM = f(HD^*, QG^*, A, F, B, AS, OR, WS, IP) \]

Theory being:
Stability = f(HD, QG, DM)

Where: HD = human development; QG = quality of governance; DM = democracy; HD* = instrument for human development; QG* = instrument for quality of governance; DM* = instrument for democracy; A = arms transfers; F = ethnic fractionalization; C = number of conflicts; P = Protestant tradition; AS = age structure; OR = proven oil reserves; E = chief executive member of military; IP = index of power resources; B = British colony; FI = foreign direct investment; WS = world system position.

(In the Prais-Winsten PCSEs estimations, the instruments for the endogenous variables used in the equations are replaced by the actual variable.)

To test the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between arms transfers and stability in the developing world, it is first necessary to construct the empirical measure that will be used to define stability. This is accomplished by estimating each regression equation operationalized in the simultaneous equation system.
independently of one another via OLS regression. This provides the unstandardized predicted values of each dependent variable. The measure of stability used in study is simply the summation of these predicted values. This stability variable will function as the dependent variable in a Prais-Winsten PCSEs regression equation. The model will consist of eight control variables, as well as the independent variable of interest, arms transfers.

The primary hypothesis of this study, therefore, will be estimated on pooled data from a sample of 88 countries in the developing world between the years of 1986-1999. The reason for each variable’s inclusion in this equation has been discussed previously and does not warrant further discussion. The regression equation is as follows:

\[ ST = f(A, IC, GDP, E, F, T, IP, WS, OR) \]

Where: \( ST \) = stability; \( A \) = arms transfers; \( IC \) = internal armed conflict; \( GDP \) = GDP per capita; \( E \) = chief executive member of military; \( F \) = ethnic fractionalization; \( T \) = political terror scale (state department); \( IP \) = index of power resources; \( WS \) = world system position; \( OR \) = proven oil reserves.

**Data**

The data for arms transfers was taken from the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report, which is published by the Department of State (formerly the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). This data source is preferable to other data sources because it includes government-to-government arms transfers as well as direct commercial transfers (enterprise-to-government). Small arms are also included, which is essential given this study’s focus on the developing world. The various sources of the data are also clearly defined. According to the report, arms transfers include:

… military equipment, usually referred to as “conventional,” including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use. Among the items included are tactical guided missiles and rockets, military aircraft, naval vessels, armored and nonarmored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and uniforms. (US Department of State 2000)

This data source has rightfully been criticized for a number of different reasons. Scholars feel that the data underestimates actual arms deliveries (Craft and Smaldone 2002) and suffers from a number of data discrepancy issues (Brzoska 1982; Levine et al. 1998). Although such criticism seems justified, the WMEAT data is arguably the best source available to researchers seeking to construct quantitative models exploring the global arms trade. This is due to the inclusion of small arms in the dataset, something the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database fails to account for.

In order to account for variation in human development, the United Nation’s Human Development Index is not an appropriate measure with regards to this study. While the data does go back to 1985 as required, country coverage is limited and would require a significant reduction in the sample size utilized in this study. Also, for the years prior to 1990 the index was computed in five-year increments, which is problematic with regards to time-series analysis. Therefore, using the UN’s theoretical framework, I construct a human development measure for all 88 countries from 1986-1999. Like the UN’s index, the measure consists of GDP per capita and life expectancy at the time of birth, albeit from different sources. Due to data availability problems, I replace adult literacy rates and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schooling with Vanhanen’s (1997) Index of Knowledge Distribution. Vanhanen’s index is the arithmetic mean of the percentage of students enrolled in higher education institutions per 100,000 inhabitants of the country and literates as a percentage of the adult population.

This new measure is calculated the same way as the UN’s Human Development Index. Each one of the three variables (GDP per capita, life expectancy, knowledge index) is converted into a measure between 0-1. This is accomplished by subtracting the minimum value for the year in question by the actual value observed in the country in question. This value is divided by the difference between the maximum value and the minimum value. In the case of GDP per capita, the log of GDP per capita is used. The summation of these three values (after each is multiplied by 1/3) is the measure that will be used to account for variation in human development in this study. Therefore, the scale is between 0-1, the closer to 1 having a higher level of human development. It is a valid and reliable substitution, as evident by the nearly perfect correlation of .968 (N=150) between this measure and the U.N.’s Human Development Index.
The data for quality of governance is an index comprised of subjective indicators taken from the International Country Risk Guide dataset constructed by the PRS Group. The PRS Group is a private firm that provides political risk analysis to overseas lenders and investors. The measure consists of three variables: corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. Corruption refers to corruption within the political system, law and order to the strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law, and bureaucratic quality refers to the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. Each variable is measured on a scale from 0-1, with the arithmetic mean of these variables comprising the index. Therefore, the scale is 0-1, the closer to 1 having a better quality of governance as measured by the indicators noted above.

The data for democracy is a combination of the Freedom House civil liberties and political rights measure, and the POLITY IV dataset. The average of the Freedom House civil liberties and political rights score is transformed into a scale 0-10, as is the POLITY measure. These two values are averaged together to form the democracy variable that will be operationalized in this study. Missing POLITY values were imputed by regressing POLITY on the average Freedom House measure. This democracy measure has been shown by Hadenius and Teorell (2005) to perform better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

Control variables

(a) Ethnic Fractionalization: Reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized the society in question (Alesina et al. 2003).
(b) Number of Conflicts: The number of conflicts in which the government of the country is involved (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
(c) Protestant Tradition: Protestants as percentage of the population in 1980 (La Porta et al. 1999).
(d) Age Structure: The percentage of the population that is between the ages of 0-14. Data from the International Database (IDB) maintained by the United States Census Bureau.
(e) Proven Oil Reserves: The amount of proven oil reserves measured in the thousand million barrels (BP Energy 2008).
(f) Chief Executive Member of the Military: This is a dummy variable coded 0 if the chief executive is not a member of the military, and a 1 if he/she is a member of the military (Beck et al. 2001).
(g) Index of Power Resources: Computed as the product of Index of Occupation Diversification (arithmetic mean of urban population as a percentage of the population and non-agricultural population also as a percentage), Index of Knowledge Distribution (arithmetic mean of students in higher education as a percentage of the population and literacy also measured as a percentage of the population), and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (arithmetic mean of family farms as percentage of the population, and the decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources). The higher the score, the greater the relative distribution of power resources (Vanhanen 1997).
(h) British Colony: A dummy variable coded 0 if the country has not been colonized by the British since 1700 and 1 if the country has been colonized by Britain since 1700.
(i) Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign Direct Investment inflows in current U.S. dollars, measured in millions (UNCTD, various years).
(j) World System Position: A dummy variable coded 0 if the country does not reside in the periphery, and 1 if the country does reside in the periphery (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994).
(k) Internal Armed Conflict: Conflicts that occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. Coded 0 if there is no internal armed conflict, 1 if there is minor internal armed conflict, 2 if there is intermediate internal armed conflict, and 3 if there is internal war (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
(l) GDP per capita: GDP levels in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars, a hypothetical unit of currency with purchasing power equal to that of the U.S. dollar in the United States at a given point in time (Maddison 2007).
(m) Political Terror Scale: A human rights score on a scale 1-5. A rating of 1 indicating that countries are under a secure rule of law and 5 indicating high levels of politically motivated murder, disappearances, and torture (Gibney et al. 2008). Therefore, the higher the number the more political terror is being inflicted on the citizenry of the country in question.
Methods

To test the model constructed to explore the transformation of the US arms industry following the end of the Cold War, as well as the model intended to examine the relationship between arms transfers and stability in this study, I utilize Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error regression in the Stata 10 software package. This technique is useful for models that are utilizing pooled time-series data because of the ability to estimate a separate autocorrelation coefficient for each country in the model. As the dataset used in this study falls into this category, this is an ideal method to estimate the models constructed for the purpose of this analysis.

In estimating the second model used in this study, the nonrecursive multiple-equation model, I assume that human development, quality of governance, and democracy have a causal relationship to one another and thus interact simultaneously. Evidence of this assumed relationship is found in contemporary literature referenced in the Models section of this paper. There appears to be a robust relationship between these three indicators of stability. Higher levels of human development appear to be associated with better quality of governance and more democratic countries. Better quality of governance seems to be associated with higher levels of human development and democracy, and higher levels of democracy are seen in countries that exhibit strong governance and high levels of human development.

The endogenous variables (human development, quality of governance, and democracy) in the model are represented by instrumental variables in two-stage least squared modeling. The technique referred to as XTIVREG in the software package Stata 10 is used for model estimation.

Results and Discussion

The model constructed to test the relationship between GDP per capita, world system position, and arms transfers performed as expected. As shown in Table 1, during the time period 1986-1990 there was a statistically insignificant relationship between arms transfers and GDP per capita. This result remained consistent regardless of which dependent variable was operationalized in the regression analysis. Also noteworthy is the relationship between states that reside in the periphery and arms transfers. This relationship proved to be a statistically significant negative relationship, indicating that during the years 1986-1990 arms tended flow to countries outside of the periphery. These results confirm the first part of our hypothesis: that GDP per capita did not play a significant role with regards to arms flows in the Cold War period. Also, the negative relationship between world system position and arms transfers indicate that in the Cold War period U.S. arms producers were not dependent upon exports to the developing world. The adjusted r-squared statistics of .769 and .527 respectively, indicates that both models are effective in explaining variation in the dependent variables utilized in each equation.

Table 1. Prais-Winsten Regression Results: Cold War Arms Transfers versus post-Cold War Arms Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-.455 (1.414)</td>
<td>-440.52 (1.414)</td>
<td>.132** (2.158)</td>
<td>470.07** (2.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>37.83** (2.230)</td>
<td>-25.98* (1.909)</td>
<td>-65.76 (.020)</td>
<td>10.09 (1.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>-91.27** (5.116)</td>
<td>-2.363 (.345)</td>
<td>-83.28** (6.565)</td>
<td>-16.53** (3.694)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>29.68** (5.442)</td>
<td>21.67** (15.901)</td>
<td>11.41** (2.091)</td>
<td>24.55** (28.948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>-1732.37** (5.993)</td>
<td>-275.45** (2.450)</td>
<td>-2030.51** (5.570)</td>
<td>303.22** (4.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>39.67* (1.894)</td>
<td>-1.25 (.190)</td>
<td>137.44** (9.981)</td>
<td>7.50* (1.791)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>-277.46** (3.236)</td>
<td>108.25** (3.169)</td>
<td>-435.14** (2.935)</td>
<td>41.54* (1.717)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>73.69** (16.078)</td>
<td>5.028 (.849)</td>
<td>45.26** (16.590)</td>
<td>-10.63** (3.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = arms transfers; GDP = GDP per capita; DM = democracy; AS = age structure; OR = oil reserves; WS = world system position; IP = index of power resources; IC = internal armed conflict; LE = life expectancy. Figures are unstandardized coefficients; absolute z-scores in parentheses. ** = significant according to two-tailed test of significance; * = significant according to one-tailed test of significance.
The control variables also performed as expected in the first regression equation. When GDP per capita is operationalized as the dependent variable, every variable with the exception of the arms transfers variable is found to be statistically significant. During the years 1986-1990, I find there to be a positive relationship between the dependent variable, GDP per capita, and four of the control variables: democracy, the amount of proven oil reserves, index of power resources, and life expectancy at time of birth. A negative relationship is found to exist between the dependent variable and two control variables: age structure and the internal armed conflict variable. These findings are consistent with several contemporary studies referenced in the Models section of this paper.

When estimating the second equation representing the years 1986-1990, only three of the six control variables remain statistically significant: democracy, proven oil reserves, and internal armed conflict. The relationship between the dependent variable and democracy is negative, while I find that arms transfers have a positive relationship to the amount of proven oil reserves inside of a country as well as the presence of internal armed conflict. This seems to indicate that during the Cold War period arms found their way to nondemocratic states. It also seems to show that oil-rich states, as well as states involved in conflict, demanded and thus received arms from U.S. suppliers.

During the post-Cold War period which is represented by the years 1991-1999, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between arms transfers and GDP per capita. The z-score of 2.158 is significant according to the two-tailed test of significance and seems to show that as the Cold War came to an end, arms producers began to target more economically developed countries. Such a finding is consistent with the literature referenced in this Models section of this paper. Interestingly, the world system position variable remained statistically significant but changed directions. The relationship between this variable and arms transfers during the years 1991-1999 was strongly positive as indicated by the z-score of 4.011, significantly different from the statistically significant negative z-score of -2.450 during the years 1986-1990. This seems to indicate that following the end of the Cold War, U.S. arms producers began to target foreign markets as a means to survive in the post-Cold War period. Again, this result is consistent with the contemporary literature on the subject referenced in the Models section of this paper. Both models constructed to test the post-Cold War period were effective in explaining variation in the dependent variables as indicated by the adjusted R-squared values of .769 and .624 respectively.

The control variables used in both regression equations constructed to test the years 1991-1999 remained statistically significant whether the dependent variable was GDP per capita or arms transfers. I find there to be a positive relationship between the dependent variable GDP per capita and three of the control variables: proven oil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>DV: Human Dev.</th>
<th>DV: Quality of Gov.</th>
<th>DV: Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>.288** (4.42)</td>
<td>1.176 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QG</td>
<td>.036 (1.17)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>.819 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>.002* (1.89)</td>
<td>.002* (1.61)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5.26e-06 (1.42)</td>
<td>.001** (3.03)</td>
<td>-.001** (3.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>.001** (5.72)</td>
<td>-.000 (0.77)</td>
<td>-.018** (4.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-.008* (1.69)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>-.001* (1.78)</td>
<td>.001 (0.67)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>-.012** (9.32)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-.010 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-.009** (3.84)</td>
<td>-.013** (3.49)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>.004** (2.26)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>.105** (4.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-.162** (6.75)</td>
<td>-.730 (0.73)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>2.47e-06** (2.42)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>.028* (1.71)</td>
<td>-.191 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-.411 (0.93)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>.935** (16.26)</td>
<td>.312** (7.21)</td>
<td>3.815** (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.849</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HD = human development; QG = quality of governance; DM = democracy; A = arms transfers; OR = oil reserves; E = chief executive member of the military; P = Protestant tradition; AS = age structure; C = number of armed conflicts; IP = index of power resources; F = ethnic fractionalization; FI = foreign direct investment; B = British colony; WS = world system position. Figures are unstandardized coefficients; absolute z-scores in parentheses. ** = significant according to two-tailed test of significance; * = significant according to one-tailed test of significance.
reserves, index of power resources, and life expectancy at birth. A negative relationship was found to exist between GDP per capita and two control variables: age structure and internal armed conflict. When arms transfers are operationalized as the dependent variable we find that there is a positive relationship between the dependent variable and three control variables: proven oil reserves, index of power resources, and internal armed conflict. A negative relationship exists between arms transfers and two control variables: age structure and life expectancy at birth. The democracy variable was found to be statistically insignificant in both models.

Prior to estimating the nonrecursive simultaneous equation model, I first tested each equation via Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error regression. The first equation significantly explains variation in human development as evident by the adjusted R-squared value of .849. With the exception of the quality of governance and arms transfers variable, all independent variables in the equation are shown to be statistically significant. There exists a positive relationship between human development and three independent variables: democracy, proven oil reserves, and index of power resources. Negative relationships were found in the case of the remaining five independent variables: chief executive a member of the military, Protestant tradition, age structure, number of conflicts, and ethnic fractionalization. The only variable that deviated from its hypothesized relationship to human development was the Protestant tradition variable. Such a finding seemingly supports the assertion that while a historically positive relationship did exist between this variable and economic growth, this variable has significantly changed over time (Inglehart 1988). The results of this study seem to show that in the case of the developing world, the higher the percentage of the population that is Protestant the lower the level of human development.

The second equation performed as expected. With an R-squared value of .766, the model significantly explains variation in quality of governance. Two of the independent variables were found to be statistically insignificant: Protestant tradition and proven oil reserves. There exists a positive relationship between quality of governance and five of the independent variables: democracy, arms transfers, human development, British colony, and foreign direct investment. Negative relationships existed between the dependent variable, quality of governance, and the number of conflicts the state in question was currently involved. Every variable performed as hypothesized in the Methods section of this paper.

The third and final equation seeks to explain variation in democracy. With an R-squared value of .310 this model proves to be somewhat weak, perhaps resulting from several statistically insignificant variables: human development, ethnic fractionalization, British colony, age structure, and world system position. While these variables were found to be effective in explaining variation in democracy is several previous studies noted in the Models section of this paper, this study seems to indicate that in the case of the developing world, their significance may not be as strong. Of the three statistically significant variables in the model two were negative: arms transfers and proven oil reserve. The only positive relationship was that between democracy and the index of power resources variable.

As seen in table 3 (below), when estimating the nonrecursive simultaneous equation model we find statistically significant relationships among the three indicators of stability. This confirms the theory that there exists a causal relationship among these three indicators. With regards to the first equation, the model reveals a positive relationship between human development and democracy. This supports the assertion made by Welzel and Inglehart (1999) that democracy is a critical component of human development. There is however a negative relationship between human development and the quality of governance instrument. This result contradicts my hypothesis that this relationship would be positive in accordance with contemporary studies that have concluded that there is a positive relationship between the three variables that comprise the human development measure and the three indicators of good governance (see Mauro 1995, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).

The endogenous variables in the second equation performed as expected. In seeking to explain variation in quality of governance, the instruments for democracy has a positive relationship to governance. This seems to show that higher levels of democracy are associated with a better quality of governance as defined by the three variables that compose the measure. Such a finding is consistent with the view that democracy is a sign of well-functioning government because it allows for the governing institutions to be readily adjusted to meet the needs of society (La Porta et al. 1999). The model revealed a positive relationship between quality of governance and the instrument for human development. Such a finding is consistent with the literature noted in the Models section of this paper.
Table 3. Nonrecursive Causal Model Results: Human Development, Quality of Governance, and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>DV: Human Dev.</th>
<th>DV: Quality of Gov.</th>
<th>DV: Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td></td>
<td>.233** (4.02)</td>
<td>2.708* (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QG</td>
<td>-.419** (2.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>.025** (2.19)</td>
<td>.027** (7.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.001** (3.59)</td>
<td>.001** (2.22)</td>
<td>-.001** (3.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>.001 (0.62)</td>
<td>.001 (0.28)</td>
<td>-.022** (5.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>.052** (2.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>-.002 (0.88)</td>
<td>-.001 (0.91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>-.010** (3.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-.016** (2.71)</td>
<td>-.035** (6.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>.001 (0.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-.213** (2.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.464** (3.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.31e-06** (2.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>.070** (3.88)</td>
<td>-.728** (4.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>1.041** (7.01)</td>
<td>.231** (8.53)</td>
<td>-5.359** (2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.369</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HD = human development; QG = quality of governance; DM = democracy; A = arms transfers; OR = oil reserves; E = chief executive member of the military; P = Protestant tradition; AS = age structure; C = number of armed conflicts; IP = index of power resources; F = ethnic fractionalization; FI = foreign direct investment; B = British colony; WS = world system position. Figures are unstandardized coefficients; absolute z-scores in parentheses. ** = significant according to two-tailed test of significance; * = significant according to one-tailed test of significance.

The third equation that seeks to explain variation in democracy performs as expected. The model shows a positive relationship between democracy and the instrument for human development, the first endogenous variable in the equation. This provides support for our hypothesis that higher levels of democracy are associated with higher levels of human development. The second endogenous variable, the instrument for quality of governance is also found to have a positive relationship to democracy. The z-score of 5.29 provides robust support for my hypothesis that more democratic regimes tend to have a better quality of governance as measured by lack of corruption, the ability of the government to ensure law and order, and bureaucratic quality.

The arms transfers’ variable also performed as hypothesized in the simultaneous equation environment. It appears that arms tend to flow to highly developed, well governed countries in the developing world. This is evident by the z-score of 3.59 in the equation seeking to explain variation in human development, and the z-score of 2.22 in the equation seeking to explain variation in quality of governance. However, in the third equation the model shows that there is a negative relationship between democracy and arms transfers. The z-score of -3.39 indicates that high levels of arms transfers are associated with lower levels of democracy. Arms seem to have antidemocratic properties when transferred to countries in the developing world.

As seen in table 4 (below), the model constructed to test the relationship between arms transfers and stability in the developing world performed as hypothesized. Utilizing the stability measure as the dependent variable, I find that there is a statistically significant relationship between arms transfers and stability in the developing world. The z-score of -1.63 seems to indicate that high levels of arms transfers are associated with lower levels of nation-state stability. While the arms transfers’ variable is significant according to the one-tailed test of significance, these results should not be considered robust. As evident by the large z-score values of the control variables used in the equation, the fact that the stability measure was constructed using many of these variables as predictors may have inflated the z-scores in the model. Therefore, while there may indeed be a negative relationship between arms and stability, the strength and significance of this relationship warrants further research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>HD: Stability Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.001** (15.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Armed Conflict</td>
<td>-.324** (13.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Transfers</td>
<td>-.001* (1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Member of Military</td>
<td>-.497** (9.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>-3.934** (27.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
<td>-0.39** (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Power Resources</td>
<td>.255** (22.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World System Position</td>
<td>-1.649** (10.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Oil Reserves</td>
<td>-.029** (22.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>14.640** (52.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are unstandardized coefficients; absolute z-scores in parentheses. ** = significant according to two-tailed test of significance; * = significant according to one-tailed test of significance.

Of the eight control variables operationalized in the equation, three variables were not used as predictors when constructing the stability measure: GDP per capita, internal armed conflict, and the political terror scale. All of these variables proved to be statistically significant in explaining variation in stability. The relationship between stability and GDP per capita was positive, while the relationship between stability and the other two control variables were seen to be negative. This is consistent with what would be expected; high levels of GDP per capita promote stability, while internal armed conflict and high instances of political terror have an adverse effect on nation-state stability.

The remaining five control variables also performed as expected. Stability was found to have a positive relationship to the index of power resources. A negative relationship was seen between stability and the four remaining control variables: chief executive a member of the military, ethnic fractionalization, world system position, and proven oil reserves. The model was effective in explaining variation in stability as evident by the R-squared statistic of .986.

Conclusions and Implications

The results from the 88 countries sampled in this study seems to provide robust support for the assertion in contemporary literature that the global arms trade was fundamentally altered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It appears that in the post-Cold War environment U.S. defense firms are turning to foreign markets located in the developing world in order to survive. The results of the simultaneous equation model provide support for this conclusion. The model seemed to show that arms flow to countries in the developing world that are highly developed (capable of paying for arms) and well-governed. However, it also indicates that arms tend to bring with them antidemocratic properties.

Arms transfers were found to have a negative relationship to nation-state stability, although this relationship should not be considered robust. Given the nature of the stability measure it is possible that this result was inflated and thus is not as strong as indicated by the z-score value. For now, one can conclude that this relationship is negative, although the strength of this relationship is in question. Consequently, the central question of this research remains unanswered. Whether nor not U.S. arms transfers are significantly contributing to the fracturing of social and political structures in the developing world remains a question of importance, both in terms of US national security and the well-being of the importing state.

Further research in this area should explore the relationship between democracy and arms transfers. The antidemocratic properties of arms when paired with the increased flow of arms to the developing world begs one to question whether or not such an industrial strategy and American foreign policy centered around the spread and promotion of democracy can coexist. Also, further research is necessary to determine how strong the relationship between arms and nation-state stability truly is. This question warrants further research given the national security consequences associated with weak states in the developing world.
References


Characterizing Twin Structure and Magnetic Domain Structure of Ni-Mn-Ga through Atomic Force

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Dr. Peter Müllner: Mentor
Materials Science and Engineering

Abstract

Ni-Mn-Ga is a ferromagnetic shape memory alloy that deforms by twin boundary motion. The magneto-mechanical properties depend strongly on the twin microstructure. A thermomechanical treatment was applied to a Ni-Mn-Ga single crystal with coexisting 10M and 14M martensite structures to create twin boundaries and align the short crystallographic c direction preferentially perpendicular to the surface. The resulting twin structure was characterized using atomic force microscopy (AFM) to obtain the surface relief caused by twinning. Magnetic force microscopy (MFM) was used to find the direction of easy magnetization (which coincides with the crystallographic c direction) of each twin. Among 18 possible twinning histories, ac twinning in 10M martensite was identified as the unique solution. The combination of AFM and MFM after thermomechanical treatment provides a non-destructive characterization of the twin microstructure including the identification of the crystallographic orientation of each twin and of each twin boundary plane.

Introduction

Ni-Mn-Ga is a magnetic shape memory alloy (MSMA) with potential applications in sensor and actuators devices, magnetic refrigeration, power generation, and computer memory. The magnetic, mechanical, and magneto-mechanical properties of Ni-Mn-Ga alloys depend strongly on the composition (e.g., [1,2]), martensite structure (e.g., [3,4]), and twin microstructure (e.g., [5]). Though the martensite structure is controlled to a large extent by the composition, there are compositions around 29-30 at.% Mn and 20-21 at.% Ga, for which multiple martensite structures were reported [6,7]. Due to the monoclinic lattice, a variety of twinning modes operate in both 10M and 14M martensites [8,9]. The magnetic-field-induced strain (MFIS) strongly depends on the twin microstructure which can be modified through appropriate training (e.g., [10]). Furthermore, the twin microstructure changes during cyclic experiments, e.g., via actuation in a rotating magnetic field [5,11]. The experimental verification of the correlation between twin microstructure, active twinning modes, and MFIS requires the non-destructive and spatially resolved characterization of twinning modes. It was shown in a recent study that atom probe techniques may be used to solve this task [12]. The aim of the present work is to expand on that study and systematically outline how the combined use of atomic force microscopy (AFM) and magnetic force microscopy (MFM) can be utilized to characterize crystallography and local arrangement of twin variants.

Twinning and Surface Relief

The surface relief at the mesoscopic scale caused by twinning is dependent on martensite orientation and the martensite structure. For monoclinic martensite (10 M and 14M) and surface planes parallel to {100}, the lattice parameters of the unit cell are correlated to the surface relief angle \( \phi_i \) (i = a, b, c) by [12,13]:

\[ \text{Surface Relief} \propto \sin(\phi_i) \]

63
\[
\varphi_a = \arctan \frac{b}{c} - \arctan \frac{c}{b} \\
\varphi_b = \arctan \frac{a}{c} - \arctan \frac{c}{a} \\
\varphi_c = \arctan \frac{b}{a} - \arctan \frac{a}{b}
\]

where \(a, b,\) and \(c\) are the lattice parameters when using a pseudo orthorhombic or a pseudo tetragonal unit cell \[14]\.

The index \(i\) of \(\varphi_i\) indicates which crystallographic direction is parallel to the twinning plane. The twinning modes are also named according to the lattice parameters which switch positions across the twin boundary. Fig. 1 shows the example of \(ac\) twinning with the relief angle \(\varphi_b\). Table I gives possible \(\varphi_i\) values depending on the type of twinning that occurs and which martensitic variant is present. Values for \(a, b,\) and \(c\) are taken from Sozinov et al. \[3\].

![Schematic illustrating the surface relief produced on a \{100\} surface by \(ac\) twinning. This is a cross-section of a twin perpendicular to the \(y\) direction. The orientation of the orthorhombic unit cell is indicated. The thick black lines are twin boundaries. The twin sequence is CAC (the letters indicate which crystallographic direction is perpendicular to the surface) and the surface relief angle is \(\varphi_b\).](image)

**Table 1.** Surface relief angle \(\varphi_i\) values for specific twinning systems in orthorhombic (14M) and tetragonal (10M) martensite calculated with Eqs. 1-3 and using lattice parameter of [3].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relief Angle</th>
<th>(\varphi_a)</th>
<th>(\varphi_b)</th>
<th>(\varphi_c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twinning</td>
<td>(bc)</td>
<td>(ac)</td>
<td>(ab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthorhombic (14M)</td>
<td>2.7°</td>
<td>6.5°</td>
<td>3.7°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetragonal (10M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5°</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The surface relief angles listed in Table 1 assume that the twins are formed in a region in which the surface was flat across the entire area prior to the formation of the twin, i.e., in the austenite phase. This is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, the surfaces are assumed to be parallel to \{100\} planes. To illustrate the variety of possible surface reliefs, a thought experiment is presented here. Assume a surface contains a relief due to \(ac\) twinning as schematically shown in Fig. 1. Individual twin domains are labeled A and C according to the crystallographic directions \(a\) and \(c\), which are perpendicular to the surface. Now the surface is polished perfectly flat (i.e., the twin relief is removed as in Fig. 2a). Upon heating through the reverse martensitic transformation, the twin boundaries disappear. A surface relief is formed (Fig. 2b) with angles equal and opposite to those in Fig. 1.

In the above thought experiment, the same twinning mode which was present before heating reappears during cooling. These are the only possibilities for twinning in 10M martensite. In 14M martensite, the twinning mode occurring during cooling may differ from the twinning mode present before heating. The next thought experiment explores the combination of different twinning modes using the example of \(bc\) twinning during cooling.

There are again four possibilities. First, for twinning on the previous twinning planes (i.e., inclined to the lower left)
and a sequence where CAC becomes CBC, the surface relief angle will change by \(-\phi_a\) during cooling so that the final relief angle equals the difference of \(\phi_b - \phi_a\) (Fig. 4a). Second, the twinning sequence may become BCB and the surface relief angle will change by \(+\phi_a\) during cooling to a total angle of \(\phi_b + \phi_a\) (Fig. 4b). Third, for twinning on twinning planes inclined to the lower right and a CBC twinning sequence, the surface relief angle will change to a total of \(\phi_b + \phi_a\) (Fig. 4c). And again the fourth possibility is that the twinning plane orientation may change and the twinning sequence becomes BCB. In this case, the surface relief angle equals the sum of \(\phi_b - \phi_a\) (Fig. 4d).

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 2. The \(ac\) twin found in Fig. 1 (a) after polishing and (b) at a temperature above the martensitic transformation where a double kink appears at the position of the former A domain. The angles are equal and opposite to the angles in Fig. 1.

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 3. Twinning options for \(ac\) twinning when cooling from the situation shown in Fig. 2b. (a) Twinning on the same planes as in Fig. 2a and the same twin sequence ACA changes the relief angle by \(-\phi_b\) and results in a flat surface; (b) reversal of the twin sequence to ACA increases the relief angle by \(+\phi_b\) to a total angle of \(2\phi_b\); (c) changing the twinning planes also doubles the final relief angle when keeping the sequence CAC; and (d) changing both the twinning sequence (from CAC to ACA) and the twinning plane orientation results in a flat surface.

There are other possibilities upon cooling from Fig. 2b. It is possible that twins will not form and the surface relief angle will be equal to \(\phi_b\). Furthermore, all twinning modes may occur with the traces of the twinning planes at different positions. The corresponding relief angles are \(\phi_a\), \(\phi_b\), and \(\phi_c\). Table 2 lists all possible relief angles from starting with one twinning type before thermomechanical treatment and upon cooling with the same type or different type of twinning. The probability of each twinning event depends on extrinsic factors.
Table 2. Total surface relief angle values after polishing going from twinning mode 1 to twinning mode 2 (or vice versa) upon heating and cooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Twinning mode 1</th>
<th>Twinning mode 2</th>
<th>Relief angle for additive shear [°]</th>
<th>Relief angle for subtractive shear [°]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tetragonal (10M)</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthorhombic (14M)</td>
<td>ab</td>
<td>ab</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bc</td>
<td>bc</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ab</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bc</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ab</td>
<td>bc</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4. Twinning options for bc twinning upon cooling when starting from the situation shown in Fig. 2b. (a) Twin sequence CBC and the same twin plane orientation as before heating leads to a final surface relief angle of \( \phi_b - \phi_a \); (b) twin sequence BCB and the same twin plane orientation as before heating leads to a final surface relief angle of \( \phi_b + \phi_a \); (c) twin sequence CBC with a different twinning plane orientation results in of \( \phi_b + \phi_a \); and (d) twin sequence BCB with twinning planes inclined to the right results in \( \phi_b - \phi_a \).

**Experimental**

A cuboidal sample cut from a Ni\(_{50}\)Mn\(_{29}\)Ga\(_{21}\) (numbers indicate atomic percent) single crystal with faces parallel to \{100\} was used. Electron diffraction taken on samples from the same crystal revealed two martensite structures, namely 10M and 14M. Cartesian coordinates were defined with the short, mid, and long edges parallel to the \( x \), \( y \), and \( z \) directions (Fig. 5). The sample was polished with a 1 \( \mu \)m diamond slurry. The larger face with the \( y \) direction normal to the surface was finished with Struers OP-AA acidic slurry to a final surface roughness of 2 nm. The sample was then heat treated at 150 °C. During heating and cooling, a constant load of (15 ± 3) MPa was applied in the \( x \) direction. This was done to align the crystallographic \( c \) direction parallel to the direction of the applied force. The crystallographic \( a \) and \( b \) directions align predominantly and with equal probability parallel to the \( y \) and \( z \) directions.
Fig. 5. Loading geometry for the thermomechanical treatment. The sample was compressed parallel to the shortest edge which is the x direction. Cartesian coordinates were defined as indicated. The crystallographic c direction is parallel to the x axis over most of the sample. There are two possibilities for the orientation of the crystallographic a and b directions. The AFM and MFM experiments were performed on the shaded surface normal to the y axis.

A Veeco Dimension 3100 Atomic Force Microscopy System with a Nanoscope V controller was used to characterize the surface relief and the magnetic structure of the surface. The surface relief was imaged in tapping mode using a Veeco MESP ferromagnetic tip coated with CrCo. For MFM, the tip was magnetized so that the magnetic moment of the tip was parallel to the tip axis and perpendicular to the sample surface.

Results

Following thermomechanical treatment, long bands were observed parallel to the z direction on the polished surface. These bands were identified as twins. AFM and MFM experiments were performed on the twins. Typical AFM and MFM results are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. The images were taken from the same larger area with a continuous relief of parallel ridges and valleys. Fig. 6a is a 3D height image of several twins and Fig 6b is a 29 µm long cross-section of said twins. The surface relief angle is $\varphi = 3.9^\circ \pm 0.4^\circ$. Fig. 6c and 6d are the 2D height image and 2D magnetic image of the area shown in Fig. 6a.

![3D AFM image of surface relief](image)

Fig. 6. (a) 3D AFM image of the surface relief found after thermomechanical treatment. The surface relief has bands of positive and negative slope. (b) A 29 µm cross-section of the surface with a surface relief angle $\varphi = 3.9^\circ \pm 0.4^\circ$. (c) AFM height image of the surface relief and (d) MFM magnetic image. The strong contrast indicates out-of-plane magnetization while the weak (neutral) contrast indicates in-plane magnetization [12]. The direction of magnetization is parallel to the crystallographic c direction. Every ridge and valley matches with a change in magnetic pattern. The position of the cross-section (b) is marked with a white line in (c).
Each change in slope of the surface relief corresponds to a change in the magnetic image of alternating dark and neutral bands. Dark areas in the MFM image indicate that the $c$ direction is perpendicular to the surface and the magnetic moment is going into the surface while bright areas correspond to the magnetic moment coming out of the surface [12]. In the bands with soft (or neutral) contrast, the $c$ direction is parallel to the sample surface as indicated with a white bar in Fig. 6d.

Fig. 7 shows the AFM 2D height image (Fig. 7a), the MFM image (Fig. 7b), and a 32 $\mu$m long cross-section of the height image (Fig. 7c) of a different section of the same larger surface area. For these twins, $\phi = 3.7^\circ \pm 0.3^\circ$. The AFM and MFM images are similar to what is seen in Fig. 6. However, there is an area in the middle of the scan where no slope change occurs in the surface relief yet there is a change in magnetic contrast from dark to neutral and back to dark. Thus, even though the surface is flat, the magnetization changes from perpendicular to the surface to parallel to the surface and back to perpendicular to the surface. Thus, there are twin boundaries without any surface relief.

**Discussion**

Since both martensite structures (10M and 14M) are formed in this crystal, all twinning modes with corresponding surface relief angles as listed in Tables I and II may be present. There are 18 twinning histories in total. The values found for the surface relief angle match for single $ac$ twinning in 10M martensite and for combined $ac$-$bc$ twinning in 14M martensite.

In Fig. 6, each transition from strong contrast to weak (neutral) contrast in the MFM image corresponds to a ridge or valley in the surface relief in the AFM image. The strong contrast in the MFM image shows an alternating of the $c$ direction perpendicular and parallel to the surface. If only considering this case, there are four possible twinning histories. If the martensite structure is 10M, the surface relief angle indicates single twinning. Thus, if no twins were present before heating, they must have formed during cooling. If twins were present before heating, the surface relief formed during heating and, therefore, no twinning occurred during cooling. However, the MFM image (Fig. 6d) indicates the presence of twins which rules out the latter case.

If the martensite structure is 14M, the surface relief angle resulted from a combination of $ac$ twinning and $bc$ twinning. If $ac$ twinning was present before heating and $bc$ twinning occurred during cooling, then the twin boundaries before and after heat treatment must be inclined towards the lower right (Fig. 8). If on the other hand $bc$ twinning was present before heating and $ac$ twinning occurred during cooling, then the twin boundaries before and after heat treatment must be inclined towards the lower left. The orientation of the twin boundaries is controlled by
the sequence of twins (e.g., CBC in Fig. 8c) and the position of the C twin domain being on the left side of the ridge (Fig. 6b,c). Analysis of twin crystallography as schematically shown in Fig. 1 yields the orientation of the twin boundary.

At first glance, the AFM and MFM images of the second situation shown in Fig. 7 are very similar to the situation shown in Fig. 6. The difference becomes evident when comparing AFM and MFM images for each case. In the first case (Fig. 6), the magnetic contrast changes six times from strong to weak and back to strong, indicating that there are six vertical twin boundaries in the field of view. Each twin boundary corresponds to a ridge or a valley in the relief which appear as three white lines (for ridges) and three black lines (for valleys) in Fig. 6c. This is in contrast to the situation in Fig. 7. Here again, there are six contrast changes in the magnetic image indicating six twin boundaries. However, the relief image (Fig. 7a) shows only two ridges (white lines) and two valleys (black lines). Therefore, there are two twin boundaries in the center of the image with zero surface relief angles.

As discussed in the thought experiments in the section on twinning and surface relief, a zero surface relief angle can only result when the same twinning mode occurs during cooling as was present before heating. An analysis of all combinations of twinning events yields three histories which are in agreement with the final surface relief and magnetic structure. The first is outlined in fig. 9. Here, there is one A twin domain present before heating. The A domain is sandwiched between two C domains, i.e., the sequence is CAC (Fig. 9a). Upon heating, a double surface kink appears with surface relief angle $\phi_b$ (Fig. 9b). Upon cooling, three A domains are formed between C domains, i.e., the final twin sequence is CACACAC. The double surface kink present at high temperature disappears at the position of the central A domain (which was present before heating). Two new surface kinks appear at the positions of the outer A domains with opposite slopes compared to the double kink at high temperature (Fig. 9b). The final situation (Fig. 9c) is in agreement with the experimental findings (Fig. 7) when assuming ac twinning in 10M martensite.

![Fig. 8. Possible twinning history for the situation shown in Fig. 6. Before heating (a), there is a CAC twinning sequence without surface kinks (this is the polished surface). (b) The transformation to the cubic austenite phase generates a double kink with surface relief angle $\phi_b$. (c) After cooling, bc twinning occurs resulting in a final surface relief angle of $\phi_b - \phi_a$.](image-url)
Fig. 9. Possible twinning history for the situation shown in Fig. 7. (a) Polished area with a CAC twin sequence. (b) Upon heating to above the reverse martensitic transformation temperature, a double surface kink with surface relief angle $\phi_b$ forms at the position of the former A domain. (c) In the event of $ac$ twinning during cooling, the central area forms an $ac$ twin with zero surface relief angle while the outer areas form $ac$ twins with a surface relief of $\phi_b$.

A number of twinning histories involving a combination of $ac$ and $bc$ twinning modes, leading to the characterized relief (Figs. 7a,c) and in agreement with the magnetic domain structure (i.e., with the crystallographic c direction out-of-plane where the magnetic contrast is strong, Fig. 7b) may be constructed. As an example, the final (impossible) twin sequence, which might be constructed by starting with a CACACAC twinning sequence (assuming 14M martensite) before heating and assuming CBCACBC twinning sequence upon cooling is shown in Fig. 10. This is in agreement with experiments (Fig.7). However, the direction parallel to the viewing direction is the crystallographic $b$ direction in the center twin and the crystallographic $a$ direction in the outer twins. Thus, these two twinning systems are not compatible since directions parallel to the twinning planes do not change across a twin boundary. This discrepancy rules out any history with combined $ac$ and $bc$ twinning.

Hence, the history displayed in Fig. 9 is the only consistent history in agreement with experimental findings. The crystallography of the twinning systems and twin boundary orientations were completely derived from the analysis of the surface relief and the orientation of the magnetic moments as displayed in the MFM images without aid of diffraction methods. These results demonstrate that the combination of atomic force and magnetic force microscopy provides a powerful non-destructive characterization tool for the spatially resolved crystallographic analysis of twinning systems.
Fig. 10. Impossible twinning sequence for the situation of Fig. 7. The starting sequence is assumed to be CACACAC. After cooling, the central area formed an \( ac \) twin with a surface relief angle of 0° while the outer areas underwent \( bc \) twinning leading to a final surface relief angle \( \varphi_b - \varphi_a \). The crystallographic direction parallel to the viewing direction is \( b \) in the center twin domain and \( a \) in the outer twin domains. This violates compatibility across twin boundaries.

### Conclusions

- The surface relief after treatment depends on the presence of twins before polishing and on the twinning mode during cooling.
- The crystallography of twinning systems in Ni-Mn-Ga can be characterized using a combination of AFM and MFM.
- The history of twinning events can be deduced from the analysis of surface relief angles in combination with the magnetic images.

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References


Abstract

Among the school-age population in Idaho, the populations most at risk for not graduating and or dropping out from high school are the children of migrant farm workers. According to data from the 2000 CPS, the dropout rate is 44.2% for Hispanics 16 through 24 who are born outside the United States. Previous research has focused on several contributing factors to the dropout rate such as, socioeconomic status, recent immigration, and linguistic differences, few studies however, have focused on the role of generational context as a possible factor. This study explores the role of generation as a factor influencing the dropout rate of migrant farm working children. It draws on narratives and life history accounts from 22 interviews of migrant workers, a project from the Hispanic Oral History Project conducted in 1991 for the Idaho State Historical Society. It concludes that the dropout rate among farm workers should be seen more accurately as a conflict between the collectivist cultural orientations of Latino farm worker students that clash with an educational system that emphasizes individual competition over cooperation.

Introduction

The United States is a land of immigrants, yet as Portes states, “never before has the United States received immigrants from so many countries (Portes 2006, 13). The focus of this study is generational choice and sacrifice within the Mexican immigrant family. It is the goal of this analysis to use a small sample of immigrant narratives to explore the way in which family stories reflect the cultural values of farm workers. Based on this sample, it will be possible to make some tentative generalizations about the importance of narrative and ethnographic analysis in better understanding the histories and cultural expectations of immigrant families. This study explores the role of generation as a factor influencing the dropout rate of migrant farm working children. For this study, interview transcripts of Mexican farm workers that migrated and worked in the United States were collected from the archives of the Idaho State Historical Society (ISHS), a project conducted for the Idaho Commission on Hispanic Affairs and the Idaho Humanities Council who funded the study and published their project in 1991. At the time of the interviews, most of the informants were older adults who ranged in age between 60 to 70 years old. Data was analyzed to understand context and structure. The goal is to use the collected oral histories as a microcosm of the Mexican farm worker experience. Future research will use these insights to target cultural themes which can be documented using the ethnographic method of participant observation.

Diaspora

Diaspora is the Greek word for “to spread” or “to scatter.” It is a term that refers to those individuals living outside their homeland throughout the world. Having left their nation of birth out of factors which are the results of economic and political “pushes or pulls” (Van Hear, 1998). Push and pull factors are what drives individuals to migrate. The push factors are what drive the immigrants out of their country; the pull factors are what attract immigrants to the target countries. According to Van Hear, “migration crises” fit into six slots. First individuals migrate due to pull and push factors. Second, households migrate based upon decisions of who stays and who goes. Third, migration is caused by differences between the receiving country and the home country attributed to economic or political reasons. Fourth, the social networks created by immigrants into the receiving country allow for the migration to occur. Five, is termed as “migration regime” by Van Hear, which is made up of international and national laws that dictate the movement of individuals. Finally that migration is molded by the macro-political economy (Van Hear 1998, 14-16).
Continuing Van Hears’ approach the six different reasons to migrate are subdivided into four domains. These include “root causes”, “precipitating” factors, and finally factors that make migration occur or not. The “root causes” are essentially the individual factors that cause migration. These may come from much larger reasons such as an economic crisis in the country of origin from or the emergence of a new political power which may or may not cause social changes in the lives of individuals. Factors that have an immediate effect on migration are those in which families and individuals weight options regarding the ways that migrating would be beneficial to them (Hear 1998, 18-21).

Communication, information and technology have made our world more connected allowing migration information available to those with access to technology in the peripheral countries. Van Hear mentions that the motivation to migrate may not be all inclusive within a population. Portes support this idea by mentioning that immigrants come for many different backgrounds and the motivation to migrate may vary with the immigrant’s experience, education, financial situation, and class status (Portes 2006, 20-34). The previous outlook on migration is one that mostly focuses on a macro approach to the diasporas, which is why there needs to be further stresses on the micro which is of importance to understand the issue of immigration, this can be achieved by balancing the macro and the micro perspective. This leads us back to narrative analysis, which is the focus of this paper.

From Mexico to the U.S: Migration and issues for Immigrants

Mexican farm workers arrived like most immigrants; out of “push” and “pull” factors linked to political or economic forces. During the 1870’s, Mexican railroad workers were recruited to work on the expansion of the railroads in the Western U.S. In the later part of the 19th century the U.S government began to express concerns regarding migration. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, being one of these preventative measures of migration, prevented the Chinese from entering the United States. These concerns resulted in the passage and legislation that allowed some workers to enter and others not. Border patrols in 1904 were deployed between Mexico and the United States in an effort to curb the undocumented migration of Chinese into the United States through Mexico. In the 1920’s, quota restrictions were established, limiting the number of immigrants permitted into the U.S. It was during this decade that immigrants were seen as a threat to the native population of the United States (Douglas S. Massey 2002, 33). In 1924, the Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began keeping statistics on the apprehension of undocumented immigrants (Espenshade 1995, 210-212).

Prior to World War II, legalization programs were established to make undocumented Mexican immigrants residing in the U.S legal citizens. This set in motion an immigration regime that continued for years (Douglas S. Massey 2002, 33). The Bracero program was introduced in the 1940’s and allowed more Mexican migrant labor to enter the country under tight federal control; it was eventually dissolved during the civil rights of 1964. In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), fined and imprisoned employers who hired and harbored undocumented workers.

During the 1982 decline of the Mexican Peso another wave of migration occurred. The U.S congress tried to restrain and abolish the flow of undocumented workers by implementing the Immigration Reform and control Act (IRCA) in 1986. The IRCA applied authority and limitations upon employees; it established legalization programs and stepped up enforcement on the border (Espenshade 1995, 210-212). With the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, issues have been exacerbated, by creating subsidies in foodstuffs upon which families need to live off.

Mexican immigrant issues

Overwhelmed by the demands of a new society, immigrants entering a destination country become trapped by low wages, while they attempt to meet the most basic needs (Carrasquillo and Rodriguez 1995). There are serious deficits in their preparatory education due primarily to poverty desperation and low educational attainment (Gibson and Hidalgo 2002, 3). In addition the immigrants must follow the cyclical pattern of shifting from crop to crop as farm workers. This entails moving frequently and children are uprooted and transplanted in different schools throughout the academic year (Gibson and Hidalgo 2002, 4). The pressures on family stability and cultural values are enormous.
Generational changes and responsibility

Generational changes occur within each succeeding generation as its members reshape and reinterpret what is lost, retained, or relinquished from the preceding one (Fischer 1986, 196). Fisher states that the problems of the first generation are family related and communal. These problems eventually lessen with each succeeding generation (Fischer 1986, 231). These changes are continually in the process of being created and learned (Smith-Hefner 1993, 152). They are thus byproducts of an on-going acculturation process which transforms generational knowledge as each new generation emerges and intertwines with the old. It is this balance between the old and the new that it will never completely disappear. It will reach a stasis where both are in harmony. However, other commentators state that the transition between generations is not always a smooth one and results in conflicts. Demartini states that generational cohorts interpret things different from each other especially the parent generation, which causes intergenerational conflict (Demartini 1985, 2).

Intergenerational relationships in industrial societies result in conflicts between the generations because of the rapid development of new social institutions around the world. Research shows that intergenerational welfare exchanges are occurring within the family. According to Ogawa, industrial societies stand at the generational crossroads on the issue of intergenerational equality and debates “the disruption of social contract between generations” will continue (Ogawa 2002, 15).

Within the Japanese culture, for example individuals are faced by customs to provide care for family. This has created a strong traditional cultural expectation that emphasizes familial responsibilities toward the elderly. In Japan women are usually the primary caregivers within this cultural context (Hashizume 2000).

In China, the care giving responsibility is extended to extended family members. Unlike Japan, Chinese caregivers tend to be mostly children or the in-laws who provide the care. Responsibility is commonly shared between children or in-laws and there is a commonality of inter and intra generational cohabitation where care giving is seen as a normative function of society and the state (T. L. Patterson 1998, 1073).

Mexican immigrants maintain a strong independence regarding responsibilities for the home. Girls and older children often help provide their own monetary support for their necessities and contribute to the household income (Gibson and Hidalgo 2002, 3). In Mexico informal care giving situations are established within which support and exchange systems play a role, specifically amongst children, where the older adult is both a provider and a receiver of such care. Women and men support different generational roles within the family the community and the society. This generational and sexual division of labor molds and reshapes networks and norms regarding ageing (Zavala 2002).

Edward Hall proposed a popular framework that may provide insight into these divergent views of generational responsibility. He stated that cultures can be situated in relation to one another through the styles in which they communicate. In order to distinguish among cultures, Hall proposed an outline to help situate cultures along a continuum from High-Context to the Low-Context social interaction (Hall, 1976). For example the majority of cultures that demonstrate high context qualities are countries such as Spain, Mexico, and France; these countries place importance on the group with an emphasis on cooperation, communicating indirectly where it is based upon implicit or unseen communication. In low context cultures these can be observed in countries such as Germany, Canada, UK and the USA. The emphasis here is the individual where the emphasis is on competition, with communication being direct and explicit, otherwise seen. Although Hall’s, dichotomy is criticized for being too simplistic, the geographical borders that encompass these cultural differences still continues. In the accelerating process of globalization, cultures are increasingly recognized as fluid and amorphous and thus are not absolute, cultures are constantly changing. With this in mind, Hall’s focus on divergence in cultural values, our paper focusing on the Mexican high context reliance upon the extended family as opposed to the U.S idealization of the individualism may still be relevant.

Methodology

Participants in this study were Mexican farm workers. The interview transcripts of Mexican farm workers that migrated and worked in the United States were collected from the archives of the Idaho State Historical Society (ISHS), a project conducted for the Idaho Commission on Hispanic Affairs and the Idaho Humanities Council who funded the study and published their project in 1991. At the time of the interviews, most of the participants were older adults who ranged in age between 60 to 70 years old.

The transcripts were reviewed twice. The first review was done to evaluate content. The second was done to identify narratives which contained rich family material. Utilizing a section of James Spradley’s model for
analysis of the narratives systematic note taking and general themes within the text were then recorded. As data was collected and analyzed interview themes and domains within the transcripts began to emerge. Spradley’s model, the developmental research sequence, uses a focus on language to identify cultural categories of primary significance to outsiders. These categories, domains, are then documented by linking them to repeated terms and words. The theme of sacrificial decision making emerged. This domain is described in a number of narratives in which the eldest child sacrifices his or her education to help the family financially.

In narrative analysis, a model for the study of personal narrative developed by Labov and Waletzky, the transcripts were broken down into abstract, orientation, complication, resolution, and coda. The abstract of the narration is the summary of the story and its importance. Next is the orientation with its specific location. This is followed by the complication which is the tension or conflict of the narrative. Fourth, the resolution illustrates how the complication or tension was resolved. Finally the coda returns the story back to the conversational mode (Labov & Waletzky, 1967). The end product becomes the narrative analysis of the interviews.

Labov and Walletsky’s approach shares a focus on language with Spradley’s ethnographic method. By using these methods in the analysis of immigrant interviews my goal is to reveal the value of using oral history of archival material as a rich resource for qualitative analysis of the narrative. The following case studies are just an example of the stories and narratives that give the immigrant experience a voice.

**Findings**

**Abel Vasquez (see Appendix A)**

Abel Vasquez was born in the United States during the 1930’s to parents born in Mexico. He was raised by his grandparents after his mother passed away when Abel was very young. Abel, his siblings, and grandparents eventually migrated following the cyclical movements of migrant farm workers following employment in the fields. It was through this pattern of moving from field to field that he came to end up in Idaho,

How we came to be in Idaho is that my grandmother had a sister that lived in Salt Lake City…and we came to visit…and we stayed there maybe six months out of the year. In 1938 my grandfather and other people decided to come to Idaho because there was field work topping beets.” (Vasquez 1991, 1)

Abel recalled his memories of school and remembered “...walking to school barefooted, we did not have money sometimes....” (Vasquez 1991, 6). When in junior high he tried out for the basketball team. He was one of the first ones there “...and I was there with all the gringitos I looked like a mosca in the leche.” To his disappointment he mentions that in order to play one had to provide your own sneakers, but he did not have the money to buy them. He played really well that first day but on the second day “got blisters from playing on the hard wood, so I couldn’t play basketball, my folks couldn’t afford to buy me sneakers” (Vasquez 1991, 9). He really had wanted to participate but did not want to burden his grandparents. Rather than asking them for money that they did not have, he decided to drop out after the ninth grade. He decided that since he was one of the older ones, he felt like he could be more useful in helping out the family economically; “I was an extra pair of hands to help support the family. If I went to school there was less money coming in, if I quit school there was more coming in.” (Vasquez 1991, 10).

Narrative analysis of Abel Vasquez;

- **Abstract:** “...being one of the older ones in the family ...male I was an extra pair of hands to help support the family...”
- **Orientation:** “...when I went to school...”
- **Complication:** “…rather than go through all the hassle of my folks buy [sic] me nice clothes to go to school at the age of 14 I quit school I was in the ninth grade. ”
- **Resolution:** “This part my aunt did and later me and my sister (he refers to working to make ends meet).”
- **Coda:** “….there was another two hands to go to work.” (Vasquez 1991, 10)

Abel’s resolution, for extracurricular activities was to not ask his parents for money to buy these things. He viewed this sacrifice, of dropping out, as trying to contribute to the cause instead of making the problem bigger for his already economic strapped parents. His decision to contribute to his family helped the family succeed and thus alleviated the economic strain on his family.
Rita Perez (see Appendix B)

Rita was born in Idaho Falls in 1930, to immigrant parents from Mexico. Her father began working on the railroad, and once her mother became ill, they were told they had to move to the country. They arrived in Idaho and her parents found work in the fields to help support the family. The family consisted of fifteen brothers and sisters. Her father did odd jobs here and there to support the family, and like many farm workers, he had to travel to where the crops were in season to find employment. On a few of those occasions, Rita remembers caring for her younger sister while her parents worked in the fields. “They would take us in the car and park it at the end of the field, where my mother could come at intervals to check on the baby and nurse him.” (Perez 1991, 7) Rita helped support her family by working with her parents. She mentions that she “managed to talk my father into allowing the younger ones to continue school and not have to take time off” (Perez 1991, 13). She helped her father make the decision to keep the younger children in school.

Narrative analysis of Rita Perez;
- **Abstract**: “We started school after the potato and beet harvest was all done and there was no more work to be had, sometimes we didn’t start until November.” (Perez, 11)
- **Orientation**: “I just went to fifth grade.” (Perez, 11)
- **Complication**: “(parents would work) from sunrise to sun set thinning beets would be from 4 o’clock in the morning to 9 o’clock in the evening…I was left in charge of my younger sister, she was about 6 weeks old.” (Perez, 7)
- **Resolution**: “All the older ones had to work to help support the whole family, and Daniel (her brother) was the first one to graduate high school.” (Perez, 11)
- **Coda**: “We went to school “either place, wherever we were. If we went to California we started school there we were not allowed to work in the fields so we had school…” (Perez, 11)

Rita saw herself as able to help her younger siblings remain in school and for her and her older siblings to help contribute to her very large family. She sacrificed her education for the improvement of her younger siblings. She viewed this as a triumph within her family, that through working she could help her family reach the goal of improving their financial situation. She had knowledge of what it meant to be responsible from a very young age, as is demonstrated by her caring for an infant brother in the fields while her parents worked whatever hours were established by the farmer.

Pablo Barbosa (see Appendix C)

Pablo recalls how he and his sisters became orphans. He states that had there been an opportunity for him to finish school it would have happened. But because they were orphans and his Uncle had taken them in, there were more in his family to support. Pablo’s Uncle did not earn more than “$20 a week and he had five in the family (Barbosa, 7).” It was later when he got to be a bit older that “my aunt … and later me and my sister (Barbosa, 7)” helped out the family financially. His education did not go beyond the seventh grade. He dropped out to help his family out financially. Pablo continued working as a laborer and eventually came with his wife to Idaho in 1975 to work in the fields of Wilder. At this point they decided to make Idaho their permanent home (Barbosa 1991, 7).

Narrative analysis of Pablo Barbosa;
- **Abstract**: “…I no more than seventh grade [sic] for the simple reason that me and my sister were orphans…”
- **Orientation**: “I could have gone to high school if there had been a manner of this…”
- **Complication**: “But not in that time, because he didn’t earn more than $20 a week and he had five in the family.”
- **Resolution**: “This part my aunt did and later me and my sister (in reference to making money).”
- **Coda**: “…I believe [sic] I could have had a high school education.” (Barbosa 1991, 7)

As we can see Pablo left school to begin working in the fields to help his Aunt and Uncle as well as his sister. The resolution again reflects a self sacrifice to attain the ultimate goal of the family which is to escape economic stress. His contribution to his family helped them succeed in having food, clothing and shelter.
Ofilia Ramos (see Appendix D)

Ofilia was born in Texas in 1943 to immigrant parents who came to work for the railroad. Eventually they moved to Idaho to work in the sugar beet fields. There were six children in her home and they all lived in a house on the farm owned by the patron. She was one of the younger children to attend school, and she was able to graduate from high school. The entire family worked on the farm and remembers having to work, particularly the eldest children to help the family out financially.

Narrative analysis of Ofilia Ramos;
- **Abstract**: “the four youngest went to school and we completed our school.”
- **Orientation**: “a couple of the older ones started school…”
- **Complication**: “They had to work.”
- **Resolution**: “…but they dropped out because of work…”
- **Coda**: “Yes, they did—well in the fields. We worked out in the field.” (Ramos 1991, 2)

Here Ofelia recounts that the eldest children had to work and the younger ones remained in school. This complication and resolution again shows that the need to have the eldest help out the family.

Victoria Archuleta Sierra (see Appendix E)

Victoria’s ancestral family was from New Mexico and Colorado before these states were a part of the United States. She was born in Colorado in 1924, which became a state in 1876. She begins her narrative accounts of memories of her father as a field worker in Colorado. She recalls having to babysit her younger brother in the family’s model T as her parents worked in the field. She remembers seeing them for a little bit before they had to continue on with their work and “pick more green [sic] beans until the late evening (Sierra 1991, 1).” Her dad had taught her to read and write but it did not stick with her. However, when her mother wallpapered their home with magazine pages she began learning to read from the pages on the wall.

Narrative analysis of Victoria A. Sierra;
- **Abstract**: “We had no other means of lively hood except my dad and mother working out in the fields.”
- **Orientation**: “I learned to cook when I was ten years old”
- **Complication**: “Sometimes I had to stay home and take care of my two brothers while my mother and dad went out and worked in the fields.”
- **Resolution**: “My dad taught me how to make tortillas and the beans were already cooked from the day before…”
- **Coda**: “So all I had to do was make the tortillas for when my mother and dad came home. There was a lot of burn ones.” (Sierra 1991, 2)

Here Victoria demonstrates her responsibility to help with preparation of meals and helping take care of the younger children. Her sacrifice of her time of playing, reading, studying, being concerned about what every ten year old should be doing; instead she began helping with her siblings and had the responsibility of doing prep food for when her parents came home exhausted from the fields.

**Discussions and Recommendations**

Most studies of educational issues within Mexican farm working families approach the subject statistically and demographically. Often these issues are presented within the context of what is called the “dropout” rate of farm worker children. It might be more accurately looked at as a “push out” or “pull out” rate to capture the essence of the many issues of cultural conflict involved.

When utilizing statistics to define who is a “dropout” and who is not, there are two ways, one is called an “event dropout rate” the other is known as a “status rate.” The first is used to report students who have dropped out of school within one academic year, November through November. The second reports when the students have dropped out at any time between their ninth and twelve grades. The latter cohort study is the one that is more frequently heard of in the Department of Education report updates. Currently the state of Idaho does not use “status
rate” to report on dropouts, it uses “event rates.” These state that the mobility of this cohort is difficult to pin point, making the data inaccurate which are then reported using a ‘hypothetical’ model to demonstrate the dropout rates. In the State of Idaho, as in any other State, there are specific definitions about who is considered a “dropout” and who is not. It is a general rule that if a student has left school without requesting transcripts, has left because of age limits, or has been expelled; he or she is considered a dropout. However, students who leave the school system because of homeschooling are not considered dropouts. (Statistics, 1997-1998 to 2004-2005).

As described below, this study reveals that rather than viewed as a failure, farm working children in the first generation leave school to help their family. Sacrifice comes from a Middle English verb meaning ‘to make sacred’, commonly known as the practice of offering food, or the lives of animals or people to the gods, as an act of propitiation or worship. The term is also used metaphorically to describe selfless good deeds. In our modern world, this has come to be interpreted as giving up something of value or importance to somebody else. It is in through narrative analysis that insights can be gained into the ways in which each of the families has viewed generational sacrifice. We can see that these ‘Mexicano’ families belong to a series of generations in which the current generations have benefited from their predecessor. Parents sacrificed themselves to work in labor related employment to find better future for themselves and their children. Older children have sacrificed themselves for the improvement of the family economically, in return helping their younger siblings remain in school; generational sacrifice from this perspective is embodied in narratives of strength, not in statistics of failure.

Abel’s narratives recount family sacrifice in which he helped out his family financially by returning to work. Although an outsider might see that leaving school was detrimental to him what they do not see is that he alleviated his family financial situation by supplying extra income for the family. He is a success within the dynamics of the family.

Rita sacrificed herself for the benefit of the family. By helping her parents with childcare, she allowed for the extra income to flow. Had she not done this they may not have survived on just her father’s income alone. In working together as an extended family they resolved the childcare issue together, and allowed her to plant the seed in her father’s mind about keeping the younger children in school.

Pablo upon noticing the responsibility that his Uncle had taken on, by bringing in his niece and nephew to live with them, also put family interest before his own. He saw the need for his Uncle to have support providing for the children. The result was that Pablo and his sister to began to work and left school to help the other children. This was related in the narrative not as a bad thing but as a collective family success.

Ofelia one of the younger participants, benefited from the eldest children working. She and her younger siblings, graduated from high school. Yet she remembers that the eldest children did have to go to work with the family in the sugar beet fields. Her family triumphed because had it not been for that help from the eldest children the younger children would have had to work as well.

Victoria’s account of caring for the babies, allowed her parents to work. She helped contribute by sacrificing her childhood to care for her infant sibling in a car as her parents worked out in the fields.

There are several conclusions that can be tentatively drawn from these stories. A primary conclusion is that they represent sacrifice and intergenerational responsibility. Secondly, the “dropout” issue is not a “failure”, as the Anglo school sees it, but a family triumph. Third these stories illustrate how the decision to support the family is viewed from within as a personal and cultural achievement.

These stories feature sacrifice for the family, revealing the depth of the cultural contrast between that of a high context culture and a low context culture. Farm working children of the first generation farm workers are caught in a dilemma between the collectivist cultural orientations of Latino farm worker families and an educational system that emphasizes individual competition over cooperation. The results of this study reveal that a closer look at cultural material from an insider’s perspective may assist in understanding the “push out” or “pull out” issue from a much more grounded and pragmatic perspective. It calls for further analysis of narratives to gain the perspective of the immigrant family to understand the full score of issues affecting immigrants. These narratives could pave the way for further study into how to approach this and other issues of cultural conflict from an insider’s point of view. In addition, further research within Mexican immigrant communities conducted from a community or family perspective might replace negative stereotypes of immigrants with more realistic and sensitive views of people who are caught up in the global diaspora, just trying to survive.
Acknowledgements

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Robert McCarl, my research mentor. Also Dr. Errol Jones, Sam Byrd, Kathy Hodges and Boise State University’s Ronald E. McNair Program, David Hall and Helen Barnes for their dedication and their drive in providing support to keep going. I take time to thank my mom and dad for their support and encouragement for allowing me to achieve my goal of academic pursuits.

References

Appendix A

Interview: Abel Vasquez OH1167 (pages 5-10)

MT: What’s your earliest memory of school? (pg.5)

AV: Walking to school barefooted, we did not have money sometimes School was nice for us, because I’m from almost the same time as he was, I’m a few years younger than he is, but our homes were so poorly insulated that we were just talking this morning how when I was raised it was so cold I just quite did not have enough blankets to keep me warm. We were a lot of children so going to school it was nice to have a warm room, hot lunch smelled so good because a lot of the times you did not have that in your It was a new way of life that was good to us and it was good. (Pg. 6)

MT: How do you recall doing in school as far as grades? (pg.7)

AV: I was just an average student my parent’s really didn’t put that much emphasis on education. They figured they’d rather have somebody who was a good worker than a good scholar. But we did fairly well, I never flunked a grade going to school…..we’d go to school maybe six months out of the year because we had to quit early to start working in the fields and we had to start late because the harvest was still going on…..I remember some of my school teachers taking a little extra with me personally helping me to catch up.……..we went to school all winter then in the spring our parents pulled us out of school to go to work. That’s why I say I never flunked a grade. I must have had good teachers.” (pg.7)

MT: Do you remember any situation in the schools or a teacher or teachers that stand out in your mind?

AV: Mrs. Gillmore in Marsing she was my third grade teacher. She used to go the extra mile to help me. And she knew that the other kids did not need that much help or I needed more than they did. So she would always help me she would take me by the hand and teach me. She was my teacher, that’s what teaching was about for me. (pg 8).

MT: Do you suppose it was because she also knew that you missed out on school that she helped you just to catch up?

AV: Yes I’m sure that she did. That’s one of the teachers that really stands out as a kid growing up..of course I remember the other teachers that we have here but nobody that stood out like she did because she really made an impression on me because of that extra care she gave me. ……..When I was in Jr. High I wanted to go out for basketball…..needless to say I was the first ones there …and I was there with all the gringitos I looked like a ‘mosca in the leche’. In order to play you had to furnish your own sneakers, well I didn’t have any but I was really good barefooted the first day……the second day I got blisters from playing on the hard wood. So I couldn’t play basketball, my folks couldn’t afford to buy me sneakers so I didn’t participate because I didn’t have shoes to play in. (pg. 9)

MT: You played barefooted?

AV: Just one day, the second day I got blisters from playing on the hard wood. So I couldn’t play basketball my folks couldn’t afford to buy me sneakers so I didn’t participate because I didn’t have shoes to play in.

MT: How did you feel about that?

AV: I really wanted to play basketball but I couldn’t but I didn’t want to put a burden on my folks so that they would have to buy me sneakers because we could barely, make it. So I just finally said that I didn’t want to do it. I never participated in any sports because you always had to stay after school to practice and it the wrong time of the year so it wasn’t conducive for me to participate in all the school activities that were available to me because of the way I was raised. Being a field worker you had to work when the crops were ready, the crops didn’t wait for nobody you had to go and do it. Me being one of the older ones in the family and the male I was an extra pair of hands to help support the family. When I went to school I liked
school too I think but then as I was getting older, when I was fourteen years old it go to be more of a hassle going because …I felt out of place not because I didn’t that I was adequate …I felt t out of place because material things were entering into my life. I didn’t have nice jeans, I didn’t have nice shoes, nice shirt to be able to go with the other kids. I knew that there was something wrong somewhere, not that the kids made me feel that way I was my worst critic in that respect. And rather than go through all the hassle of my folks buy me nice clothes to go to school, at the age of 14, I quit school. I was in the ninth grade, I finished ninth grade…… I had an out, simply because I asked my grandmother…I don’t want to go to school anymore……she wanted me to go to school but she didn’t push it to a point…the reason she did not push it was because there again was the economic situation. There was another two hands to go to work” (pg. 10).

Appendix B

Rita Perez OH1156 (pg 9-11)

RR: What did you do before you worked out in the field?

RP: Babysitter.

RR: You took care of your little brother’s and sister’s? Your three older brother’s worked and your mom and dad? And you would stay in the tent…

RP: Yes, but they would take us in the car and park it at the end of the field where my mother could come at intervals to check on the baby and nurse him.

RR: How old was the baby when you took care of her?

RP: The first time I was left in charge of my younger sister, she was about 6 weeks old and I was not quite five.

RR: What was a normal working day for your mom and dad? How long did you have to take car of your brother’s and sister’s?

RP: From sunrise to sun set thinning beets would be from 4 o’clock in the morning to 9 o’clock in the evening. Picking green peas because it was under the contractor and he set the hours it was from 6 to 6 pm.

RR: Would that be in Idaho or California.

RP: Either place, wherever we were. If we went to California we started school there we were not allowed to work in the fields so we had to school. When we went there was nothing they could do before we moved there.

RR: Did you graduate from High School?

RP: I just went to fifth grade.

RR: But your younger sisters and brothers did graduate? You were the one that had to help support the family.

RP: Yes. All the older ones had to work to help support the whole family, and Daniel (her brother) was the first one to graduate high school.

Appendix C

Interview: Pablo Barbosa OH1147 (pg. 7).

MT: How interesting the themes of education. You had, forgive [sic] me a moment, I would like to ask before we continue another topic. When you say you sold her for [can’t understand] when you carried her there you left or…
PB: No, no more than to Reynosa. No more than the bridge to Reynosa.

MT: That bridge there it was here [sic] is was like she could return to her town. The topic of education, can you describe something about how many years.

PB: She didn’t have a formal education and I no more than seventh grade for the simple reason that me and my sister were orphans and my neither my sister nor my father, my uncle and unfortunately he couldn’t either and for this…..the opportunity that he could send me to school until seventh grade. I could have gone to high school if there had been a manner of this; I believe I could have had a high school education. But not in that time, because he didn’t earn more than $20 a week and he had five in the family. This part my aunt did and later me and my sister they couldn’t send me to high school my education wasn’t more than seventh grade.

Appendix D

Interview: Ofelia Ramos OH1157 (pg. 2)

RR: And were they, how many children were born in Idaho Falls?

OR: Two, the two youngest. The girl May, was born in 1948 and the boy Bill, was born in 1950

RR: So you and your other brothers and sisters went to school here?

OR: Just myself. Let’s see, the four youngest went to school and we completed our school. But a couple of the older ones started school, but they dropped out because of work. They had to work.

RR: And did they work there in the sugar factory with your dad?

OR: Yes, they did—well in the fields. We worked out in the fields.

Appendix E

Victoria Archuleta Sierra OH1164 (pg 1-2)

AL: How did your family come to Idaho?

VS: My dad traveled a lot in his young days and then he finally settled down in La Junta, Co and that is where he met my mother.

AL: So he married your mother.

VS: My dad’s niece married my mother’s brother and that’s how they came to know each other. They married and started having a family, I have an older brother that was born in New Mexico, because they traveled back, and I was born in La Junta six years later. Then they moved to Grand Junction Colorado where he was working as a ranch man. He milked cows for this man and we lived there until I was six years old. And then we moved into the town of Grand Junction. From there my dad was a field worker, because he had no transportation of any kind for a while until he bought a Model-T car and then they used to make us pick green beans quite far out of town. My brother and I took care of my little brother that was born in 1930. We stayed in the car all day long waiting for them. They would come to eat lunch and we’d see them for a little while and then they’d go back and pick more green beans until the late evening. Many a time the car wouldn’t start and we had to be there until it was dark. We had a few times of panic when the car wouldn’t start and it was getting dark and everybody left except for us. There are happy memories too, at the time there were lots of sad things that would happen at that time. I can remember when we’d eat lunch my mother would boil potatoes, corn on the cob, and boiled eggs that was fun to eat lunch. That far out it was
like a picnic every day we had fun then. We really had lots of good times. I think about it now and it seems kind of sad that we grew up like that, but it didn’t damage us any. It was just fun at that time. We had no other means of lively hood except my dad and mother working out in the fields. I learned to cook when I was ten years old because sometimes I had to stay home and take care of my two brothers while my mother and dad went out and worked in the fields. That wasn’t easy and I wasn’t too crazy about it. My dad taught me how to make tortillas and the beans were already cooked from the day before so all I had to do was make the tortillas for when my mother and dad came home. There was a lot of burn ones.
The purpose of the current study was to examine intimate partner violence (IPV) among adolescent pregnant teens and their partners. The intention was to test a preventive intervention among adolescent relationships. Forty-one Latino couples were recruited through public health clinics and high schools. Couples were randomly selected to intervention or control groups; 24 couples participated in the intervention and 17 couples participated in the control. An original scoring template was created to measure IPV within the relationship. Results indicated that couples who participated in the intervention had significantly less IPV than couples who did not. Results also indicated that jealousy was significantly related to IPV; however, this outcome was not expected. This study shows that the preventive intervention being tested may have an effect on the participants who were involved.

Introduction

Nationwide, intimate partner violence (IPV) is a problem that affects many people. There are an estimated 1.5 million women in the United States, who are eighteen and older, who are raped or physically assaulted by an intimate partner (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000), including over 320,000 women who were also pregnant at the time (Gazamarian, Peterson, Spitz, Goodwin, Saltzman, & Marks, 2000). IPV is a serious problem that needs attention to be resolved, and it occurs against both men and women in a relationship. Typically however, the majority of the violence is against the female partner (World Health Organization, 2002). Throughout the literature, IPV is defined as physical violence, threats of physical or sexual violence, psychological and emotional violence, and sexual violence; and in some cases stalking is included as part of the definition (Center for Disease Control, 2006). There are many other costs involved in IPV; in a study conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services, costs of IPV were examined, including medical (2 million injuries, and close to 1,300 deaths) and mental health care costs (18.5 million mental health care visits) (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2003). The World Health Organization has also conducted a study examining the relationship between IPV and alcohol. An interesting aspect mentioned in the research is that the children who witness violence between their parents are more likely to develop violent and delinquent behaviors (World Health Organization, 2006). The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence reports that four to eight percent of women experience domestic violence during their pregnancy (Gazamarian, et al., 2000). The effects of this violence, both physical and non-physical, have the potential to affect the mother and the unborn baby. This same research study also shows domestic violence during pregnancy being linked to other unwanted effects such as depression, substance abuse, smoking, amnesia, first and second trimester bleeding, and the reduction in birth weight (Parker, McFarlane, & Soeken, 1996; McFarlane, Parker, & Soeken, 1996). IPV during pregnancy can cause a wide range of unwanted effects, and could also lead to other forms of violence. The World Health Organization reports that in intimate relationships there are often other forms of violence involved besides physical violence such as psychological abuse, and sexual violence (World Health Organization, 2006). This particular study was conducted with adult participants; researchers could apply these results while examining IPV among adolescent relationships more closely.

Although there is a fair amount of research on adult relationships and IPV, more research is needed to examine adolescent relationships and IPV. Much of the current research throughout the literature examines violence after it has already occurred, future research would validate the need for preventive interventions. The National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence conducted a research study where nearly thirty percent of pregnant teens reported physical violence with their boyfriends (Brustin, 1995). In nearly fifty percent of these cases, females stated that the violent behavior began or increased after the partner learned about the pregnancy (Brustin, 1995). The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence reports that domestic violence is a frequent occurrence during dating relationships. Female partners in the relationship, ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-four, experience the highest rates of domestic violence (Rennison, 2001). This statistic must not go unnoticed as these patterns may develop and increase in severity. Noticing this behavior early in the development process would allow researchers to further examine the problem and take needed steps toward prevention and intervention measures. Otherwise, this type of behavior could have much more serious consequences. Physical violence is also much more prevalent in relationships where the pregnancy was unplanned as opposed to being planned. In a study by the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, women with unplanned pregnancies were two to four times more likely to experience physical violence during their relationship than their counterparts with planned pregnancies (Gazamarian, et al., 2000). Until the age of twenty-five, pregnancy can be a risk-factor for partners in a relationship after which pregnancy becomes a protective factor. Before the age of twenty-five partners may not be able to support a child financially or emotionally, but are better prepared to do so as they get older. Finally, in a study conducted by Moore, Florsheim, and Butner (2007), adolescent co-parenting couples’ relationships were examined to identify predictors of relationship outcomes (e.g., hostile, warm, etc.). Our study has relevance to the study conducted by Moore, et al. as similar methodology was used. In their study, Moore, et al. interviewed young co-parenting couples during the transition to parenthood.

Even less research has been conducted in the area of Latinos and IPV. Tjaden and Thoennes (2000) conducted a survey for the U.S. Department of Justice. The National Violence Against Women Survey assessed intimate partner violence in three ways: rape, physical assault, and stalking. In this study little difference was found in Latino women’s reports of intimate partner physical assault and stalking, compared to non-Latino. However, the study did find a significant difference in Latino women’s report of rape, compared to non-Latinos. This same study found no significant difference in reports if intimate partner violence between Latino and non-Latino men. There is a need for this type of research because this information could then be applied and used as preventative measures in the future, leading to future research studies examining violence between other specific groups.

The purpose of this study is to examine IPV among Latino adolescent expectant couples. Specifically, this study will be to examine physical and non-physical violence, jealousy, and positive conflict resolution. This researcher is interested in examining the intervention effect on the Latino adolescent couples. Participants in this study consisted of Latino adolescent expectant couples. Female partners ranged in age from fourteen to eighteen. Male partners ranged in age from fourteen to twenty-four. Participants took part in multiple interviews. Audio information was collected and used from the interviews.

We were interested in examining IPV among these Latino couples. Couples were independently interviewed at Time 1 (pre-intervention, before the baby is born) and Time 2 (8-12 weeks post-birth). We expected a decrease in violence over time, both physical and non-physical, among couples who participated in the intervention and couples who were not part of the intervention. Additionally, we expected that higher rates of jealousy at Time 1 would predict higher rates of IPV at Time 2.

**Method**

**Participants**

Participants for this study include a subsample, drawn from a larger research study of pregnant and parenting adolescents (Florsheim, Hall, Gaskill, McArthur, & McElligott, 2007; Florsheim & McElligott, 2004; Florsheim, McElligott, Buchi, & Burrow-Sanchez, 2005; White & Florsheim, 2003). This study focuses exclusively on participants who self identify as Latino or Hispanic. Forty-one Latino adolescent couples, 82 total participants, were included in this study. Seventeen couples were part of the control group, and twenty-four couples participated in the intervention. Couples were selected at random to participate in either the intervention or control. Female partners ranged in age from 14 to 18 (\(M = 18.83; SD = 2.20\)), and male partners ranged in age from 14 to 24 (\(M = 16.37; SD = 1.24\)). Participants were identified and recruited through prenatal health care service providers and high schools providing services for pregnant and parenting teens.
Procedure

Couples completed two interviews which were documented using audio recordings. Interviews were conducted prior to child birth (Time 1) and about 8 weeks after the birth of the baby (Time 2). Participants were compensated for their time ($40.00 per person per interview). The protocol for the study was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board. All participants 18 year and older were consented. Participants under 18 were assented and parent permission was obtained. All interviews were recorded to capture verbatim answers, which were later used for the purpose of coding. For a more detailed description of the intervention, please contact the author at albertvarela@u.boisestate.edu.

Measures

Participants were independently interviewed for approximately one hour, using the Young Parenthood Study Interview at Time 1 and Time 2 (Florsheim, 2004). At each time, participants were asked questions about their relationship. Questions relevant to the current study include: general relationship questions and conflict resolution questions. Coding Schemes:

1. Jealousy: Jealousy was coded using a simple 3 point scale; in which 0 reflected no evidence of jealousy and 3 reflected the most serious jealousy. The anchor points used for this coding scheme were developed after reviewing previous research on jealousy, including measures obtained from (Bordeaux, 2005; Bringle, Roach, Andler, & Evenbeck, 1979). The coder was blind to intervention status and 7 of the 164 interviews were independently coded by a second researcher.

2. Conflict Resolution Skills: Conflict resolution was coded using a simple 0-2 point scale, in which 0 reflected low evidence of conflict resolution skills and 2 reflected high conflict resolution skills. The anchor points used for this coding scheme were developed after reviewing previous research on conflict resolution skills, including measures obtained from (Davis, Capobianco, & Kraus, 2004). The coder was blind to intervention status and 7 of the 164 interviews were independently coded by a second researcher.

3. Verbal Aggression: Verbal aggression was coded using a simple 0-3 point scale, in which 0 reflected no evidence of verbal aggression and 3 reflected the most serious form of verbal aggression. The anchor points used for this coding scheme were developed after reviewing previous research on verbal aggression, including measures obtained from (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2006; National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The coder was blind to intervention status and 7 of the 164 interviews were independently coded by a second researcher.

4. Physical Aggression: Physical aggression was coded using a simple 0-5 point scale; in which 0 reflected no evidence of physical aggression and 5 reflected the most serious form of physical aggression. The anchor points used for this coding scheme were developed after reviewing previous research on physical aggression, including measures obtained from (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2006; National Coalition Against Domestic Violence n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The coder was blind to intervention status and 7 of the 164 interviews were independently coded by a second researcher.

The coding templates were first pilot tested by other researchers to test for reliability. After the pilot testing was complete, coding for interviews of the current study began. During the actual coding of interviews used for this research study, a co-investigator conducted coding of the same interviews to test for reliability. Please feel free to contact the author for more information regarding the coding schemes.

Results

Repeated measures ANCOVA was used to test the hypothesis that couples who participated in the intervention would have lower IPV scores at Time 2, than couples in the control group. In this analysis, combined IPV scores were the within subjects variable; and treatment group status was the between subjects variable. Results indicated that couples who participated in the intervention did in fact have lower IPV scores at Time 2 than couples in the control group, $F(1, 36) = 4.05$, one tailed $p < .05$. Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the interaction between treatment status and IPV scores over time.

Repeated measures ANCOVA was also used to test the hypotheses that higher rates of jealousy at Time 1 would predict higher rates of IPV at Time 2. In this analysis, combined IPV scores were the within subjects variable;
and couple Jealousy (high, low) was the between subjects variable. In this analysis, results indicated that jealousy at Time 1 was a significant predictor of IPV at Time 2, $F(1, 36) = 6.25, p < .05$. Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the interaction between Jealousy score (high, low) and IPV scores over time.

**Discussion**

It was expected that couples who were part of the intervention would have less IPV at Time 2 than couples who were not part of the intervention; this result was statistically significant. Since one of the primary goals of the intervention is improving communication skills between the partners, it could be inferred that lower IPV scores could be related to better communication skills. However, more research is needed in this area to retest this assumption. These findings display the effectiveness of the intervention; additionally, the need to research and implement other preventive interventions for pregnant teens and their partners. It was expected that jealousy would be a significantly related to IPV at Time 2. These results were statistically significant; however, findings were not expected. We did not expect that jealousy would be negatively related to IPV at Time 1 (see Figure 2), and do not fully understand the role of jealousy in adolescent romantic relationships. Future research could continue to examine this factor in adolescent relationships to better understand what is happening. The results of this study could be generalized to adolescent pregnant couples with caution, as only Latino couples were examined in this study. However, there are certain variables which may be seen in all adolescent romantic relationships. For example, jealousy will continue to be present and not fully understood. These findings could assist in the implementation of future preventive interventions.

This study examined Latino populations and did not make direct comparisons to any other groups. This limits the amount of generalizations that can be made to other adolescent groups. Due to a limited time frame, we were only able to work with a limited population size; 82 total participants participated in both the intervention and control. In the actual interview, participants are not asked explicitly whether or not they or their partner is jealous. Jealousy was coded for by listening to participant responses in the things the couple argued about. Asking participants this direct question may or may not have changed responses to the study. The argument could be made that if jealousy questions were asked explicitly this may change the response of the participants. However, we believe that this may not be the case. In the event of this current study, conflict about jealousy and infidelity was brought up by the participants. Often times the interviewer did not need to assist with answer the interview questions. Asking questions of jealousy explicitly will assist in understanding this issue among adolescent relationships.

An original scoring template was created to measure IPV, jealousy, and infidelity among these couples’ relationships. Other researchers were involved in testing the reliability of the scoring template. However, as this is an original template more research would need to be conducted to be able to use this as a strong measure.

Future research could continue to examine jealousy among adolescent romantic relationships. Jealousy was defined for the purpose of this study, but clear definition needs to be established. This might be the first step in continuing to examine this issue among adolescent relationships. This preventive intervention was used to examine IPV among Latino couples; future research could examine IPV among other populations (i.e., whites, African Americans). Additionally, this study was conducted in a mostly homogenous area; the majority of the population consisting of whites. Future research might also test this intervention in different geographical areas which are more diverse.

This preventive intervention does seem to have a positive effect on adolescent couples in some regard. Findings indicated that being part of the intervention was related to lower IPV scores over time. This result is very promising; however, more research is needed to examine more closely why this is happening. Having seen that preventive interventions are both needed and beneficial, it is important to keep moving in this direction; and move away from interventions that begin after serious violence has already occurred.

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References


Table 1. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations between Primary Variables

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*Note.* Father of the baby (FOB); and Mother of the baby (MOB). T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2.

![Figure 1. IPV scores by treatment group](image)
Figure 2. IPV scores paired with jealousy
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<th>Class of 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sandina Begic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan Berrocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Garcia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Katey Irwin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jennifer Jenkins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Megan Jensen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josh Redden</td>
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<td>Irene Ruiz</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isabel Aguilar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deborah Allen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorena Alvarez</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brandi Bailey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adriana Solis-Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lou Bonfrisco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jenna Elgin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maria Lara</td>
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<td>Margarita Melchor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christine Pearson</td>
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<td>Luis Rosado</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Busnardo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sancheen Collins</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Estrada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rafael Garcilazo</td>
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<td>Antonio Oblea</td>
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<td>Miki Skinner</td>
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<td>Adam Torres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erika Velasco</td>
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<td>Rosario Venegas</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jason Arnold</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.J. Durrant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gary Grogan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carol McHann</td>
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<td>Geneva Roman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nikki Svenkerud</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon Tu</td>
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<td>Fred Waweru</td>
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