In 1981, the Toledo Federation of Teachers (TFT) and the administration of the Toledo Public Schools (TPS) forged an agreement unique to collective bargaining contracts within public education. From this agreement emerged the Intern and Intervention Program (hereafter referred to as the program), which placed significant responsibility for quality control of the teaching staff with the teachers themselves, through their union, the TFT. Obviously, the actions taken by the negotiating parties represented a significant departure from the standard operating procedures of public sector labor-management relations. To successfully implement and maintain the reformation of such a fundamental aspect of normal operations as administrative evaluation of teachers required an incredible level of commitment on behalf of both the TPS and TFT. The fact that people involved in Toledo schools were able to muster this level of commitment for over a decade is truly impressive.

One would think that after a decade of success, during which support for the program had grown among teachers and administrators alike, that the program would be institutionalized as a permanent feature of the Toledo public schools’ policy environment. On April 25, 1995, however, fourteen years after it began, the program was terminated by the president of the TFT, Dal Lawrence, the same person who originally proposed the idea. As a result, a puzzle exists. The purpose of this study is to solve this puzzle. Simply put, the research question of interest can be phrased, "Why was a successful program canceled?"

The demise of the Toledo Plan is worthy of study because it speaks to the larger issues of teacher professionalism and teacher professionalization. The traditional hallmarks of occupations considered as professions include, an arcane body of knowledge, specialized training, and self-regulation (Freidson, 1986). Teaching, in comparison to the traditional professions of medicine and law, has always faired poorly. Several factors have contributed to the inferior position of teaching among occupations (See for example, Fenstermacher 1990).

Peer review is a means by which teachers can begin to professionalize both themselves and their occupation (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; Kerchner, Koppich and Weeres, 1997). Establishing self-regulation through peer review can accomplish at least two things. First, peer review can effectively support the new conceptions of teaching and learning within current educational reforms. The schools of the late twentieth century are facing an increasingly diverse student population as well as an increasing range of knowledge which students are asked to master. These conditions have greatly changed the central role of classroom teachers from being the traditional, didactic "fount of knowledge," to being more of a learning facilitator or cognitive coach. As the role of teachers has changed, so too has the tacit knowledge imperative to successful teaching and learning. Only current, active teachers can reasonably be in possession of such knowledge, or wisdom of practice. Therefore, peer review acknowledges and respects the special skills and types of knowledge involved in quality teaching as well as provides a more authentic means of assessing individual teacher’s attributes. By doing so, peer review strengthens the quality of the teaching workforce and thereby, facilitates improvement in student learning.

Second, because active teachers are in possession of the tacit knowledge required for successful teaching in the late twentieth century, evaluations conducted by other teachers, rather than administrators, can yield more accurate and insightful measurements of teacher quality. As currently performed in most public schools, teacher evaluations are conducted by building level administrators, people who have chosen to leave active classroom teaching. Some of the people responsible for evaluating classroom teachers have not taught for a decade or more. Such administrators, under the press of their administrative duties, are prohibited from devoting the time necessary to conduct effective, knowledgeable, and relevant teacher evaluations.

Unfortunately, teachers in today’s classrooms are heirs to an organization which is not based upon teaching and learning, but instead upon management and supervision. Because of the incompatibility between bureaucratic governance and teaching and learning, teachers are not (some would argue cannot be) held professionally accountable, but instead, are bureaucratically accountable (Darling-Hammond 1988, Densmore 1987). Unfortunately, "the accountability system exerts a powerful influence on teachers and students alike, pulling both away from the sorts of tasks that are complex and difficult to assess" (Devaney and Sykes 1988, p. 18). Thus, efforts taken to exert such management techniques ultimately reduce the probability of effective learning taking place by reducing both teachers’ freedom to make professional decisions and their accountability to their clients, be they students or parents. Therefore, the normative ideal of service to client inherent in most definitions of "professionalism" is turned upside down, meaning instead, "unquestioning compliance with agency directives" (Darling Hammond, 1988, p. 61).

By shifting the focus of teacher evaluations to professional accountability through peer review, teaching and learning remain central to the process. The goals of professional accountability are to ensure that 1) all practitioners are adequately prepared and trained, 2) professional knowledge will be brought to bear in decision making, and 3) all practitioners will hold as their primary commitment the welfare of the clients (Darling-Hammond, 1988 and 1989). Only by ensuring professional accountability can teachers make the "professional bargain" with parents specifically, and society generally, in which they guarantee the competence of the teaching workforce in exchange for professional autonomy, meaning self-governance and the setting of professional standards (Sykes 1987, Darling-Hammond 1989). Anything less than professional accountability nullifies this bargain.

The demise of the Toledo Intern and Intervention Program thus becomes a puzzle which possibly may hold some beneficial insights for future efforts to establish and maintain teacher peer review systems. Viewing this puzzle from a slightly more distant lens, it may also shed some light on the compatibility of teachers’ professionalization with teachers’ unionism.

To assemble the pieces of the puzzle being solved, data collection was focused on the three main participants. The first two, Dal Lawrence, President of the Toledo Federation of Teachers and Bill Lehrer, Assistant Superintendent of Human Relations, Toledo Public Schools, together designed and operated the peer review program from its inception. The third interviewee was Pat Kennedy, a long-time TPS employee as both a teacher and principal, who also served as President of the Toledo School Board prior to, and at the time of, the cancellation of the program. The interviews were conducted in the respective offices of the respondents over a four month period from December 1995 to April 1996, approximately eight months to one year after the termination of the program. In addition to these personal sources of data, documentary evidence from both the TFT and the district’s archives was reviewed for information relating to either the Intern-Intervention Program or the TFT.

The Intern-Intervention Program was specifically designed to improve the professionalism of Toledo teachers. Lawrence, when recalling the beginning of the program describes his motives as follows.

What we cared about was not only better evaluation and better screening of people coming in to the public schools. What we cared about was changing the whole attitude and the whole design of what the teachers were all about. We moved from the old industrial model (of unionism) where we were the hired hands and treated that way to where (we had) some serious responsibilities that are clearly characteristic of classic professions, like medicine and law. (We wanted) to take on those responsibilities, and execute those responsibilities competently and begin to build some pride in a real profession for classroom teachers. That was extremely important in this whole concept. (DL-I-265-275)

The Intern-Intervention Program represented a radical shift from the standard approach to employee evaluation within the public sector at the time. No longer would a teachers’ union defend its dues-paying teachers at the cost of quality teaching. Instead, the TFT position evolved to one more indicative of a professional organization defending quality performance standards over simple job protection. A statement clearly delineating the TFT’s stance is included in the Intern-Intervention Program literature which reads in part,

In the event it is necessary to recommend non-renewal or termination of your contract, and if the review panel confirms the recommendation, the Toledo Federation of Teachers will not process a grievance contesting the non-renewal or termination. (emphasis added, p. vii)

For a union to advocate programmatic non-support for some of its members is truly a dramatic departure from the traditional industrial unionism mentioned previously.

Although implemented in 1981, Lawrence first introduced the topic of peer review in negotiation in 1972 when he initially advocated an internship program for all incoming teachers to the TPS. Unfortunately, Lawrence notes,

For nine years we couldn’t get it accepted because school administrators, they just looked at it as a turf issue. (DL-I-13,14)

During those nine years, the chief opponent was none other than Bill Lehrer, who at the time was president of the administrators’ union, the Toledo Association of Administrative Personnel (TAAP).

After finally being implemented, the program survived several challenges. Toledo, being primarily an industrial town, was heavily affected by the economic recessions of the early 80’s and early 90’s. Consequently, the $ 500,000 necessary to operate the program was a prime budgetary target during lean times. The TFT also faced legal challenges for lack of representation from dues-paying members who faced dismissal after being part of either the internship or intervention. To date however, no legal action taken against the TFT regarding the Intern-Intervention program has been successful.

Surprisingly, peer evaluation has caused little internal distress within the TFT. In fact, Lawrence indicates that "for 8 or 9 years we surveyed our members and that 4 to 1 (margin in favor of the program) kept growing. It kept getting more and more support. Then after we set up the program and started firing teachers, it got up to 11 to 1. It was amazing!!!" (DL-II-789-791). After the initial terminations occurred, support among TFT members continued to grow. As indicated below, the teachers surveyed indicated that evaluation of teachers was the responsibility of the teachers, themselves.

Lawrence -- We asked really tough questions on (the survey) like, "If you have an experienced teacher in trouble and they need to be removed from the profession, whose responsibility is it? Is it management’s responsibility or is it the union’s responsibility?" Eleven to one, (the teachers) said it’s the union’s responsibility. It’s just amazing. (DL-II-802-806)

Member support for the program continues to the present as was recently measured by the TFT in a survey of members prior to their 1996 contract negotiations. In the compiled results, the TFT reports that 78 % of the respondents indicated that the Intern program "was the best thing we have done" (TFT, 1995, p. 4). Even more surprising, is the fact that most of the tenured teachers recommended for intervention have been recommended by fellow teachers.

Lehrer -- Two-thirds of the recommendations have come form other teachers in the school. ...What happens is that the teachers in the building get upset that the kids come to them the following year and they don’t know anything, and maybe they see that the teacher’s been absent a lot. The teachers are in an attempt, policing their own ranks. (BL-II-110-122)

The Toledo Intern and Intervention Program survived during a time in which public schools were buffeted by successive waves of reform, a significant proportion of which perished without a trace. The commitment necessary to continue such a program, considering the challenges it had to face, was significant. Why then did the creator of the Intern program terminate it after it had become apparentely institutionalized in the policy environment of the Toledo Public Schools?

Initial reports in Education Week (5/3/95 and 5/31/95) regarding the end of peer review in Toledo appeared to be rather superficial. According to Ann Bradley, an Education Week reporter, the TFT

canceled its highly regarded peer-review program in a dispute with the school board over extra pay for principals. The school board voted last week (4/25/95) to pay elementary principals an extra $515 for administrating a new state proficiency test for 4th graders. Supporters argued that principals should receive extra pay for extra work as teachers have done. When the board voted in favor of the payments, the union made good on weeks of threats to cancel the peer-review program at the end of the school year. (p. 3)

Knowing the uniqueness of Toledo’s peer review program and the effort necessary for its success, the account given by Bradley seemed to be missing a significant piece of the story. It did not appear logical for Lawrence to end the program which he referred to as his "legacy" over a small stipend being paid to elementary principals (Bradley, 1995, p. 3). The manner in which Bradley portrayed Lawrence’s actions seemed analogous to a petulant child taking his ball and going home. There had to be more to his actions than just retaliation. Because he canceled the program, this analysis is primarily focused on the perspective of Dal Lawrence. The perspectives of both Bill Lehrer and Pat Kennedy will be compared to that of Lawrence

When asked about his termination of the program, Lawrence adamantly states that his actions were not singular in time or focus, but the culmination of years of adversarial relationships. In his words, Lawrence tells the story as follows.

There’s a five-yr. history that goes back to 1990 when our school board member, Harry Kessler was a private citizen and headed up a Chamber of Commerce committee to investigate the schools. He turned in a report in which he concluded that management had to retake rights -- that the district had given away their responsibilities to the unions. It was really a vicious kind of thing. It also said, quite inaccurately, that the TFT controlled the hiring of teachers and that’s why the district doesn’t have more minority teachers. (DL-I-60-66)

They stirred up a lot of powerful black people in this town. It took us a year and a half, repeating ... what the facts were before that was finally having some effect within the black community. It did not cause a problem with our membership, among our black teachers, because they knew what the story was. They did not have a problem with it. There were problems with black people in the community who really fell for that. (DL-I-71-76)

(Kessler) had four Democrats on the school board and he just dominated the school board when he got on it. For whatever reason he had, he was bound and determined (to go) after this union, as well as a couple of the other unions. He was going after me personally. So it got to be more and more contentious, but mostly he was using the issue that black teachers were being fired unfairly in the program. (DL-II-196-201) A tremendous amount of animosity (was generated) between this union, myself and other officials in the unions and people outside the district. Mr. Kessler ... had been a popular (Democratic) mayor in this town. (DL-I-81-86)

During that five-year period of time, the management union (TAAP) had put together a plan on its own for reforming the district. Because of the "reforming" of the district, part of it ... was to get administrators involved in evaluation again. The president of the middle management union was working with the business community and was working with Kessler. When I say "business community," there are maybe a half dozen, ... business people who are spear-heading this. ... I think that without a doubt right now, there are some people in the Chamber of Commerce that would just like to see the whole damn thing disappear. (DL-I-415-423)

Lawrence’s story thus far brings the events up to the beginning of the 1994-95 school year during which the controversy involving extra pay to the elementary principals arose.

In the fall of 1994, the Toledo Chamber of Commerce indicated that they wanted to get the district involved in "some kind of collaborative training process." According to Lawrence, "they saw that things were really beginning to spin completely out of control" (DL-I-543-545).

Lawrence -- The union officials, the management officials, and the middle management officials and probably five different people from the Labor Management Center put on this (cooperative) training. It was pretty good. ...Well, this whole thing blew up right at the end of the training session. Within two or three weeks, this whole thing comes out. I mean not only have they screwed us back in the economic reopener and now we’re in this training thing and all of a sudden ... they signed this lousy deal (1/12/95). ... it was the most God-awful approach that you could possibly imagine. ... you talk about a mistake and a dumb move. ...I mean it’s so bad, I don’t know whether to laugh or cry. It’s that bad. There’s no explanation for it. I mean it’s just stupidity. (DL-I-557-573)

It became public knowledge in ...early January. Someone in management deep-throated the document that was signed to grant the bonus.... We found out about it within a couple of days after (it was signed). (DL-I-131-134)

That’s actually a secret agreement that was entered into by... Lehrer and McClellan (TAAP President). That was never supposed to be made public. The circles on there represent, this is how bad it is, they represent negotiations that should have taken place in our bargaining unit under state law, but did not and took place in a different bargaining unit. ...So it wasn’t just $515. It was (that) they really screwed us. (DL-I-139-151)

Kelly -- Six weeks later you informed the board that you would end the peer review program. What happened in those six weeks?

Lawrence -- (Lehrer) came over here to the office. He called and said he had an idea of how we could resolve the problem. ... (Lehrer) suggested that $415 be paid to one teacher at each school and we were working on it. When he left here we thought we had the deal put together. But it got axed by the superintendent (Chrystal Ellis). It was not until two or three weeks ago that Ellis told us why. He had been ordered to.

Kelly -- So that came directly from ... the Board?

Lawrence -- That’s right. See Kennedy (Board President) is a former member of TAAP. She was an elementary school principal.... And McClellan, to put the finish on the story, so this is not speculation, wanted the program. ... Ellis was a trustee of TAAP before he became superintendent. There’s your connection, the three of them. Plus Kessler, he is on the Library Board in town and McClellan negotiates for the employees of the library. They are very close. ...So there’s the connection. There, the whole riddle is undone for you (DL-I-178-222)

During a follow-up interview, three months later, Lawrence was questioned further about why he used the program for leverage against the district, instead of filing an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge with the State Employees’ Relations Board (SERB) or following some other avenue of recourse. In response, Lawrence once again referred to the history of relations between the TFT and other parties in the TPS citing three major reasons. First and foremost, Lawrence characterizes the precipitous agreement as "the last straw in a ...history of deteriorating relationships." The second and third reasons identified by Lawrence highlight the personal nature of his interpretation of the events as well as his sense of betrayal. Lawrence specifically points out that it was Lehrer, the administrator "that the program relied on, ...who put his name on the (agreement regarding the $515)." Finally, Lawrence recounts the timing of the agreement referencing the labor relations training occurring at the same time, saying

In December we had been off for two days going through a training program. McClellan and myself had been paired together. We had actually started to restore some communication. The whole training was around being open and honest and that’s the only way you can restore trust in the district. (The agreement) was done at the time that training program was going on, or was done after that training program. ...Within that context, it was simply unspeakable. It was an outrageous thing to do. (DL-II-516-523)

 

Unlike Lawrence, Assistant Superintendent Lehrer describes the demise of the program in a more linear fashion, devoid of all the interrelationships highlighted by his TFT counterpart. Instead, he emphasizes the bureaucratic actions supporting the final decision to approve the agreement.

Lehrer -- We had to start the proficiency tests in elementary school. As a result of starting proficiency testing in the elementary schools, the president of the administrators’ union Dave McClellan ...was working with Jerry Burnacki (Deputy Supt.) on the implementation and the role of the principal. There was a series of things that he wanted, inservice activities, payment for principals. ...Near the end of the discussions, I became involved because it appeared that there was going to be an agreement that was going to need to be signed. Since I am in charge of human resources, or personnel, it became necessary for me to sign any document that was going to be signed between the union and the board.

Part of that agreement that was worked out was ... a stipend of $515. Now that did not seem unreasonable to us because in the administrators’ contract already is the provision to pay junior high testing coordinators and high school testing coordinators. These are usually counselors. If the counselor refuses, then the principal can assume the role of testing coordinator and is eligible for the stipend which is approximately $1130. So because that was already in the contract, Jerry and I discussed this whole thing with the Superintendent and felt ... that it would be appropriate to pay the elementary principals that amount.

So then we agreed to go ahead and pay the $515. As a result of us paying the $515, Dal Lawrence said if the board executes that contract and approves that at a board meeting, ... that he would pull the plug on the intern program. Now to this day, I don’t know why he used the intern program as the hostage. ...I think that he felt everyone wanted that program so badly, ... that they would never take the chance to risk getting rid of that program by approving the $515.

Well, what happened was, the board felt that... it would be appropriate to pay elementary administrators. The board went ahead and approved it. At the conclusion of the board vote, that evening, (Lawrence) presented his letter that with the effective 94-95 school year, the intern-intervention program would no longer be in existence. There is a provision in the contract that either side can pull the plug at any time on that program, but he chose to do it over that particular issue. (BL-I-76-128)

 

Pat Kennedy, School Board President at the time of the cancellation, presents a different account of the proceedings. In Kennedy’s story, she defends the actions of the board and portrays Lawrence’s actions as spiteful.

Kennedy -- It was a reaction, if you like, on the part of the Federation of Teachers to a decision that we had made, ... setting aside a separate contract for administrators who worked on the ... proficiency test. For some time, when the ninth grade proficiency test was the only one we had, we had administrators who were getting extra pay for just the handling, the unpacking, packaging, distributing, making sure of the secrecy of all of those kinds of things.

Where you have one administrator, one principal does everything. ... Then you add the handling and distribution and secrecy kind of thing, you add that onto the burden of the elementary principal and it becomes the kind of thing where you say "Wait a minute here! Where is the equity in what’s going on here?" So the administration felt that some kind of (stipend was justified).

It doesn’t help the situation, it doesn’t give you another pair of hands, in other words. But at least it does say that we recognize that this is an extra burden outside your regular routine and your regular responsibilities and we will give you some kind of stipend. ...when it came before us, I said, why are we doing this? ... the rationale for it was the contracts that had been awarded to (TFT) members who had an extra burden put upon them when we went into the Medicaid kind of thing. ... Because of their added burden,... it seemed logical to me that there would be also the extra stipend for the elementary principals who were taking care of the proficiency test. So that was the logic behind it.

It seems to me his statement, ... pulling the intern program, came as a real shock to us. We had no way of knowing. At least I did not. I don’t think anybody else did either. I don’t think any of the board members did either. Because nobody had mentioned it to me at all, just prior to that. So all of a sudden, in a public meeting, he just said in that event, we will no longer have the intern program.

...we were all very surprised. We were surprised that that would even be part, it didn’t even seem related... The intern program was in no way connected with this $515 in any way, shape, or form. It just seemed to be, "I’m mad at what you’re doing. I’ll do something to get even." Because the two things weren’t tied together in any way. (PK-I-8-68)

Thus, the three principle participants present three different versions of this series of events. Dal Lawrence, as a union leader, tells a very long story focused primarily on relationships among the power brokers of the Toledo Public Schools. Bill Lehrer, as a district bureaucrat, focuses primarily on the mechanisms of policy formulation maintaining programmatic continuity. Pat Kennedy, as a school board president, looks upon these actions in a more personal manner focusing instead on the aspect of personal revenge. Each of the respondents interpreted the cancellation of the program from their own unique perspectives.

The events occurring in Toledo can best be interpreted through the application of the ecology of games metaphor developed by Long (1958). Originally applied to the local social structure of a municipality, Long focused on macroanalysis of municipal dynamics. The ecology of games metaphor was later modified by Firestone (1989) for macroanalysis of the dynamics involved in the formation and implementation of educational policies. Rather than focusing on multiple games which provide an over-all coordination to a social group, Firestone highlights the various levels of games involved as policies evolve from the desks of policymakers, through legislatures, to implementation with clients. While neither Long’s nor Firestone’s conception of the ecology of games fits perfectly with the demise of the Toledo Plan, each offers interesting tools with which to gain insight.

To answer the fundamental question "Why was a successful program canceled?" will require a refocusing within the ecology of games to perform not a macroanalysis of a system, but a microanalysis of a single player, Lawrence. By isolating a single player from the milieu of games being played, it becomes possible to distinguish the individual games in which he participates. These games, their rules, and the interrelationships between them constitute the "webs of significance" to which Geertz (1973) alludes. Therefore, by identifying the webs which Lawrence has spun, access may be gained into his unique perspective on the situation in Toledo and an explanation of his actions may hypothesized.

Lawrence’s lengthy history behind his decision to terminate the program illuminates for the reader the interconnectedness of several games within one player. Several times throughout our interviews, Lawrence referred to the precipitous agreement as "the last straw," unlike both Lehrer and Kennedy who see it more as the only straw. Analysis of the transcripts and the Toledo press indicates that Lawrence was a player in no fewer than 7 games. In his position at the time, Lawrence participated in

1. Traditional Union-Management Relations, in the day-to-day operations of the TPS.
2. National Teacher Unionism as a vice-president of the American Federation of Teachers.
3. Teacher Professionalization, through the collaborative efforts of the Intern-Intervention Program.
4. Local Politics, by endorsing and fiscally supporting local candidates, and publishing weekly column in the Toledo Blade.
5. Interunion Politics, indicated in struggles with TAAP.
6. Intraunion Politics, managing the TFT, facing electoral challenges.
7. Educational Reform, through supporting or opposing efforts in TPS and through Blade column.

Because of natural limitations, all of these games competed for Lawrence’s intellectual and temporal resources. Some games’ demands were continuous and occured simultaneously, while others were more episodic in nature. Complicating matters further is the fact that each game "is a structured competition with its own rules, its own winners and losers, and sometimes its own audience that keeps score..." (Firestone, p. 18). Therefore, as one shifts from game to game, one must apply distinct, and sometimes conflicting, rules in the appropriate manner while playing each. Consequently, in order to achieve anything, Lawrence was forced to allocate his limited resources in some fashion.

To successfully facilitate resource allocation and to manage participation in a number of games, individuals must base their occupational sense of self primarily in one game. Consequently, "their sense of major achievement is through (that) one" (Long, p. 253). For Lawrence, this central base was as the leader of an urban teachers’ union participating in the multiple facets of politics in urban public education. He served continuously as TFT President since 1967. Over much of the three decades of his presidency, Lawrence faced challenges and obstacles to successful union leadership. During the 70’s, the TPS endured two "terrible" strikes occurring in 1970 and 1978, which according to Kennedy "are not over yet" (PK-I-121). During the 80’s, the entire city of Toledo suffered a serious economic downturn during which the city "fell apart" (PK-I-128). Because of the resulting fiscal constraints, the TFT had difficulty negotiating competitive salaries. Lehrer summarizes it well, saying

... whenever you don’t have money to pay teachers or give raises, then you have a tendency to give away language. That’s what historically the district has done ... given away language because the financial resources haven’t been there to give appropriate raises. Our teachers are paid well below other cities in Ohio. We’re certainly not proud of that, but we have not had the financial resources to give them. (BL-I-247-253)

Unable to win monetary concessions for his members, Lawrence did firmly establish "the right to appoint teachers to serve on all committees related to curriculum, testing, and staff development and to have department chairs and building-level representatives elected rather than appointed" (Gallagher, Lanier, and Kerchner, 1993, p. 161).

The elevated prominence of TFT members within the governance structure of the district gained during the 1980s attracted criticism for Lawrence from both within the TPS as well as from the general press which continues to the present. Kennedy illuminates this point well, saying

Dal Lawrence runs the school district. That’s the perception that’s out there. (It is held by) the business community, the Blade newspaper. That’s a common perception that’s there. When you have that kind of thing, that produces want-to-be’s. I want to be as big as .... So I want my union to be this or that or the other thing. (PK-I-101-109)

A few leaders in the Toledo business community continued their criticism of Lawrence and the TFT for the previous six years. As mentioned earlier, Harry Kessler, former Mayor of Toledo, as a member of the Chamber of Commerce issued "The Kessler Report" which indicated that the management of the district had to retake rights back which had been negotiated away to the TFT. The issuance of this report led to the establishment of a standing committee of the Chamber of Commerce being formed which contracted a Chicago-legal firm, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, to investigate all collective bargaining in the Toledo Public Schools. This report was released in September of 1995 and concluded the same as did Kessler’s committee.

Following his work for the Chamber of Commerce, Kessler was elected to a seat on the school board from which he continued his criticism of the TFT. Lehrer confirms Lawrence’s portrayal of Kessler, labeling him as "anti-TFT" (BL-I-259). The long adversarial history between Lawrence and Kessler is considered so significant that Kennedy attributes the ending of the program to it, saying

Harry, he wanted things done and he didn’t want Dal to interfere. He saw things that people wanted to do that they couldn’t do because of union rules and he just bristled. Of course, when somebody bristles at Dal, he bristles back, and it escalated. ...That probably has as much to do with why Dal did what he did. I think he was very angry. He was very angry with Harry. (PK-I-220-225)

Since the recent retirement of Kessler, the relationship between the school board and the TFT have "improved significantly" (DL-II-217).

Unfortunately, relations between the TFT and TAAP continue to be as contentious as ever. As noted earlier, although administrators initially opposed the peer review program, most administrators supported it after it proved beneficial. However, support for the program did not translate into support for the TFT. Because of the zero-sum nature of public school finance, any gain by one bargaining unit can be seen as a loss by another. Consequently, the TFT and TAAP are in a direct fiscal competition which dates back to 1971 when a district report was issued declaring that the ratio system of salary determination was inherently unfair to teachers (DL-II-344-358).

More recently, TAAP has filed unfair labor practice (ULP) charges against the TFT as well as the district. When Lawrence threatened to end the program over the agreement between TAAP and the district, TAAP charged that the TFT "interfered in their right to negotiate those things with the board and that (the TFT) tried to intimidate people into backing away from their agreement" (DL-II-380,381). This charge was not resolved at the time of writing. TAAP filed a second ULP charge against the district when the program was terminated and the principals were forced to resume evaluation of first-year teachers (BL-II-212-216). TAAP’s argument that the conditions of evaluation had to be negotiated was rejected by the State Employees’ Relations Board because evaluation was already in the job description of an administrator.

On a more personal level, the president of TAAP, David McClellan, a former student of Lawrence, is the "want-to-be" to which Kennedy referred. Of their relationship, she says

Dave and Dal have an interesting history... Dave was one of Dal’s students. And I’m sure they locked horns then. Although I think they’re more alike in a lot of ways than different. I’ve known both of them for thirty years. (PK-I-243-247)

Lawrence’s characterization of McClellan highlights the "want-to-be" aspect of their relationship saying,

McClellan ... wanted the program. He wants the national publicity, okay? He can put his principals in that room in McKinley school and do exactly what we were doing. He would get all of these headlines. He wants that publicity. He wants that national attention. He’s dying for it! He tells me, "I wish I could get in on the ground floor of some reform." (DL-I-206-211)

It thus becomes evident that Lawrence was challenged on several fronts, often simultaneously throughout much of his career as TFT President. Although the Intern-Intervention Program was a constant factor in the district for fourteen years, because of its wide acceptance, it did not demand much from Lawrence when compared to factors requiring his energy.

As stated earlier, because of natural limitations, Lawrence must necessarily divide his attention and resources among the various games in which he participates. Because of the plethora of challenges he has faced, the primary demand for his resources have come from the traditional games one would expect any labor leader to play. In an unending struggle for power and resources with the school board and TAAP, and with McClellan and Kessler on a more personal level, Lawrence became an embattled leader.

As Firestone highlights, within Lawrence’s ecology of games, the Intern-Intervention Program was forced to compete for attention with "a variety of contextual factors" (p. 21). Being primarily a union leader trying to protect and advance his members’ interests, the program was not a foremost concern but was treated as a bargaining chip. By design, the program involved only a small fraction of the teachers employed at any one time, only first-year novices and veterans facing termination. Lawrence explains this characteristic of the program saying that the TFT "wanted to have a shared governance arrangement" (DL-I-462,463). He also did not want "to be accused of taking over all of the evaluations in the district" (DL-I-463,464). Furthermore, if the TFT thought it the professional responsibility of teachers to engage in peer review, the continuation of administrative evaluation of the majority of the Toledo teachers would have been a target of negotiations. It was not, however. In fact, Lawrence resisted the administrators’ requests for the minimal expansion to include the second year of internship. While this attitude may have been prudent during the initial stages of implementation, over several years it actually inhibited expansion of the program and further teacher professionalization.

A second possible object for negotiation is the provision within the TPS-TFT contract that allows for either side to end the program for any reason. If peer review was internalized as a professional right of the teachers, the TFT would have treated it in the same manner as any other right of the teachers. Protections for the program from capricious cancellation by the administration would be protected as strenuously as would working conditions such as teacher preparation time, seniority, and teacher workload.

Although Lawrence believes that teachers can evaluate in a more professional manner than administrators, his actions and those of the TFT, stopped short of operationalizing the idea that it is the responsibility or professional duty of teachers to evaluate each other. If peer review were truly the professional duty of the union to maintain and protect for its members, the program would not have been used as a bargaining chip. It would have been defended strenuously against any challenges as any right of the workers is defended by their union.

It is easy to place responsibility for the lack of progress upon the shoulders of Lawrence as President of the TFT. One must be careful to avoid this seemingly straightforward conclusion, however. Once again, we must be mindful of the overall ecology within which Lawrence, specifically, and teachers’ unions more generally, have traditionally operated. Because of historical factors beyond the control of any current teacher or union leader, teacher unionism operates within the conceptual confines of industrial unionism. Therefore, Lawrence’s range of practical options for the further professionalization of teachers within the industrial city of Toledo were constrained by rules of a game which he could not substantially change.

You can’t professionalize teaching unless the teachers do it. They have to do it, because part of it is up here -- part of it is an attitude.

Dal Lawrence (DL-I-331,332)

I agree with Lawrence that the only avenue for teacher professionalization is for teachers to do it themselves. In the United States, the only venue through which to address a vast majority of the teachers is through their unions. Therefore, the most efficient way to advocate teacher professionalization is through union action. As we shift our focus from the actions of an individual man or local union to the larger institution of teacher unionism, the "4-I" framework of Weiss (1995) offers great utility.

At the individual level, Weiss notes that "people bring different interests, different ideologies and different information to the decisionmaking task. The positions that individuals take on an issue are the result of the interaction among these three elements" (p. 574). At the organizational levels of unions and other organizations involved in education, a fourth "I" is involved, "the institutional arena" which influences decisionmaking in two ways.

First, the institutional environment shapes the way in which participants interpret their own interests, ideologies, and information. ...Second, organizational arrangements affect the decision process itself, such as who is empowered to make decisions. (Weiss, p. 574)

The manner in which Weiss describes the institutional arena above is remarkably similar to the manner in which both Long and Firestone discuss the limitations imposed by the rules and norms of the various games. As with the games in which individuals play, the institutional arena is shaped to a large extent by its history.

Unfortunately, the institution of teacher unionism has historically acted in accord with the tenets of industrial unionism. One of the most sacred of these tenets is member solidarity. Therefore, any program which may challenge the solidarity of a union, such as peer evaluation, is immediately suspect to union leaders. As it is currently is organized, the 2.2 million member National Education Association (NEA) officially refuses to recognize any qualitative differentiation among its members. Peer evaluation is thus a direct challenge to the norms of the union which represents over 70 % of the country’s unionized public school teachers. Consequently, the institutional arena in which the professionalization game is to be played is unlevel to the disadvantage of those who advocate the expansion of the professional responsibilities of public school teachers.

Until the national teachers’ unions actively support teacher professionalization, which necessarily entails ridding themselves of the yoke of industrial unionism, teachers will continue to be held bureaucratically accountable instead of professionally accountable. Julia Koppich (1993) summarizes the challenges facing teacher professionalization through unionism well writing, "professional unions ... must be willing to assume roles that fly in the face of conventional unionism" (p. 202). She continues,

Teachers must ...be willing to tackle thorny issues of colleague competence and resource allocation. They must struggle to come to terms with the definition of good teaching and with important issues of quality ... (P)rofessional unionism is fundamentally about educational reform. We do not think that it is possible to make much change in schools and schooling without it. (emphasis added, pp. 202, 203)

It is for this reason that future efforts at teacher professionalization need to be focused within teachers’ unions. Public school teachers, as currently unionized, cannot professionalize themselves. To return to the ecology of games metaphor, teachers must change the rules of the union game. If they do not, educational reform and systemic change will take place in spite of them rather than through them. If this happens, teachers will only face further proletarianization under an increasingly unsympathetic educational bureaucracy.

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Darling-Hammond, Linda. (1988) "Policy and Professionalism." in Lieberman, Ann., Ed. Building a Professional Culture in Schools. New York: Teachers College Press. (pp. 55-77)

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Koppich, Julia E. (1993) "Getting Started: A Primer on Professional Unionism." in Kerchner, C. and Koppich, J. A Union of Professionals: Labor Relations and Educational Reform. New York: Teachers College Press. (pp. 194-204)

Long, N. E. (1958) "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games." American Journal of Sociology. 50 (2) (pp. 251-261)

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